But yes, a smart TV programmed to do the same is even more unscrupulous given that it can 'spy' on everything it displays, to presumably include the input of connected devices.
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But yes, a smart TV programmed to do the same is even more unscrupulous given that it can 'spy' on everything it displays, to presumably include the input of connected devices.
I otherwise completely agree with everything else you've said.
link to this set of man pages: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/...
NB: Configure you email clients not to automatically download HTML unless you prefer to let senders know you're actively maintaining your inbox. I love receiving 'if you're still reading please click here, otherwise you'll soon be automatically removed from our ML.' I consider that the real unsubscribe non-button in 2024.
All seriousness though—this pedant appreciates you giving me an English grammar rule to brush up on. My pronoun work has been strictly en el español of late.
In the case of a large-scale, multi-domain authoritative nameservers assignment change, only the DNS provider would be able to facilitate the process programmatically. And at that kind of scale (i.e. hundreds of domains), one would hope verification would not only be obtained through, but require some form of human-to-human contact coupled with thoroughly documented scope.
That's exactly right. That is how this "attack" happens. Bad actor exploits registrant's abandoned yet still authoritative third-party nameservers assignment.
Discussion elsewhere in this thread[1] of how some of that responsibility/risk could be spread/shifted onto the DNS provider.
(I would also never maintain a registration nor a zone file with a web/cloud hosting service.)
The DNS provider absolutely can send a notification to the registrant without having to 'go through' (meanining interact with) the registrar. Even a third-party privacy service merely exists as a notification broker. Any notification sent by the DNS provider would simply pass through onto the registrant directly.
[1] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en/#...
Point being that, short of transfer Auth-Codes[5], a verification link sent to the registrant's email address by the DNS provider is the functional equivalent of nearly the most that a registrar may be required to do in order to contact and/or verify a registrant.
[1] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/ra-agreement-2009-05-2...
[2] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/ra-agreement-2009-05-2...
[3] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/benefits-2013-09-16-en
[4] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registration-data-accu...
[5] https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/auth-2013-05-03-en
This is generally the level of diligence (i.e. emailed verification link) that registrars are held to. DNS providers should be held to the same when the requesting account isn't the same account that created the 'earlier' zone file for a given domain at the very same provider.
Ah, beautiful little displays of an attempt to understand, not merely memorize.
Right—not simply memorizing what's happening around them. Those are fundamentally different activies. That is the gist of the parent comment's point.
They've also acknowledged expressly that rote memorization techniques are "valuable" and "have a place."
It's easy to see how this would've been baked into a human-made algorithm when you consider waveforms. Speaking only to Spotify's algorithm here. And it doesn't really bother me for obvious reasons. But it is creating something of a musical echo chamber for me.
genuinely curious—why would you want this?