125 karma · joined April 5, 2022
do you have any sources for that?
I've only seen this mentioned from research results recently but no real world exploitation reports.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-acoustic-...
my understanding is that the same would apply if you use ykcs11 in the OpenSSH agent instead of using it directly in `ssh`, which would make this a comparison between (OpenSSH agent + YKCS11) vs e.g., ssh-tpm-agent.
from the qualys report you linked:
> Note to the curious readers: for security reasons, and as explained in the "Background" section below, ssh-agent does not actually load such a shared library in its own address space (where private keys are stored), but in a separate, dedicated process, ssh-pkcs11-helper.
additionally, as I understand it, this basically boils down to use-after-free due to unsafe code, which could occur in either agent implementation, even without loading an extra .so, although the presence of .so loading in general certainly does increase the attack surface.
> `ssh-tpm-agent` is not dealing with secret material.
while the agent is certainly not accessing the private key directly, as long as you can access the agent and make it sign whatever you want, this will still be a very valuable vulnerability, with the only downside (compared to non-HSM keys) that you won't have persistent access to the private key, only temporary access for signing.
this can also be partially mitigated by requiring user interaction for every signing operation, but it's also not necessarily something that works for all use cases, such as when connecting to a few hundred destination hosts.
> There is a separation of concerns here though.
when you compare (OpenSSH agent + YKCS11) to ssh-tpm-agent, they're both separated from the main `ssh` process and communicate through the SSH agent API.
PKCS11 allows you to use `ssh -I /path/to/lib.so` directly, which there doesn't seem to be a comparable alternative for in ssh-tpm-agent, so I'll ignore that feature for now.
both variants, whether it's using a PKCS11 provider using a standardized interface, or using a completely custom SSH agent, will need to deal with secret material.
although I'm no expert on the inner workings of SSH, I'd expect there to not be much difference between having the OpenSSH agent interface with ykcs11 (which is also open source and can be reviewed) and using an alternative agent with piv capabilities that was found on github.
ykcs11 allows you to use the native SSH agent (or even no agent at all for individual ssh invocations) with an ssh key on a yubikey using their pkcs11 provider.
https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Guides/SSH_with_PIV_and_PK...
> One person or legal entity may maintain no more than one free Account (if you choose to control a machine account as well, that's fine, but it can only be used for running a machine)
https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/github-terms/github-t...
all CA requirements for validation still need to be fulfilled for issued certificates, as ssl.com, the Quantum CA operator, which exclusively holds the private keys, is a "proper" CA.
this does not affect the trust in the CA infrastructure or ssl.com itself; while this is morally questionable to keep the business relationship, it does not mean the CA is not following the signing requirements.
would you like to no longer receive water or electricity at your home because your utility companies don't like you, despite (being willing to) paying the bills like any other citizen?
you should pass the transaction, as you should be in a neutral position.
edit: to clarify, payment providers/processors nowadays are a core utility function in our society. imo this is not something you can consider a regular private business.
it shouldn't be my decision whether i want to allow the transaction, even if i wouldn't want to allow it. i'm not in a position to perform due legal process to determine whether you're indeed being paid for a hit job.
the provider should be in a neutral position.
just the other day i've used it in a CLI application (which authenticated against web, but without real browser): https://github.com/Yubico/python-fido2
how do you know with 100% certainty/due process that this is indeed the case and it's not just your ML algorithm going crazy?
people can also pay with physical money if they desire to do so.
If you demand lots of information that should be clear right away.
it's not just an unused iCloud settings icon.
it's a persistent red (1) that is always showing up in the settings app or in your dock while settings are open, indicating that something needs your attention.
there used to be no official way to disable this "reminder", though it seems that with Ventura it can finally be dismissed.
there's a json file on GitHub referencing the download of the source archive, stored on pypi infra.
in the tgz you can download from pypi you can find python code containing the secret.
https://github.com/orf/pypi-data/blob/main/release_data/i/h/...
you can also use GHE with unmanaged accounts that are still connected via SSO for approving access.
using enterprise managed accounts and unmanaged accounts on the same system can be quite annoying because you'll need to use different browser contexts (container tabs, separate browsers, etc.) and also different hostnames for ssh cloning to use different ssh keys.
https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/ide...
https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/ide...
your standard user agent (e.g. browser) will not send different values in SNI and HTTP Host header.
this is a deliberate action by the user agent to obscure the actual traffic destination.
this can of course be used both for censorship circumvention but also misleading corporate traffic inspection when TLS is not broken, though it's debatable whether that should work in the first place.