583 karma · joined March 16, 2015
While it may be true for some companies, I've never seen a company do this.
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They're also the only company who has been strong enough to stick up for their customers and publicly decline the US government assistance or backdoors into their products.
That's not necessarily true. The AWS forums are pretty active, and I was actually able to get some help/feedback from engineers themselves including promises to look at improvements. This is also a good example of how limiting API Gateway is - https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?threadID=228067
Q: What is Mosh's security track record so far? Mosh 1.0 was released in March 2012. As of the release of Mosh 1.2.5 in July 2015, as far as the developers are aware:
In the last three years, no security vulnerabilities of any kind (major or minor) have been reported in Mosh. No major security vulnerabilities have ever been reported in Mosh. We define major security vulnerabilities to include privilege escalation, remote code execution, denial-of-service by a third party, etc. Two denial-of-service issues were discovered and fixed in releases in 2012. One issue allowed a mosh-server to cause the mosh-client to spend excess CPU (CVE-2012-2385, fixed in Mosh 1.2.1, released May 2012). Another issue allowed the server host to cause the mosh-client to send UDP datagrams to an incorrect address, foiling its attempt to connect (fixed in Mosh 1.2.2, released July 2012).
Q: How does Mosh's security compare with SSH's?
We think that Mosh's conservative design means that its attack surface compares favorably with more-complicated systems like OpenSSL and OpenSSH. Mosh's track record has so far borne this out. Ultimately, however, only time will tell when the first serious security vulnerability is discovered in Mosh—either because it was there all along or because it was added inadvertently in development. OpenSSH and OpenSSL have had more vulnerabilities, but they have also been released longer and are more prevalent.
In one concrete respect, the Mosh protocol is more secure than SSH's: SSH relies on unauthenticated TCP to carry the contents of the secure stream. That means that an attacker can end an SSH connection with a single phony "RST" segment. By contrast, Mosh applies its security at a different layer (authenticating every datagram), so an attacker cannot end a Mosh session unless the attacker can continuously prevent packets from reaching the other side. A transient attacker can cause only a transient user-visible outage; once the attacker goes away, Mosh will resume the session.
However, in typical usage, Mosh relies on SSH to exchange keys at the beginning of a session, so Mosh will inherit the weaknesses of SSH—at least insofar as they affect the brief SSH session that is used to set up a long-running Mosh session.