244 karma · joined September 29, 2018
There definitely was no motivation to murder him, I'm convinced of it. Armed conflict inherently breeds a general cynicism, and lack of clear goals and guidance from leadership only exacerbates that. We all said out loud, "this is fucking bullshit," more than once when we would give full-throated efforts only to be frustrated by sideways shit like innocents or friends being maimed/killed, no clear mission or point to the killing and violence in general, a commander who seemed more eager to give a teary-eyed killed in action speech over a dead Ranger than to actually lay the hammer on insurgents, etc. All that to say that Tillman's misgivings about the war were especially normal. The real conspiracy was in the outright lying done about the whole thing, and in institutional leaderships' efforts to cover everything up.
Tillman was killed because of miscoordination/incompetence. The miscoordination at the macro level was from Hodne as I mentioned earlier, in his attempted orchestration of troop movement that introduced too much chaos. The incompetence came from a few variables of the people on the ground that I won't get too much into, except to say that it wasn't out of nefarious intent but instead from confusion and bad training. The SAW gunner who pumped rounds into Tillman had a reputation after he left of a bumbling, incompetent rock farmer. Note that I never met him personally, it was just his reputation around the company.
His death wasn't taboo internally. His named was invoked pretty regularly when it came to target selection and deciding if you had enough awareness of the assault forces' positions to pull the trigger into a room or general area; you never wanted to accidentally kill your buddy. A new Ranger would be liable to get smoked[1] until fluid leaked out of his ears because he "could kill another Ranger like Tillman, you fucking moron." Externally, we were ordered to divert all questions/comments about Tillman to the SOCOM Public Affairs Office.
[1]: "Getting smoked" in the Army (military?) is a euphemism for punishment through strenuous exercise/tasks, usually accompanied with humiliation and general hazing
I happened to join the same Ranger Battalion Tillman was in after he was killed. The ground force commander at the time of Tillman's death (and perhaps whose decisions mostly attributed to Tillman's death), Major Hodne, later came back to 2nd Ranger Battalion as its commander when I was still active. He won no respect from any of us enlisted guys. Last I heard, he was a general in charge of general infantry training in Fort Benning. Fort Benning is the home of the infantry, where most basic and advanced infantry courses for the US Army are held. The irony is thick.
Not writing this to say you're necessarily wrong. The two major GWOT wars in Iraq/Afghanistan were bullshit, and Tillman along with thousands of others were killed for nothing worthwhile. There's just more nuance to the whole debacle that I think are worth pointing out. Or maybe I'm just insecure at how pointless all that shit was and I'm writing this to validate my/others' actions, hard to tell.
This doesn't happen in small or mid companies, either. Or if it does happen, it happens begrudgingly. SWE's have too much to do.
[1]: https://martinfowler.com/articles/data-monolith-to-mesh.html
[2]: https://martinfowler.com/articles/data-monolith-to-mesh.html...
Bad: dumb service names, API’s are not at all easy to learn and much of the documentation is subpar (WorkDocs is the latest pain), feeling some unease with all the downed services this year
edit: thanks for the responses. My question was not on PTO accrual or the optics around it, but on the practice of just scheduling time off and taking it versus asking for permission. Today I learned I am either very lucky to be working at the places I have been, or maybe my bosses have been too timid to tell me no
An observation not lost to the ground forces. I was in the US infantry 10+ years ago. We were well trained and lethal. We had an overwhelming technological targeting advantage. We had the support of a sizeable amount of the local population that we generally stayed a few steps ahead of the lower and mid tier rungs of whatever insurgency we were fighting (Al Qaeda in Iraq [ISIS predecessor], the Taliban, whatever-local-Afghan-village-thugs-in-later-deployments). We understood the war wasn't purely militaristic in "kill counts" or territory sieged, and the lessons of irregular warfare (hearts and minds) were beaten in to us.
The biggest issue, at least for us that actually had to kill and be shot at, was that the progressively restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) defanged us, both from lethal and willpower standpoints. There were so many nested bullet points and gotchas and just a wide breadth of rules that no person that wasn't a lawyer could keep up with it. Arbitrary things like "if you are in a gunfight with insurgents and they fall back into a cave, no matter who the insurgent is or how many casualties they were lucky to have inflicted on your forces, you absolutely cannot roll grenades into the cave." Very specific, very arbitrary, very confusing. Furthermore, it was beat into us that the full weight of the law was to fall on our heads if we screwed these things up. Which makes sense from a humanitarian point of view, but that lingering legal guillotine built in a sizeable amount of self-doubt and apprehension in us where we weren't ever sure when or if we were allowed to be lethal.
I imagine a set of ROE was drafted, and enough bureaucrats scribbled in "small edits" that the overarching sense of direction was lost in the sea of Great Ideas by Smart People and nobody with both the political clout and common sense was able to get to these revisions before they were inflicted on us on the ground. Not dissimilar to scope creep you see in software, except parties involved couldn't just vote with their feet and leave. That, and those functioning as the wars' PM's weren't as much concerned with delivering results as they perhaps were with empire building and political posturing. Just a god damn mess
Don't they already have this essentially locked in?
https://aws.amazon.com/govcloud-us/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DEc6kVAXSs8&feature=youtu.be...
Second link has the CIO of the CIA talking about it
There are some forward-moving, solid "soft skill" analysts/data scientists that can make this happen. But by and large they shouldn't all be held to this standard. Maybe my standards/expectations have been soured too much and I'm too pessimistic, but as a whole they're just not cut out for this kind of stuff. Which is fine - being a "doer" is easy to begin with, and over time the more that you're able to automate as a data engineer, the more trivially easy ETL/everything else becomes.
> tells me I'm being deceptive and obviously support jihadi terrorism. This as I'm getting ready to leave on my 12th deployment.