814 karma · joined December 24, 2017
As I recall X11 doesn't really support that at all so there was no way to implement that on Linux. Doing it on mouse up seems sensible though. I couldn't find my bug report but I bet it was met with "I like it broken".
I believe there is (or once was) also an Inkscape plugin somewhere but I never tried it.
As for how I reverse engineered it, I just used a USB sniffer and wireshark. I don't think there's a big risk of bricking these devices - I don't think they even have non-volatile storage, so worst case you turn it off and on again.
I would like to reverse engineer my solar power inverter too, but that is definitely brickable (the first one they shipped me came pre-bricked!) and is a lot more expensive so I've had to resist. :/
Really it should probably be part of SystemD, but I know that would anger the anti-SystemD zealots.
V8 is actually a nice case for CHERI since you can easily sandbox the JIT'd code. If you were to just rewrite V8 in Rust then you wouldn't get that benefit (you can't run the borrow checker on generated assembly). I assume they have some other sandboxing methods instead though.
But in general if you think about things like V8, that's used on high performance application class consumer CPUs. It's going to be at least 10 years before anyone has one of those with CHERI (unless ARM changes its mind about Morello). I would not bet against V8 being ported to Rust before that.
As I said I think CHERI is great technology and I hope it does succeed, but it does seem like the business case for it is not as strong as it was just a few years ago.
There are two counter-arguments:
1. There's a lot of C/C++ code still out there. You can't rewrite it all. I'm not totally convinced by that though because, a) do you need to? Google has shown that just writing new code in Rust is very effective, and b) AI is actually pretty decent at porting from C/C++ to Rust so maybe you can?
2. CHERI also allows really strong and fine grained compartmentalisation. This is absolutely fantastic for robustness, supply chain security and so on. If you want the absolute 100% most secure code possible, then Rust + CHERI with compartmentalisation is basically the best thing you can do. (Though Rust compartmentalisation is still not actually ready yet; it's in progress though.) That's really great but I'm not sure that level of security is needed by most projects, and also I think you can get pretty good compartmentalisation (though definitely not CHERI level) by doing something like what Xous does (basically isolation with processes/virtual memory, combined with the ability to call functions in other processes; IIRC Hubris OS does something similar).
CHERI is clever tech though and it would definitely be a boon for RISC-V if it succeeds.
That's not the case at all. The spec is developed in the open: https://riscv.github.io/riscv-cheri/
If you want to run CHERI code, it's true that silicon isn't easily available, but that's simply because it takes time. Various companies are working on it (Codasip, SCI, Secqai, lowRISC, etc.).
But you don't need silicon to run CHERI code. There are various emulators available that support it. There's QEMU: https://github.com/CHERI-Alliance/qemu There's also the RISC-V Sail model, this is the latest CHERI branch: https://github.com/CHERI-Alliance/sail-riscv (unfortunately it is a bit behind upstream master, and also a bit behind the latest CHERI spec which is still evolving).
There are also a few open source chips available that implement CHERI which you can run in Verilator or an FPGA. For example cheriot-ibex https://github.com/microsoft/cheriot-ibex . This is actually a variant of CHERI for microcontrollers called CHERIoT. Long story but the plan is to merge CHERIoT back into CHERI so it is just a "profile" of CHERI.
https://blog.reds.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/questa13.png
Or something like Visual Studio.
Obviously most GUIs are not nearly that complex so immediate mode can get you quite far. Its biggest limitation is that it makes it hard to do some layouts. Your GUI layout becomes dictated by your data dependencies which is quite awkward.
But it's definitely more awkward and has costs throughout the CPU.
I would be really surprised if the lower code density is worse than the improvement due to everything being nicely aligned. Especially because Qualcomm had actual data that it isn't (if you add new instructions with the extra coding space you free up).
Yes that's precisely the point of excluding it from the RVA profiles. It would mean that Linux distros don't compile code with C enabled, so chips are free to not support C and therefore can achieve higher performance (probably). And it opens 3/4 of the instruction encoding space for use by other things.
> Also the excuse given by Qualcomm - that it would make all instructions fixed length and so much easier to decode - is just wrong. RISC-V supports variable length instructions, even much longer than 32 bits, and you've just got to deal with it.
It's not wrong. RISC-V defines a mechanism by which 48/64 bit instructions might be used, but currently none are actually defined. All existing instructions are 16 or 32 bits. Without C all instructions are 32 bits. You don't have to deal with 48 bit instructions because there aren't any.
It's possible that they will add some in future, but I'm doubtful of that because a) it would be a huge pain, and b) they didn't for Vector which is where it would have been most useful.
> Just because Qualcomm acquired a company with a microarchitecture that could only deal with fixed length instructions is no reason to break the ecosystem.
Yeah it was too late to change but that doesn't mean it wasn't a mistake.
Zicond looks good - I forgot that exists.
There's a practically unending list of undefined/implementation defined behaviours, which is great if you want to implement an ultra minimal microcontroller with 100 flops, but pretty awful otherwise.
Requiring the C (compressed) extension in the RVA profiles was definitely a mistake. The lack of true 16/64kB pages and conditional moves are probably a mistake (though fixable).
I don't know how any of these make it more robust and mature.
(But to be clear, I still think it's pretty good overall.)
I suspect that is not KDE's fault (or Wayland's) - it's probably PAM, which by default has a 2 second delay (+/- 50%). That default is extremely difficult to change, but you can configure it. See my instructions here: https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/issues/778#issuecomme...
Also if you follow that issue you can see I've been trying to convince the PAM developers to fix it (by changing it to a 0.5 second delay, which is much more tolerable and no less secure). Unfortunately they have this weird idea that users want the delay, because it lets them recompose their thoughts after getting the password wrong or something like that.
That isn't a fundamental limit of the algorithm though; you can easily add error checking, as I did here: https://github.com/Timmmm/expr/blob/1b0aef8f91460974d526b5ba...
I'm not really sure why this is omitted.
> You can't run unix_chkpwd against a local account without root because you won't be able to access /etc/shadow to get the hash.
unix_chkpwd can access /etc/shadow because it is suid.
> Otherwise you have to use the setuid version which won't let you run it directly.
Haha you mean this?
$ unix_chkpwd
This binary is not designed for running in this way
-- the system administrator has been informed
Take a look at the source code I linked about 6 comments ago!> Perhaps try checking something yourself?
I have. You haven't.
printf 'hunter2\0' | unix_chkpwd yourusername nullok; echo $?Wrong. At least check before you say something is obvious.
> No, it's very simple.
Even more wrong: https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/issues/778#issuecomme...
> feels like arguing with an LLM
I could say the same about you, repeatedly and confidently asserting falsehoods.
It's really really not. By default PAM has a difficult-to-disable 2ish second minimum delay for all authentication methods. However this is completely pointless for local password authentication because PAM checks password using unix_chkpwd, which has no delay. The comment I linked to is explaining that unix_chkpwd has a silly security theatre delay if you try to run it in a tty, but that's trivial to avoid.
If you want to brute force local password authentication you can just run unix_chkpwd as fast as you like. You don't need to involve PAM at all, so its 2 seconds delay achieves nothing.
It maybe does more for remote connections but I'm not sure about that either - if you want to check 10k ssh passwords per second what stops you making 10k separate connections every second? I don't think the 2 second delay helps there at all.
> Change both the config files and you can remove the delay if you want.
This is extremely complicated. See the comments in the issue for details.
https://github.com/pibara/pam_unix/blob/master/unix_chkpwd.c...
I didn't actually know that Mint had enabled this by default. That would have been a useful counterpoint to the naysayers.
If you want the original behaviour you don't actually need to change the configuration - they added a patch afterwards so you can press tab and it will hide the password just for that time.
> The catalyst for Ubuntu’s change is sudo-rs
Actually it was me getting sufficiently pissed off at the 2 second delay for invalid passwords in sudo (actually PAM's fault). There's no reason for it (if you think there is look up unix_chkpwd). I tried to fix it but the PAM people have this strange idea that people like the delay. So I gave up on that and thought I may as well try fixing this other UX facepalm too. I doubt it would have happened with the original sudo (and they said as much) so it did require sudo-rs to exist.
I think this is one of the benefits of rewriting coreutils and so on in Rust - people are way more open to fixing long-standing issues. You don't get the whole "why are you overturning 46 years of tradition??" nonsense.
If anyone wants to rewrite PAM in Rust... :-D
This is usually how they do it though. First make a dumb law with poor enforcement. People don't push back about it because it obviously won't be enforced. Wait a bit, then say "people are flagrantly violating this law, we need better enforcement". At that point it's a lot harder to say "it shouldn't be a law at all!" because nobody complained when it was brought into law.