240 karma · joined March 8, 2024
Your second sentence is a great example of the type of both-sidesing that needs to stop.
Your third sentence is a great example of the type of both-sidesing that should not stop.
Your fourth is disappointing conclusion, a strawman to start ("demand immunity from criticism"...) and a false equivalence / faux symmetry as a bonus ("sets everything on fire" & "doesn't support progressive policies" are two sides of _which_ coin, exactly...?)
> We are here in many ways as a direct result of the last admin, particularly the way they threatened tech companies. This moved tech companies to feel emboldened to go all-in on Trump.
I agree - he clearly should have done much more than just threaten.
My second thought was “perhaps they’re just very forward-thinking”, and now I’m sad about the future again.
I just gave 4.7 a run over a codebase I have been heavily auditing with 4.6 the past few days. Things began soothly so I left it for 10-15 minutes. When I checked back in I saw it had died in the middle of investigating one of the paths I recommended exploring.
I was curious as to why the block occurred when my instructions and explicitly stated intent had not changed at all - I provided no further input after the first prompt. This would mean that its own reasoning output or tool call results triggered the filter. This is interesting, especially if you think of typical vuln research workflows and stages; it’s a lot of code review and tracing, things which likely look largely similar to normal engineering work, code reviews, etc. Things begin to get more explicitly “offensive” once you pick up on a viable angle or chain, and increase as you further validate and work the chain out, reaching maximum “offensiveness” as you write the final PoC, etc.
So, one would then have to wonder if the activity preceding the mid-session flagging only resulted in the flag because it finally found something seemingly viable and started shifting reasoning from generic-ish bug hunting to over exploitation.
So, I checked the preceding tool calls, and sure enough…
What a strange world we’re living in. Somebody should try making a joke AUP violation-based fuzzer, policy violations are the new segfaults…
If a company hires a new CEO and word leaks that HR exempted him from the background check, would you think “well, background checks have very high false negative rates anyway”, or would you think “what the hell is on that guy’s record!?”
This is not a story of incompetence. This is a story of corruption. Corruption that is seeping into processes that exist solely for the nation’s protection. If you are not arguing in bad faith, then I must assume you are passively commenting and did not care to read the article.
There are procedures to vet senior officials before handing them incredible amounts of power over the rest of the citizenry. These particular officials so happen to be part of an agency basically defined by structure, process, rules, and by a lexicon that does not contain the word "exception." If one step of the vetting process is to count how many freckles the candidate has on their left arm, then that is what they must do - no exceptions, no room for interpretation at the ground level, no "well, we could probably just skip this."
You obviously already know this, and the article of course discusses this as it is a defining component of this story; for example, very concisely:
"People familiar with the matter say his ascent to that position without passing a standard FBI background check was unprecedented."
"In fact, the FBI’s employment eligibility guidelines say all employees must obtain a “Top Secret” clearance in order to work at the agency following a background check. “The preliminary employment requirements include a polygraph examination,” the guidelines say."
"Former FBI officials said they could not recall a single instance in which a senior official like Bongino received a waiver and was then given a top secret clearance."
This story _should_ make one wonder: well, why did they break precedent and skip this part of the vetting process? What would they have been asked that perhaps they were trying to avoid discussing? Is there a chance there are real risks to placing these people in these positions, and why are we circumventing the safeguards intended to mitigate them? Is a podcaster with no qualifications for this role worth breaking security protocol & precedent? This is a story that gained media attention, I wonder if this is not a lone instance - what else could they be bending behind the scenes? Well, let's give them some benefit of the double - Is there perhaps actually a reasonable explanation for this that laypeople like us just wouldn't be aware of?The article does answer some of these questions, such as "what could they be trying to avoid discussing" -
Polygraph examiners ask a standard list of questions about drug use, criminal history, foreign contacts and mishandling of classified information.
It also helps answer the "is there maybe a reasonable explanation?" question - and the answer is no, there surely is not, as instead of offering such a description they instead offered a lie: The FBI spokesperson initially said the three officials are so-called Schedule C — a category reserved for political appointees. He said the status would mean they were “not required” to undergo polygraphs. But Daniel Meyer, a former executive director for the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community External Review Panel, told ProPublica that an FBI employee wouldn’t be excluded from taking a polygraph exam simply because they’re a Schedule C employee. Three other lawyers, who specialize in national security matters, said the same.
At no point in thinking critically about the situation relayed by this article should "well, polygraphs are bad anyway, so..." steer your thought. It is so "off" that the old forest-for-the-trees cliche isn't even applicable. Even if wanton and unprecedented disregard for process in a process-defined agency is generally not much of a concern to you, surely the fact that the disregarded process is one intended to weed out incompetence and people with intolerable levels of risk exposure from highly-privileged and sensitive agency roles should still raise significant alarm.tldr; if your first thought after reading this article is "well, polygraphs are bad anyway" and not "what the hell may they be trying to hide", then you read the wrong article.
The problem is selective waiving of vetting processes due to political pressure and affiliation.
Acting as if the efficacy of the vetting process is a point relevant to this conversation either implies you believe they waived this process for these three due to their ineffectiveness - very much not the belief held my most observers, why just 3 then - otherwise it’s a pure strawman argument. Neither option is good.
That is to say, sometimes nation state hackers _were_ behind the compromise. F5 is a very believable and logical target for such groups.
> Writes “Unfortunately the left cannot have debate and disagreement.”
> Receives downvotes - literal expressions of disagreement incarnate.
> Updates post to add “(weird way to prove my point, by downvoting)”
I guess you’re implying you’re a liberal?
It feels ridiculous even writing that out. Can you help me understand your perspective?
/*
* Claude AI Military Grade - Navy SEAL Level Security
*/
I wonder how an AES implementation written by a Navy SEAL looks. // Note: Real AES decryption would be implemented here
// For security in military systems, we only support one-way encryption
void mil_crypto_decrypt(const char* ciphertext, char* plaintext, crypto_context_t* ctx) {
// Decryption disabled for security - data remains encrypted
// In real implementation, would use AES-128 decryption
plaintext[0] = '\0';
}
Just beautiful. The essence of vibe coding distilled into a few lines of… well, comments, and like one line of code.Real crypto indeed.
Sure, but that doesn’t change anything, does it? Most people that use or have benefited from the CVE program are not even aware of these criticisms, and I’d be willing to bet that the majority of people who _are_ aware only became so in the past week.
> This is purely a reputational concern. Being on government networks doesn't make it instantly more trustworthy or safe.
I did not say the concern was the safety of the CVE program. The concern is influence over the world’s inbox for 0days and the tangible ways that can be used to a nation’s benefit. It is most certainly not just a reputational concern. If China had stepped in last week and took the reins there would be groups within both industry and government having mild freakouts this week.