FBI Director Waived Polygraph Security Screening for Three Senior Staff
propublica.org
propublica.org
They are about as accurate as flipping a coin.
Polygraphs are not detecting lies, they're used to assess your sensitivities; there are really talented interrogators in counterintelligence, whose full-time job is to fuck with you in subtle ways. To poly a person at will is very much a power move, and some guys fucking love it. But that's a different story all together. Most of the time it's a formality like everything else. In reality, people don't have remotely enough bandwidth to pursue stuff like that unless there's a genuine investigation. But office politics people will office-politique.
Unpopular opinion: private companies should poly people more often in hiring, it could prove more useful than other arbitrary kind of culture fit interviews. Food for thought.
Useful in what sense? That you can't figure out anyway what tested person is capable of because tested person can believe that they have skills on godlike senior level, but they are junior at best?
I never said I subscribe to the unpopular opinion, but it's a point of contention regardless!
And this is a process that you expect to produce an output with any predictive value what so ever?
> it could prove more useful than other arbitrary kind of culture fit interviews.
You could also just end up selecting for psychopaths and sociopaths for whom this test does not function, regardless of how much you "fuck with them."
Poly is just one tool, and it's never a solution to anything. What you say about potential abuses, undesirable selection, etc. I agree 100% and hate the office-politique jockeys as much as the next man. In most corporate environments, fucking with people has no place and use, but it's far from only application, in fact it's pretty much the worst application possible. Doesn't change the fact that it happens, even though it shouldn't. I also believe that it's important for many orgs to start taking security seriously; in the world where there's so much exploitation, and where applicable, it helps a lot if your org can have some kind of counterintel function. It doesn't have to include poly, but whatever helps you better understand the people you work with is surely a boon.
The relationship between politics and finance has lost accountability. Would you take a chance investing with just any cryptocurrency? Or will you make the wise decision and choose mine, the first and only crypto that’s polygraphed all programmers for accountability.
Because what we need is more inscrutable judgement calls in the interview process?
I don't get what you thought was inaccurate?
I couldn't disagree with you more about your unpopular opinion.
I've been hiring for years and imo the best interview is a trial period doing the actual work with the actual team, not cop movie cosplay.
OK. I'll bite. I'm interviewing with you to be a frontend developer. You have me hooked up to a polygraph. What do you ask?
It would be a different matter if the entire process was being removed as policy, but nope, that's not it.
They are actually worse than a coin toss.
The TV news show, "60 Minutes" tested several companies that provided polygraph testing services.
The show claimed some one stole some equipment. For each testing service the show said they suspected a different employee. In every case, the polygraph operator claimed they detected deception in the person they had been told by the show was the person already under suspicion. Polygraph is total bullshit, just used to add a pseudo-scientific shine to prejudice.
https://antipolygraph.org/blog/2007/01/30/cbs-60-minutes-exp...
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/us/politics/fbi-polygraph...
After all the examples of the media getting caught playing fast and loose with anonymous sources, I’m going to take this one with a huge grain of salt.
Leading is a bit different than "loyalty tests" isn't it?
> DHS said it was "unapologetic" about its drive to root out leakers. "We are agnostic about your standing, tenure, political appointment, or status as a career civil servant - we will track down leakers and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law,” a DHS spokesperson told Reuters.
Maybe that’s true? I think HN was ok with this because it felt like a rational reaction to bringing guys like Big Balls into the SCIF.
I would.
It's just the political loyalty that's a bad requirement.
The cabinet is chosen to implement the President’s policies. It would be odd to select for people opposed to the policies or those would actively try and stop them through leaks.
The government does a lot of security theater and campaigns to make you believe that they are competent.
They are perfectly fine as detectors of areas of interest for investigators to probe deeper.
The point is that just because something can be done without a specific tool does not mean you should never use the tool.
I guess I should’ve added “doesn’t mean it makes sense to use hammers exclusively" for the HN pedants.
"A routine Shin Bet polygraph test of a senior officer close to Military Advocate General reportedly exposed new clues about video leak, prompting Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara to order a full criminal investigation"
https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkbichbjbe
While polygraphs are not perfect they are widely used as part of a broader set of measures. I'm not sure "must not be used" is really the right way to approach this. This person would not have been caught if it wasn't for this polygraphs screening.
Plus, finding "clues" could mean anything, including false leads. If the Shin Bet is resorting to interviews under duress, they really must not have much physical evidence to work with.
It should probably read, "A senior officer exposed clues during a polygraph test..."
The polygraph is a McGuffin. The interviewer applies pressure by psychologically manipulating the suspect. That's all the polygraph is, psychological manipulation.
The fact that the person is being asked to take the test is a pretty good indication that investigators think there's something there. The suspicion caused the interview and the interview caused the admission. There's no way to know what happens in an alternate universe with no polygraph. I worry a lot more about law enforcement that use it as justification for their erroneous suspicion.
It's a fine tool as long as the interviewer doesn't think it actually works. I've seen enough police interviews on TV shows to know that many of them are believers.
Either way a great many police are believers in the power of theatre. As they should be, staging power imbalnce, inserting faux sympathy, etc. are all powerful tools with strong potential for misuse which has prompted regulation in a number of countries demanding full recording of interactions with suspects.
Speaking of police interviews on TV shows:
Opening scene to Season 5 of The Wire.
Classic moment where a copy machine is used for a lie detector.
The way they talk about both people refusing to take the polygraph and whether they pass or fail belies a belif in their credibility. I also know some police personally who speak in the same way but that's a much smaller sample size.
I absolutely believe that some police detectives have real genuine faith in polygraphs being accurate. I strongly suspect a good many do not.
That's orthoganal to how detectives that don't have faith in polygraph results being "real" feel about people that refuse to take them.
Many may feel that people that refuse tests that supposedly tell truth telling from lying can be ranked with people that refuse a search or to unlock their phones ... ie. that's a sign that that they very probably have something to hide.
> I'm talking about interviews with detectives on a show like 20/20.
These are professionals being interviewed who are projecting all manner of things, if they don't actually trust that polygraphs work as scientifically accurate tests that reliably detect lies they are still motivated to not say so and to project belief, that's all part of the theatre of manipulating suspects.
They're detectives from the case. They aren't interviewing the same guy over and over, it's a different guy for every case. And, like I said, I've known a few personally who echo the same thing.
Never once have I seen it presented as an interview technique. They will "clear" people based on polygraph.
This could all be theater, as you're saying, but we're getting into 9/11 size conspiracies to keep all of this coordinated. It's much more likely they are telling the truth. If only there was a machine we could hook them up to to find out...
> Many may feel that people ... that's a sign that that they very probably have something to hide.
That's another can of worms.
The interview is the part that exposed those clues.
The thing about pseudoscience is that it will sometimes appear to “work.” A dowser will sometimes find water. A horoscope will sometimes predict your day. My birthmark has successfully warded off tiger attacks for 40+ years.
The organization whose crimes she exposed claims she would not have been caught if its wasn't for the polygraph screening. Corrupt law enforcement types love things like polygraph tests because they give them a ready avenue for parallel construction.
In terms of the details here, the leak wasn't to expose the crimes, it was to resist political pressure [my speculation anyways]. The crimes were being investigated anyways and the video was available internally fairly broadly (and I think maybe externally as well). There was a political storm as a result of the investigation and the arrests made. Apparently leaking the video is was not illegal (though that's subject to some interpretations) because the role of the chief prosecutor is independent but this became more complicated when it required lying to the supreme court to cover the leak.
But yeah, it's possible the Shin Bet already had an idea but just used the polygraph as an excuse/opportunity. While it's understandable in the political climate why the chief prosecutor would leak the video it's also unethical and poor judgement for someone in her role to do so, and then to cover it up. The role of the Shin Bet is to find people in sensitive roles who are secretly doing things they should not be doing (typically spies but more generally people betraying the trust put in them). For those not following, the plot got thicker because she proceeded to throw her iPhone in the Mediterranean and it was found by a swimmer some days later. She also tried to harm herself. It's pretty crazy stuff. Now there are arguments about who should oversee the investigation with the supreme court set to decide today. It's a pretty small/tight legal community and everyone knows everyone, especially at the top. The legal system has been in a battle with the government for some while with the justice minister refusing to accept the last appointment of the chief justice of the supreme court.
Anyways, the polygraph angle is interesting. That this machine survives as a practice in many places tells us something about its usefulness (or at least people's belief in its usefulness).
What always struck me about reporting on them was how there was a great deal of coverage about how fraudulent they were, but seeming puzzlement on why security services would keep buying such obvious BS. What seemed clear to me, was that the BS was the point. Similar to polygraphs and drug-sniffing dogs, the purpose of the tool is to give the investigator a seemingly-objective excuse to follow their intuition (or engage in arbitrary targeting and abuse; take your pick).
Those wands were completely fake. Dogs do have a keen sense of smell and can be trained to sniff certain substances.
The polygraph I think is more in the disputed category. It actually measures some physiological signals which in theory could correlate to stress.
That said I don't disagree. These tools can be abused. At the end of the day you need various checks and balances in all these systems (e.g. FBI's internal investigation or whatever body is involved in the security clearances in the US in this example). Applying psychological pressure in various ways is a legitimate tool in these domains.
My theory is that the new head of the Shin Bet who is pretty right wing and took a personal interest in the story was involved. They simply used the polygraph results as an excuse to direct the interview in the direction they wanted. The timing is certainly very interesting.
It's a very high profile case so i guess the truth of the matter will eventually emerge.
One could even argue that the polygraph benefits the person being screened, as it provides some additional motivation for them to take it seriously.
The FBI and CIA still have moles and they often times operate out of the highest levels.
They're like door locks. They keep honest people honest. They provide zero security.
Similarly, I can see how structured psychological interrogation, assisted by a polygraph, is a useful deterrent. The presence of moles doesn't negate all of its value. Just like having your house broken into once doesn't mean you'll stop using door locks.
Considering polygraphs don’t work at all, I have to imagine that an equally effective interrogation could be constructed without them.
https://antipolygraph.org/blog/2016/04/26/operation-lie-bust...
The issue is, if exceptions are made, what's stopping other breaking the rules?
I don't care if he's a dem, rep or maga, rules are rules.
Once they are consistently broken, the rules only matter for the powerless.
There have always been stupid rules, and legitimate reasons to break them. But “I am an unqualified appointee and this unqualified person is my friend” is not a legitimate reason.
Which works great as long as the people in command are sane and ethical. When you have an FBI director who spells his name with a dollar sign, well...
The school decided they were not going to recognize the test results and instead would only credit me with an elective class for it, I would still have ot pass the introductory class. This is in spite of pass all the later comptuer science classwork.
I escalated it to the dean, who told me that while he recognized this made no sense, "rules are rules and if we didn't follow them they wouldn't be rules".
My general experience with colleges is that "rules" are mostly for the little people. And pretty much all of them become negotiable the moment that serious money, prestige, or scandal avoidance are on the table.
(BTW - University of Michigan? I know several people who got similar crap from their CS Dept.)
> The issue is, if exceptions are made, ...
Except that "exceptions are made" can also be a stage of phasing out useless or counter-productive rules - as social acceptance grows that Astrology, Polygraphs, and Tarot have no place in security screening.
If the rules are bad, then work with the whole team to change them. Don't just ad-hoc fiddle, that makes procedural debt.
The best that we can realistically hope for is that they'll muddle toward being better, as older managers retire and the org's social consensus drifts away from "Competence Theater is good enough", "CYA is SOP", and "Phrenology works".
</sad cynicism>
The standard process starts, as it has for decades, with filling out Standard Form 86.[1] I see they only want residences for the last 10 years. It used to be "list all residences from birth".
Then, all of that gets checked.[2]
These criteria are not, apparently, applied to White House staff or Presidential appointees.
you're blind if you want to pretend that this specific action is the top of a slippery slope when we're below the slope at this point, Congress isn't gong to do anything so why even act surprised. let's focus on the hypocrisy of polygraph being standard at all
I don't know who the other two are, but Bongino was already polygraphed and cleared for the Secret Service -- there's no reason to pretend that he wasn't cleared for the job. This article reads like a political hit piece and has no real grasp of reality. It also has statements that clearly betray its author doesn't really understand how security clearances work anyway -- most clearances don't require polygraphs, those are an IC and LE thing, and any OCA can grant any waiver they choose to grant. In this particular case if the AG wanted to review this decision she could do so as his boss, but it really makes no difference.
Given that polygraphs are, again, junk science, who gives a shit.
Your argument about the effectiveness of polygraphs is entirely irrelevant. The inconsistency and special treatment is the problem.
The furor here is about Dan Bongino, and Nicole Rucker, Kash Patel's assitant
The article goes on to say that FBI employees at the level Bongino and Rucker are working at have "SCI" clearance on top of Top Secret. Back in the 1990s, it was exceptionally difficult to get TS clearance. SCI on top of that must have been even harder.
I guess this is no worse than Jared Kushner getting a waiver to work at the White House during Trump's first term, but holy cow, getting this kind of special treatment really does reinforce a big difference between classes, doesn't it? Any ordinary, non-rich person getting "alerts" on polygraphs would probably be immediately dropped from getting a Top Secret.
Not really. I know a litany of people who had TS/SCI clearances in the 90s. It was literally a job requirement for entire divisions of the US govt.
Some fed contacted every single reference I gave, my old scoutmaster, and the minister of the church I was a janitor for during college. Top Secret was notoriously more difficult in terms of paperwork and scrutiny of your past.
The article about Bongino's waiver made it clear that TS was a requirement for FBI employment, an entire division of the government, although it wasn't clear if that was everyone, or just the higher level administrative staff.
I've been a reference interviewed in the processes before. It was not exactly rigorous. (It would have been hard to be, frankly... I had no knowledge of them doing anything shady, and they had no specific prior area of concern to try to grill me specifically on.)
I was confused that I wasn't even asked if I was a citizen, or that my friend listed me as a reference because I'm pretty sure he knew.
There is an entire industry built around clearing people, your tax dollars pay them. Of course everyone you listed was contacted, that’s the whole point.
How is filling out an SF-86 hard?
Maybe what you meant was, justifying the reason to get a clearance in the 90s was harder. Perhaps that is true. Getting a clearance isn’t hard.
Divulging where you've lived for the past 10+ years, having agents contacting your references, etc for "Secret" is not very onerous or difficult.
Given that, your subsequent statement that "Top Secret was notoriously more difficult in terms of paperwork" seems to be pointless.
As a former federal government employee, all of this is also required as part of the standard background check. People will show up in a black sedan and interview your neighbors, all you past employers and people who knew you at each residence. This happened for me and I’ve never had any real security clearance (nor required it).
Just because it’s work doesn’t mean it’s rare. My father and most of his coworkers all had TS clearance in the 90s. It required flying out to Dallas (if I recall correctly) for the polygraph. Lots of work but very common.
The number of poepl that hold top secret clearance (assuming its the same thing...) is 1.3mil
Most people just back into a clearance without realizing they need one, and bounce right through the process.
If you haven’t been convicted of a felony it’s basically falling-off-a-log easy to get cleared. The whole process is a charade.
I think you are exaggerating this as the other poster points out. Every US military cryptolinguist gets a TS-SCI clearance. So, while every student at Defense Language Institute was doing his/her language course, a background check was done, and the rejection rate in the 1990s was presumably tiny. And ditto for other military intelligence roles. A certain amount of military personnel getting the clearance were semi-native speakers of a language in demand who still had foreign ties (family or land owned in the old country) but they passed nonetheless, which must speak to a certain laxness.
The different clearance levels are not really an indication of different levels of vetting being done to a person. If you can get cleared for Secret, there's no particular reason you couldn't get cleared for TS. It's the same SF-86 form, the same investigation (well, not that I know, exactly. All I know is that it didn't look any different from my perspective), the same interview. There are some differences in how often you'll get re-interviewed, I think. It's not really anything so onerous that you have to ever think about it, really.
The different levels are much more about need to know, which is driven by potential impact of breach. You don't even have to go through the lower levels before you get to the higher ones. The selectiveness of giving people higher clearance levels is more about controlling exposure surface area.
On top of that, clearance level is kind of more about what meetings you'll be allowed in, what conversations you'll be allowed to participate in. SCI is more having ongoing access to data. Then there are additionally "caveats", which are clearances to specific programs. Each of these things are a different axis in the clearance system, not different levels of a linear system.
Contrary to somewhat popular belief, a polygraph is not required to obtain TS/SCI. You can do a polygraph and that's a whole additional designation, "TS/SCI with Poly," as you might see in various job ads.
The fact that these people can't pass TS is extremely telling and extremely concerning. Not being able to pass basically means the investigation revealed information that the person has a reasonable chance of being coerced into providing information. A simple example: maybe you have a mistress you're trying to hide; a foreign intelligence service could try to blackmail you into providing them information. Maybe you have a lot of debt, especially gambling debt; you'd be judged particularly susceptible to taking bribes, which would also set you up to be easily blackmailed.
But I know at least one guy who is a raging pothead who has had high level clearance for the last 20 years. They didn't care because he was open about it. If he was open about it with them, then it was clear it wasn't an issue he could be coerced over. I know people who had past criminal charges on their records. They were fine, too, for the same reason. It used to be you couldn't hold a clearance if you were gay, but nowadays, people are much more open and accepting of it such that it's not a reasonable attack vector for coercion.
Basically, it means you've got major skeletons in your closet and probably tried to lie about them if you can't pass for S or TS. If you can't pass for TS then you probably shouldn't have a position of public trust at all, even for just handling CUI.
Where does it say that?
Big companies make these kinds of exceptions for important hires all the time. This is no different.
The other reality is that no one needs to fill out an SF-86 to enable them to do a thorough background check.
In the case of Bongino, at least, he was in the Secret Service before, and might well have already gone through the TS clearance process once, including a polygraph, which would be a reason to waive it this time to expedite his clearance.
The Trump admin has always been an example of ignoring the elite political class and bringing in whoever he likes. Kash Patel himself came from a family of asylum seekers who fled India and he got his start as a public defender. Not exactly old money.
The guy he brought on as an assistant (without a polygraph) got his start as a beat cop from NYPD before joining the Secret Service.
Of course things have improved. Decades ago they were trusted a lot more to the point that a lot of innocent people got prosecuted and guilty people went free based on polygraphs. These days they’re inadmissible in court, but they’re still used in the court of public opinion and in some jobs.
"For my friends, everything. For my enemies, the law" — Óscar Benavides.
The problem is selective waiving of vetting processes due to political pressure and affiliation.
Acting as if the efficacy of the vetting process is a point relevant to this conversation either implies you believe they waived this process for these three due to their ineffectiveness - very much not the belief held my most observers, why just 3 then - otherwise it’s a pure strawman argument. Neither option is good.
It's all part of the same problem.
When you have agencies lead by people so incompetent that they believe polygraphs work then you will inevitably get more bad decision making.
If a company hires a new CEO and word leaks that HR exempted him from the background check, would you think “well, background checks have very high false negative rates anyway”, or would you think “what the hell is on that guy’s record!?”
This is not a story of incompetence. This is a story of corruption. Corruption that is seeping into processes that exist solely for the nation’s protection. If you are not arguing in bad faith, then I must assume you are passively commenting and did not care to read the article.
There are procedures to vet senior officials before handing them incredible amounts of power over the rest of the citizenry. These particular officials so happen to be part of an agency basically defined by structure, process, rules, and by a lexicon that does not contain the word "exception." If one step of the vetting process is to count how many freckles the candidate has on their left arm, then that is what they must do - no exceptions, no room for interpretation at the ground level, no "well, we could probably just skip this."
You obviously already know this, and the article of course discusses this as it is a defining component of this story; for example, very concisely:
"People familiar with the matter say his ascent to that position without passing a standard FBI background check was unprecedented."
"In fact, the FBI’s employment eligibility guidelines say all employees must obtain a “Top Secret” clearance in order to work at the agency following a background check. “The preliminary employment requirements include a polygraph examination,” the guidelines say."
"Former FBI officials said they could not recall a single instance in which a senior official like Bongino received a waiver and was then given a top secret clearance."
The article does answer some of these questions, such as "what could they be trying to avoid discussing" -
Polygraph examiners ask a standard list of questions about drug use, criminal history, foreign contacts and mishandling of classified information.
The FBI spokesperson initially said the three officials are so-called Schedule C — a category reserved for political appointees. He said the status would mean they were “not required” to undergo polygraphs. But Daniel Meyer, a former executive director for the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community External Review Panel, told ProPublica that an FBI employee wouldn’t be excluded from taking a polygraph exam simply because they’re a Schedule C employee. Three other lawyers, who specialize in national security matters, said the same.
tldr; if your first thought after reading this article is "well, polygraphs are bad anyway" and not "what the hell may they be trying to hide", then you read the wrong article.
Person A believes they work.
Person A says "we shouldn't use this on Persons B, C, D".
Pretty major implications about the integrity and suitability of Persons B, C, and D, and about how Person A suspects they have stuff to hide.
(In some ways this is a good reason to keep them around. Even if some people know they're crap, the existence and popular mythology causes people to reveal more than they otherwise would through actions like this.)
It’s certainly suspicious. But it’s also a huge problem they use them at all when the private sector was banned from doing so since they’re so unreliable decades ago.
I'd be quite comfortable if I knew that these polygraph tests were being scrapped entirely because they're nonsense and that the FBI is reworking its security procedures to improve all its background checks. As it is, these articles make it sound like they're replacing the polygraph test with nothing, and only for these select few people. I don't like that. It is a human-led interrogation, albeit with a useless (at best) machine. I want to know what's so trustworthy about these people that the FBI doesn't even want to get to know them before giving them jobs high up?
That's something that companies do all the time, they pay people "out of band" or give them extra benefits or accelerate their vacation accrual or vesting, or one of hundreds of other things.
I agree it looks bad for sure but it isn't necessarily sinister.
While it would never be allowed for the average Federal employee it does exist outside of purely political positions.
It's irrelevant whether they do anything. It's more important why they were skipped. What questions would the interviewer ask that they didn't want to risk answering?
This is just something you made up. Here's an alternative idea:
You are deciding whether to take a test. The test's results are 100% subjective. Anything you say during the test can be interpreted as a negative statement about yourself, and this determination will be made by the examiner.
Is taking this test a good idea? Why or why not?
* Polygraph “tests” presented as objective, independent evidence for the truth or falsehood of statements, and
* Polygraph used as an additional channel (similar to but on top of assessment of body language, voice tone, etc.) by an interviewer to determine how to guide an interview to elicit information from a subject, including information that they might prefer to conceal.
If you're trying "tricks" to get past it for example, that's one data point. It's useful for things like clearance investigations because there is a counter-intel side to it, your comms, pattern of live and other things will be scrutinized.
it is essentially a "vibe" tool. Do you look too clam, too nervous,etc..
That said, people end up contradicting themselves when focusing too much on beating the polygraph too. Skilled interrogators throw questions that will cause that. Do you sound too prepared and detailed, answering questions with details most people won't remember? Are you too consistent, indicating recollection of prepared facts, instead of wading through unreliable human memory?
Even without a polygraph, your eye movements alone are hard to get under control unless you practice for it. That's why they baseline you first with simple things you're expected to lie on, and then more complex things that most people would at least partially lie about.
The accuracy of the polygraph itself is not too relevant. If you're hiring someone for a senior role at the FBI, a polygraph is the formality that opens you up to all kinds of legal trouble. it's purpose is to put the subject under legal jeopardy. A simple interrogation will do, but a polygraph introduces an adversarial evidentiary element into the equation.
In short, it gives the FBI in this case the option to say "this guy is acting shady, we can't trust him". Even if they're wrong, the sensitivity of the position requires passing on good candidates if they must. An investigator on their own would have to prove/justify their conclusion. a polygraph is their way out. They've seen spies, traitors, etc.. it's a way to filter people out with a somewhat justifiable cause.
The question you should be asking is why was it waived in this case just for those three staff members? If it is indeed unreliable, why not stop it entirely?
Millions of Americans have TS/SCI clearance, which had them pass a polygraph just fine. The government isn't losing a lot of talent who're fumbling a polygraph. This is a big deal. Any conversation about the reliability of a polygraph is a distraction.
Polygraphs appear to be another sad outcrop from the same pseudoscience formation as phrenology or witch-ducking; basically theatre to legitimise people exercising power in a way they were already going to do. The fact that it gets used speaks more volumes about the culture in intelligence services than the people who may or may not undergo the test.
From mid-way in the article
He’s had a rocky tenure so far, marked by public fights with senior Cabinet officials and accusations that he leaked information to the press, which Bongino denied. In August, Trump appointed Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey as co-deputy director at the FBI, setting off speculation that the White House had lost faith in Bongino. But he remains in the job.
ProPublica could not determine whether Bongino sat for a polygraph exam or what its results were. Though the existence of a polygraph waiver is an indication he may not have passed the test, it is possible Bongino received a preemptive exemption, a former senior FBI official with knowledge of the vetting program told ProPublica.
When ProPublica sought comment from the FBI, the agency denied that Bongino or the other senior staff members failed polygraph tests. “It is false that the individuals you referenced failed polygraphs,” wrote spokesperson Ben Williamson.