Wayland forwarding over SSH: done
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Wayland forwarding over SSH: done
Tor is simpler, better audited, and I don't mind too much the little centralization of the authority TOR nodes, plus the pluggable transports.
I2P is more complete (UDP, protocol libraries, nice hidden service client and server port handling, etc) its somewhat chaotic decentralization is a mixed bless, but that's the point. I like the tradeoff of mixing my bandwidth with others bandwidth (pay with some bandwidth now to save my rear-end later when needed).
I2PD c++ node is pleasant for me because it is compact and clean for my needs (authenticated hidden service SSH access and self-hosted web services) and I can manage it almost like the TOR node. The original IP2 Java node is good for end users, handy with integrated IRC, email, and file sharing services.
I like it so much that 2 years ago I jumped to the Fedora Core/IOT thing for my servers. A somewhat deeper learning curve (ignition files...) but very pleased to used lightweight Fedora rpm-ostree based immutable OS on metal and virtual. Cleanest rock solid server experience on Linux servers (that actually updates worry free) of my career.
In a current one or patched one, is more likely to have a non-vulnerable LUKS2 volume that you can not downgrade to a vulnerable one, or a kernel and userspace tools non-vulnerable to the metadata manipulation even for a LUKS1 volume.
I concede the plausible scenario of replacing the kernel to a vulnerable one, if you ha access to the drive (by external OS boot or get the hardware) and replacing the kernel on the usually unencrypted boot partition along modifying the LUKS2 metadata of the encrypted volume. Not a quick local or remote feat to do. Not doable on an encrypted boot volume or signed boot files (secure boot thingy). Sincerely, if you have that kind of access, it is easier to modify the initramfs file to grab the LUKS key.
It as fixed bug, and a plausible scenario is if someone wants to decrypt a LUKS2 (in and old linux kernel system) which is auto unlocked by a TPM like device.
"Linux version 5.13.0+ (x@x) (Debian clang version 13.0.0-++20210418105309+a0898f0cecc7-1~exp1, LLD 13.0.0) #6 SMP Thu Jul 1 10:22:40 CDT 2021"
"Magic VPN" or "Magic E2EE LAN" kinda IPSEC for commoners, depends on how you config it.
YG puts more "magic" on protocol (autorouting, mesh making, etc), but is not that clean on design (crypto not formally tested, latency prone TCP links, not good enough NAT punching, etc).
Wireguard and YG are different tools on the SDN network toolbox, and can be mixed for special porpoises.
YG uses it own crypto and routing, wintun is used here only to expose the virtual network interface on Windows.
YG is decentralized, direct peer to peer and multi hop routing, manual key exchange for direct peering, virtual internet (each node is a router to another nodes)
ZT (and Tailscale) requires a central node coordinator for automatic config and peer key exchanges, peers directly to each node to create a flat virtual network, not multi hop routing, between two peers you need a reachable IP or port mapping (supports UPNP) by one of them (fixed in config there are private TCP relays when carrier NAT/double NAT/ restrictive firewalls are in place, very slow), Uses UDP for the links, mimics a virtual switch and support custom IPV4 / IPV6, good for virtual private networks.
YG (and CJDNS) is kinda an overlay public network, is fully decentralized, it supports automatic routing between nodes to mimic a virtual Internet, each node is a router too, needs to register each key for every direct peer node connection (config needs peer key, reachable ip and port, but supports automatic key exchange for local networks), YG uses TCP for the links, support self-healing routing, every peer has an IPV6 address derived by its public key.
ZT (and Tailscale) can mimic a mesh network and node routing because supports bridge nodes between networks (routing between virtual switches), but is not self-healing and somewhat heavy work to config. ZT is fully open source, can be config with your own node coordinator and discovery helpers (Controllers and Moons in ZT), not easy. Only Taislcale client is open source, can't be config with your own node coordinators for free.
You can mix ZT and YG, weird side effects warranted but works. (Edited post - some grammar fixes)
After 8 years since the initial announcement and 5 years of the initial papers submission, the CAESAR committee selects the most robust AEAD crypto implementations that offer better security and performance than AES-GCM. The portfolio groups in three categories: lightweight application, high performance and nonce misuse resistance.