NextCloud: self-host OR pay for a managed option (this means someone runs it for you.) ownCloud: self-host OR pay for a managed option (this means someone runs it for you.)
He compared it to Dropbox, Nextcloud, and ownCloud.
-13 karma · joined November 22, 2015
NextCloud: self-host OR pay for a managed option (this means someone runs it for you.) ownCloud: self-host OR pay for a managed option (this means someone runs it for you.)
He compared it to Dropbox, Nextcloud, and ownCloud.
Disclaimer; I have nothing to do with HashiCorp, they've just done right by me, have been great to the community, and are always improving and learning from their mistakes. A nerve is struck when marketing tells people that they are using the wrong tool (without backing that up with data), and making comparisons to a protocol which has fallen to the wayside aside from limited use cases but otherwise is predominantly insecure.
However, please stop trying to contrast yourself with these analogies. Owncloud and Nextcloud both have hosted OR on-prem versions
However `Enterprise tools like HashiCorp Vault and AWS Parameter Store felt like we were stuck using FTP instead of Dropbox!` is in itself bashing other peoples' work, and misleading prospective users.
It's not alright to mislead people, and the trends over the years of new engineers without a ton of experience looking at a battle-hardened, vetted system with their one specific use case and no understanding of the endless numbers of refinements that resulted in the predominant solution that solves more problems and edge cases than just their partially understood use case, is... why we have shit like this coming out of Apple (for example)
https://lapcatsoftware.com/articles/macl.html
Despite being a millennial, I can't help but agree with this sentiment:
> When I try to list the contents of the Documents folder in Terminal, I get a permissions dialog, because Millennials are killing Unix.
Understand _why_ things are done the way they are before you write them off as inferior and re-invent the wheel, otherwise you'll simply discover all the things you didn't understand previously, and create effectively the same solution, only poorly implemented and without all the vetting and refinement that went into what was already there before you came and "did it better".
You are saying that not having the choice to choose what to share is acceptable though. Privacy isn't about having something to hide, it's about having the same rights you have with your day-to-day thoughts; you aren't forced to shout every single thought that pops into your mind, you are able to pick and choose what you would like to express and share. Privacy and encryption aim towards that goal.
Can do all sorts of great things with this; for example TLS (ssl) certificate renewals, etc, as the certificate expiry IS the TTL; when a certificate needs to be renewed it can happen automatically and your application can receive any signal you choose (SIGHUP, for example)
It's incredibly simple, and a breeze to use.
``` job "vault" { group "demo" { task "task" { vault { policies = ["database"] } template { env = true data = <<EOF {{ with secret "database/creds/production" }} DB_USERNAME={{.Data.username}} DB_PASSWORD={{.Data.password}} {{ end }} EOF } } } } ```
edit: thanks HN formatting
You lost the entire audience who have actually used Vault before when you claimed it was too complex for your team to understand.. Why would I trust a company staffed with a crew that can't even understand the tools they are trying to compete with
decks, you're thinking (some examples):
cdj350 cdj400 cdj800 cdj850 cdj900 cdj1000 cdj2000 xdj1000 etc
If you don't want to send them a government issued photo ID, you can make a new account that lasts 10 minutes and then is locked on you and holds any accounts linked to it hostage as you can't sign in.
Sure you're sort of an idiot to make those assumptions, but I'm sure you already came to this realization about yourself years ago.
The lack of light = black, and light which includes literally all colours = white.
When light is "blocked" from passing, black. When light is "allowed" to pass, white.
I look forward to seeing what other concepts can be mutated to make a point on unrelated topics.
- why doesn't everybody already encrypt everything to begin with? there's often a disconnect between the benefit and the ease/overhead of doing so (it's hard enough to for people to care about using distinct and strong passwords, or 2fa; if the implementer isn't concerned with their users' security then often no one is) - people are lazy in general and security takes effort for a variety of reasons. how many users do you know who want to put in more than one password on every boot/resume from sleep/hybernation (which would be necessary, as using the same password would obviously be dumb, and using a keyfile beyond the first layers breaks the model for having those layers in the first place)?
- hindsight is easier to gain than foresight. people rarely predict the specific fuck up that seals their fate, and most don't think about operational security at a high level of competency, never mind in ways that survive 5+ years of advancements in technology, and against someone whose job it is to keep on trying (or more realistically just waiting for developments/discoveries made in security research).
- how many operating systems can you name that support multiple layers of full disk (or root partition) encryption with little to no effort? probably the closest would be encrypted GRUB with LUKS, with ecryptfs for encrypted home, maybe an encrypted loopback filesystem, and finally individually encrypted files; mobile is far worse too (ie. how would you approach implementing your own several layers of encryption on blackberry? that's what system was broken in this instance). aosp/android? good luck. macOS you'll find much more difficult to do any 3rd party FDE, and anything you do get working will break in miraculous ways - close-knit integration hell. iOS? HA - try convincing Apple to let you do a better job on anything system-wide, and while you're at it convince them to let other browser vendors do a better job there too, it would seriously improve iOS and be great for the web if Safari wasn't holding the whole industry back.
Overall, it's generally not the encryption itself that breaks; sure sometimes, but far less often than other channels that can be attacked. Cold boot attack for a device still powered but locked to pull encryption keys from memory is fun, but more often it's a weak/dictionary-based password or a 4 digit passcode that bottlenecks the security offered all the way down to 16 measly bits, or just attacking the joints where the encryption begins and ends. If you weld a metal frame on top of a bamboo frame, it'll be the bamboo that breaks, not the metal.
Also, the article doesn't even specify if the encryption was broken; the "new technology capabilities" could have been simply the purchase of some new hardware tooling or software to extract and dump the keys from the hardware devices securing them, or simply a court order was obtained to compel RIM to do so on their behalf.
Imagine the scenario where service A has read-only access to the authentication db/table, whereas service B (which could be maintained/operated by an entirely different person/team that leverages a more stringent code review process, or simply one performed by better eyes) has write access to that same db/table - the credential database could be leaked but due to a variety of measures in place further compromise through that specific avenue is mitigated.
One of the primary goals of "security" is to stop an attacker from accessing things or being able to perform actions that they "shouldn't" be able to access/perform. When dealing with humans it is incredibly difficult to decisively achieve that goal. It could be a zero day, a vulnerability in a code dependency, or otherwise some service dependency or other such software (say an internal analytics system with its own entirely separate models and storage of data) that leads to a breach - the bigger the team/company, the more people involved, the higher the chances that someone makes an inadvertent (or intentional) mistake somewhere.
I do not agree that a compromise of any form should be considered a reason to not attempt to build a secure system resilient to layers and layers of human failure.
You're running just about the latest of everything, and you pick and choose everything you want to run. It becomes easy to try every window manager and desktop environment, because they are all there (and up to date!).