This sounds like a great change in that at least software can opt-in without having to even edit their systemd unit.
4,395 karma · joined November 23, 2015
This sounds like a great change in that at least software can opt-in without having to even edit their systemd unit.
There is also a couple of hardware projects that to that in hardware. I used the ISOstick for many years.
You can also PXE NetBoot a lot of installers with dynamic menu selection - see http://netboot.xyz
I don't have hard data however on like the "curve" of flash cell failures as an SSD ages and therefor exactly how much longer you might get based on the minimum to median cell failure.
This was highly enlightening the first time I watched it :)
In some ways it seems having the "Contacts only" mode enabled is almost worse than having it set to everyone. The obvious problem with having it set to everyone though is you can easily get airdropped things by people around you. Which can be a great joke but since it displays preview of image receives can also be used in harmful or abusive ways.
It -is- possible, as others have commented, to do this within the VM or container but they need a way to get that information. systemd-resolved does this. From what I understand of fly.io, the container is setup by the user, so you're not going to have control over their networking configuration or environment - is that right?
Now there is an alternative, which is instead of using .internal, to use a public facing internet hosting that is delegated to your internal DNS servers. That way they use their normal DNS, and it resolves to your nameserver. But the DNS needs to be public, and critically, if the internet DNS goes down, your .internal resolution will also stop working. Which is highly likely to cause problems for peoples applications. And also adds un-predictable latency to their local service connections which is almost certainly going to cause problems - it's not a good idea.
Having said all of that, generally speaking, it makes sense that -you- provide the DNS. It's pretty much the standard way that your 'ISP', 'Hosting Provider', etc, provides the DNS rather than relying on the public internet DNS. Only a few years ago there was no such public DNS.
The other possible alternative would be to leverage multicast DNS (libnss-mdns/avahi-daemon) or LLMNR but I'm not sure those are really ideal for this use case either. And in both cases requires resolver support that you dont get from the basic glibc resolver. So for your use case, may still not be workable.
So I think you're stuck, unless you can mandate that all of your VM images use systemd-resolved and somehow communicate the config into them.
Though honestly not the most obvious or accessible thing. Most people would probably just call the emergency number directly instead of using the convoluted button combination.
"You can also add emergency contacts. After an emergency call has ended, your iPhone will alert your emergency contacts with a text message, unless you choose to cancel this option. Your iPhone sends them your current location, and, for a period of time after you enter SOS mode, it sends updates to your emergency contacts when your location changes."
Let's assume for a moment they want to go ahead and disable this accidentally enabled feature, OK, but they should have changed it such that - On existing installs: You could mount existing volumes, but not create new ones - Start showing a warning to users asking them to migrate - If they are desperate, on new installs, you could potentially disable mounting existing volumes or at least and a stern warning. (The downside is for example, if your NAS died, you got a new one, migrated the drives, you can't access them again. So this is a hit and miss idea, depending on how keen they are to push disabling the feature)
The good and bad news is that in all liklihood they didn't intentionally brick existing users but instead some braindead engineer went "oh that's not supposed to be enabled it, let's disable it" and didn't think about or realise how it would affect existing users until it was rolled out. Good because less malice, bad because they should ideally have smarter engineers reviewing such things.
He even says in TCP it's used in TCP it's just relatively infrequent, by comparison to UDP.
This was common when I was writing puppet. It was easy to have your entire puppet run take minutes - and want to run every few minutes - while consuming a LOT of cpu time including on a centralised server and not just the end host.
There are of course ways and strategies to this and not every situational falls afoul of it. But it is something you very much need to be aware of.
I otherwise whole heartedly endorse this.
It's possible in theory they could add hooks into the OS to then do that next time you use the key (e.g. effectively a baked in backdoor) or maybe in some cases the key can be extracted from an iCloud backup or similar (I'm not 100% sure how those keys are stored, but it's likely detailed in their security documentation) but in general the service itself cannot see the encrypted device location.
The reason is that (a) zfs send/recv is very fast and can be done on an hourly (or even faster) basis even with billions of files, but file-based replication (e.g. rsync or rclone) is typically slower with large file counts. We can afford to have a slower pipeline to the offsite-storage.
(b) I wanted to prevent some kind of ZFS bug in send/recv handling accidentally transferring corruption from the original data store to both backups
(c) Depending on the zfs send/recv flags that are used, it can remove snapshots not on the source host. So there is scope for both accidental and malicious deletion of all snapshots depending on the circumstance.
(d) You don't want all files being removed on the source to remove all copies in either the backup or offsite-backup location. That is the reason the offsite-backup had it's own point-in-time snapshots so that if all of the files are deleted from the source + backup, when the offsite-backup replicates that state and removes all of it's files, you can still access the files from the previous point-in-time snapshot.
(e) You don't want a hacker that penetrates 1 of the 3 storage locations to be able to cause or directly access both of the other 2 locations. This is commonly possible because SSH keys are used to allow zfs send/recv or rsync. Pivoting from a production storage to all backups (and destroying them) has happened in some high profile malicious cases, e.g. Distributed IT.. At a basic level, this means for example your backup server can't directly co-ordinate both the local and offsite backups via SSH otherwise it may have direct access to both environments and if the backup server is compromised.
Ever since then I now backup and image the entire HDD and I have almost literally terrabytes of extra OS images "just in case" I forgot or lost something. Hasn't really happened yet. Except I still can't find my Bitcoin from 2010. Doh.