2,406 karma · joined July 30, 2007
E.g. that chart says that ~96% of Medicare spending went to beneficiaries. That sounds good, but all it means is that 96% of the dollars were paid to hospitals/doctors/medical device manufacturers/etc. It says nothing about how efficiently those people are providing their services, i.e. how efficiently those 96% of Medicare dollars are being spent. A lot of those dollars get quickly chewed up by high prices (which I'd argue are themselves caused by the market distortions that these programs foster).
There's often an assumption in these discussions that if a billionaire isn't spending their money in a socially optimal way, the government will spend it better. But if you look at how governments actually spend their money, you'll find very little evidence to support that assumption.
Regulatory agencies, by contrast, are an extremely fragile system. That's in the sense that if the right people are in charge, it could go well, but if the wrong people are in charge, it's a disaster. And it's completely commonplace to find that the wrong people are in charge.
A good system either makes it very hard for the wrong people to gain control, or, to use a Milton Friedman line, "makes it profitable for the wrong people to do the right thing".
What I was trying to say with my comment is that neither of those conditions is true at most regulatory agencies.
You can't cry foul when a coin comes up tails if you were happy the whole time it was coming up heads. Agencies that have the power to make good decisions by force also have the power to make bad decisions by force.
http://www.wired.com/2013/07/we-need-to-stop-focusing-on-jus...
I think the author is right about the problems, and these solutions seem sound. These are the kinds of things ossified institutions always say, and they're actually usually right (e.g. Bill Gates's prescient Internet Tidal Wave memo which predicted the ways in which Microsoft would fail to become a dominant player on the web, or the peanut butter memo at Yahoo).
The trouble is that actually implementing changes like these at an incumbent institution is hard. Really hard. So hard, in fact, that failure is overwhelmingly the rule. In most industries, the way that plays out is that incumbents fail to change, new competitors emerge with the new processes baked into them from the beginning, and they then kill the incumbents. A few years later, those new folks ossify and then themselves get killed by the next wave. And so on.
A healthy industry offers all its players a choice: "Evolve or die. Do whichever one you want, but one of those two things will happen." There's no third option, "Do your best to evolve". The institution succeeds at changing or it dies, and that's all there is to it.
The trouble in healthcare is that incumbents do get that third option. And the reason they get it is that for the most part, there are no new competitors to kill them off.
There may be some extremely marginal contribution to housing costs that you can blame on these ultra-premium buildings, but it's not the root cause, and playing whack-a-mole with these symptoms is what got the city's real estate so expensive in the first place.
Do folks think that if One57 hadn't been built, a building full of $150k studios would have gone up in its place? Because of the difficulty and cost of building, these money towers are increasingly the only thing that developers can afford to build. Build something more palatable and you'd go out of business.
The backlash to these buyers is IMO a misguided blend of economic misunderstanding and xenophobia. Something tells me that if the rich buyers were all from Colorado, people wouldn't have quite so much to say about it.
(To avoid getting sidetracked by chronic medicines that some people swear by, I'm directing this point more at non-food drugs that are designed to take people from normal health to great health rather than from a disease state back to normal.)
The book gets at the problems in the industry on a much deeper level than anything else I've seen.
For a good summary, check out Goldhill's Big Think interview on the subject: http://bigthink.com/ideas/big-think-interview-with-david-gol...
This is an amazingly light convenience, with really solid, streamlined execution. People, it's ok to think something is good.
They don't actually posit a natural right to anonymity specifically. The core idea is that the only moral use of force is self-defense. Therefore, it would be immoral for people to use force against you (in this system, laws are considered force because the government backs them with the threat of arrest) if you're not using force against them.
"Anonymous communication being a non-violent act, it is immoral to use force to suppress anonymous communication" ~= "the government has no right to shut down sites like Silk Road"
A law that "protects" applicants from having the option to say "yes" lowers their income. Giving them the freedom to answer the question either way leaves them the choice between a higher income and the privacy of their Facebook account. It's not a happy choice, but if I valued the first more highly, I wouldn't like the government to force the second on me.
http://reason.com/archives/2011/02/14/the-19-percent-solutio...
Lots of companies automatically delete all email older than six months for this exact reason, actually.
That precedent doesn't bode well for this case. I don't see a qualitative difference between the contents of a safe and those of an encrypted drive.
One workaround: fail-deadly. Automatically wipe the encrypted data if the password isn't entered every n days. With a small enough n, the courts can't move fast enough to get the data before it's gone. (Whether this scheme constitutes obstruction of justice, I have no idea.)