I get your frustration here, but keep in mind: your use of that word is not harming Stripe any more than alternatives you could use, but it does harm an unrelated and oppressed group.
167 karma · joined March 18, 2011
That program P will certainly be longer than K (as it contains K), but not much longer — it's adding to K only the instructions needed to iterate over strings and define the threshold complexity ("2 million"). P will then produce that "2 million"-complexity output, but it didn't need any input and thus the complexity of its output is truly just the length of P (which is smaller than "2 million"). It eventually stumbles upon S by going through all possible strings, and didn't need S to be provided.
The main idea of the proof is very similar to the interesting-number paradox [0] or the Berry paradox [1].
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interesting_number_paradox
→ Software Engineers, Product Managers (PMs), Product Designers
Slang started as an MIT research project on using AI and NLP to make learning a new language as efficient as possible, and has grown into an adaptive English-learning platform that offers an unprecedented variety of specialized English courses and proficiency tests in 50+ industries like Law, Oil & Gas, and Aviation. With just a small team, we’ve already created the largest professional-English offering in the world, and now we’re scaling up to release 1,000 more courses over the next three years.
Learners use our learning apps to submit millions of language activities per week, managers use our LMS to visualize the progress of their students or employees, and our Content team uses our internal tools to provide expert curation and refine the output of our models.
We just closed a round and are scaling up our 6-person Product team to grow those applications. We're looking for engineers, product managers, and product designers. Our backend combines a Ruby/Rails API with a data-intensive Java stack, and our frontends include a React/TypeScript/MobX web UI and Cordova-based hybrid mobile apps.
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Your point stands nonetheless — they could certainly be losing money on certain large users of their free tier. Serving relatively static content has gotten extremely cheap across the board, though, and like the parent said, they might be benefiting from the pricing by more indirect means.
A bit of a bigger space to search ;)
[1] https://chessprogramming.wikispaces.com/Simplified+evaluatio... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chess_piece_relative_value
[1] Black bile is actually the source of the term "melancholy" — from the Greek melankholia, from melan- ("black") and kholē ("bile")!
I wonder if his choice to cancel Comma is related to Tesla's recent announcement that all new Tesla vehicles would ship with a full video camera outfit.
Wikipedia has it first on their "list of problems that might be NP-intermediate", i.e. problems that are in NP but not in P or NP-hard. [0]
For what it's worth, the latest Canary (https://canary.is/) is configured via a 3.5mm cable connected to your phone, and the configuration process is relatively smooth compared to the goofy ad-hoc WiFi network approach.
[1] http://www.rvapc.com/works/707-20-fenchurch-street [2] http://www.rvapc.com/works/index/691-vdara-hotel--spa-at-cit...
Chrome's threat model [1] paints a different analogy. In their view—which I do think is reasonable—the OS is the house and Chrome is simply a room in the house. You don't put locks on all of the interior doors of your house to keep out burglars who might've bypassed your front door, do you?
Their threat model makes sense for many users, and it's flawed for many others. One valid criticism that I do support of Chrome's model of handling passwords is the obscurity of it all. Users as a whole should certainly have a much better idea of how their passwords are being handled.
[1] http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/security-faq#...
Why aren't physically-local attacks in Chrome's threat model?
People sometimes report that they can compromise Chrome by installing a malicious DLL on a computer in a place where Chrome will find it and load it. (See https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=130284 for one example.) People also sometimes report password disclosure using the Inspect Element feature (see e.g. https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=126398).
We consider these attacks outside Chrome's threat model, because there is no way for Chrome (or any application) to defend against a malicious user who has managed to log into your computer as you, or who can run software with the privileges of your operating system user account. Such an attacker can modify executables and DLLs, change environment variables like PATH, change configuration files, read any data your user account owns, email it to themselves, and so on. Such an attacker has total control over your computer, and nothing Chrome can do would provide a serious guarantee of defense. This problem is not special to Chrome — all applications must trust the physically-local user.
That's why I mentioned an iPhone-specific design, as well. The iPhone's pixel density isn't a problem because it can be distinguished from the iPad 2. And, as you've shown, if the iPhone-specific design is displayed on the iPad Mini then there is no problem at all. The issue is that there is no way to distinguish between the iPad 2 and the iPad Mini.
If iPad Minis are served iPhone-specific designs, then you're right—it doesn't matter. And perhaps the solution is "you shouldn't be making iPad 2/iPhone-specific designs," but that's not what I'm getting at.