However, it might mean that they have to re-implement big parts of the Android runtime, or even do clean-room implementations by people not previously involved in those projects, to prevent legal attacks on the inevitably-similar code that results.
3,510 karma · joined April 1, 2010
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/ge0rg; my proof: https://keybase.io/ge0rg/sigs/IbGDkSaF88bGZ5TR2pBfzVgSpIjQIR2ujem0AQx0qms ]
However, it might mean that they have to re-implement big parts of the Android runtime, or even do clean-room implementations by people not previously involved in those projects, to prevent legal attacks on the inevitably-similar code that results.
A licensing fee would be a valid and reasonable outcome. It probably can even work without making Android closed-source, by choosing the licenses accordingly or maybe have some kind of early-access or migration-support agreements (IANAL).
The main point is that Google is using a monopoly in one market to retain a monopoly in another market, and this is illegal. As far as I'm reading the press release, Google is not barred from developing and offering Android for free, if they wish so - they are only disallowed to abuse their monopoly.
but it also forced browsers to find independent business models
It stopped Microsoft from preventing independent business models for browsers; it was just too late already for the commercial browser vendors of the time. And the current EU ruling will hopefully allow other mobile OS developers (or startups) to compete on more equal grounds.
Of course we still have the network effect of Google Play, featuring a market dominance over Android apps and Android users. I wouldn't be too surprised to see another future EU ruling requiring Google to unbundle Google Play from all but technical requirements, possibly allowing users to legally get access to Google Play on AOSP-based devices, or using alternative clients.
They sheer developer power Google has at hand to throw at Android development, including out-of-tree-kernel patchsets, means that it is a very significant effort to just keep pace with them, and the AOSP "code drops" come late and require major integration work.
If they wanted to switch to a closed-source model, they could have adopted that for the runtime a long time ago, still keeping the closed-source blob on top of the Linux kernel.
Maybe the EU decision will change the benefit balance of Android "being open source", and Google will go on with forking off / replacing the whole middleware, but I think that with their speed of Android development most commercially viable OEMs only have a chance to follow by subscribing to Google contracts (and maybe getting early access to new releases) anyway.
Proving a business relationship sounds like a multi-day endeavor, whereas you typically want to undo the damage ASAP.
I've seen a BigCorp load balancer / web firewall log the first 1KB of each HTTP POST body into a permanent archive. A typical login submission is much smaller than that. Also in some networks the TLS connection is terminated by a frontend server and backend communication is plaintext HTTP.
While these examples are obviously bad practice, having your requests signed and not leak user passwords would easily nullify their impact.
On my Android Auto, the voice-activated voice control also tends to trigger inadvertently when playing podcasts.
1. the data link layer is not protected, so an attacker can perform a relay attack (forward the encrypted radio packets between the phone and the actual cell tower).
2. from watching the encrypted traffic patterns, it is possible to guess which websites the user is surfing by comparing the traffic fingerprints.
3. the packets are not integrity-protected, so it's possible to change bits of data, if you can guess which packet you have and how it's constructed. This is used to manipulate DNS requests to redirect traffic.
I'm not sure about the significance of #1 and #2. A passive attacker might be able to obtain the same information simply by monitoring the physical layer traffic patterns emitted by the phone. Additionally, mobile operators are typically monitoring their frequencies for abuse, so an active attack might not stay under the radar for long.
Regarding #3, this is a complicated way to achieve what you can do with a fake WiFi hotspot, and gives you control over unencrypted communications, which hopefully is only a very small subset of todays traffic thanks to omnipresent HTTPS.
Unfortunately, the article doesn't state the false-positive and false-negative rates of the technologies used, so it's impossible to calculate the actual risks of being accused of something, once your sample is in the database.
As somebody who has been on irc for over 20 years now, and shares most of the sentiment, I still wouldn't invest into the tech. As others have written, the protocol simply isn't adequate for today's usage scenarios.
This is a problem that people have been fighting with some success on xmpp, which is far more flexible and is a superset of what irc provides, and there are the obvious web stack based solutions like Slack, Matrix and Mattermost.
Still, people rather use Facebook groups today, and we won't convert them by making irc better.
- violate my GDPR rights by requiring opt-out from their tracking, instead of opt-in
- are going to sell my data to hundreds of "partners"
https://gdprhallofshame.com/5-techcrunch-engadget-and-oath-c...
Even if I would bother enough to do this dance from my mobile device, which I don't, there is no way the article can convince me that it's unbiased journalism.
BlackEnergy is a toolkit that has been used for years by various criminal outfits. In the summer of 2014, we noted that certain samples of BlackEnergy malware began targeting Ukranian government organizations for information harvesting. These samples were identified as being the work of one group, referred to in this document as “Quedagh”, which has a history of targeting political organizations.
The only way I see how anybody could conclude from "APT uses a black market toolkit" to "Anybody using this toolkit is that APT" is: clickbait.
[0] https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AR-...
[1] https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenerg...
[..] to counter Russian-engineered malware that has infected hundreds of thousands devices.
I'm interested in the evidence for this attribution. Both ars and dailybeast [0] are pointing to Russia, but the only specific hints are that it's targeting Ukraine (which might also have to do with the prevalence of vulnerable devices there, we don't know that), and that it shares code with the BlackEnergy bot builder toolkit[1], which apparently can be bought on the black market for a decade already.
Neither of the original articles [2,3] mention Russia or any of the Russian APTs, so I'm genuinly interested in better attribution data.
[0] https://amp.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-fbi-seizes-control-o...
[1] https://community.rsa.com/thread/186012
[2] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html
[3] https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/vpnfilter...
I'm not sure I agree that making the vendors liable in case of vulnerabilities is the right way. It should probably suffice to require vendors to define a guaranteed product support period, where they are obliged to provide security patches, and then hold them liable if they fail that.
Regarding cutting off backwards compatibility to improve the design, Intel's Itanium (affectionately called "Itanic") was a very progressive approach to shift the optimization work from the CPU (and the compiler) to just the compiler. I'm not sure what the reasons for its failing were, though.
Microsoft has set up a patch delivery infrastructure that's pretty effective and comparably fast by industry standards, if not deactivated by the people who got offended by the forced Windows 10 upgrade and feature creep.