fmoralesc

"Do finish the house chores" is more naturally taken as a command, so the question is whether it should be assigned a truth value at all. It is linked to some normative claims that would plausibly be truth-valued: "you are permitted to play Minecraft only if you finish the chores", or perhaps "you ought to finish the chores, or you are not permitted to play Minecraft". The former is equivalent to the original sentence only if we take "can't" as expressing lack of permission (which it may not): "if you don't finish house chores, you can't/are not permitted to play Minecraft".

> Gnome just removed the middle-click paste option. Is that because they fixed the clipboard situation on Linux, and there's a universal, unambiguous way of cut and paste that works across every application? No. It's because middle-click to paste is an "X-ism." This is just demagoguery and unserious.

They disabled it by default. You can enable it if you want.

I use lazygit in neovim through the snacks plugin: https://github.com/folke/snacks.nvim/blob/main/docs/lazygit.... It works really nicely, without any fuss.

Some quick remarks:

1) I have been using typst to create slides with some success. Adding special features tends to be simpler than in beamer.

2) cetz (https://github.com/cetz-package/cetz) works quite well and is comparable to tikz in complexity and capability. of course, there is more support for tikz, but it is bound to improve over time.

You can use typst locally and bypass the commercial bits. It is really easy to create different kinds of documents with it. I have been using it to create slides and handouts, and for that I already find it much easier to use than the alternatives.

Any Turing-complete language should be able to express programs that do this.

I read it recently and while the ideas are there, it is not a great read (the dialogues in particular are pretty bad).

Not just not GNU: they also ditch systemd for dinit, syslog-ng and a bunch of homegrown plumbing:

> We are also putting a lot of effort into writing fresh low-level plumbing. For example, Chimera comes with first-class and built-in support for user services and other things dependent on session tracking (such as a shared session bus), implemented from scratch thanks to our Turnstile project, finally bringing functionality previously only available on distributions using systemd. This is being implemented in a vendor-independent manner so that other distributions can adopt it.

> For all of modern human history, work has been limited to screens.

Is this a parody?

The far right can only infest.

AZERTY is plainly the worst.

I got 44.

The compositor (mutter) provides support for global hotkeys.

If one thinks that certain mathematical are mere constructions, one might also reject certain mathematical methods. Take intuitionism as a case: Brouwer thought that mathematics was the product of the human mind, and restricted maths to whatever is constructible in a very strict sense. Finitism adds even further constraints, disallowing infinitary methods altogether. In these cases, the position seems to be that we cannot hold on to the usual commitment to mathematical entities.

The problem is that if your definition of knowledge requires only three conditions (belief, truth and justification), then it has counterexamples, namely, the Gettier cases. So we need to either revise our concept of justification (for example, make it so that a knowledge-apt belief is justified only if it is for the right reasons -- but then, how to account for justified but false beliefs?), look for ways to supplement the analysis with additional conditions (for example, that the conditions are satisfied in a robust ways counterfactually), or reject the idea that knowledge can be analyzed altogether.

To make it more concrete how this sort of thing can get complicated quickly, consider your own explanation of the case. As I take it, you think that the issue is that "the justification is faulty". But how is it faulty, besides not being true (remember, we have reasons to want justification to not imply truth)? And also, there are Gettier-like cases where we cannot say that justification is faulty or where we can't find false premises (for example, cases where it seems like the problem is that the individuals in questions are not in an appropriate environment, see [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem#False_premises...)).

One assumption there is that testimony can provide you with justification. We are told by the article that Edmund Gettier has died earlier this year, and we seem to be justified in believing that. In that case, let's assume, justification and truth matches. But this isn't the case always. You may see that the color of the wall is red, for example, and may feel prima facie justified in believing that the wall is red. But it may be the case that, unknown to you, there is a red light projected over the wall, which is actually cream color. In an absolute sense, you are wrong, but your belief is still justified. 'Justified' and 'true' are used for different purposes.

Gettier cases are not cases where erroneous logic leads to a correct conclusion. The reasoning in a Gettier case can be perfectly fine; this is why the belief of Gettierized subjects remains justified. The issue is, rather, that because of "luck" there is a risk for reasoning/belief formation mechanism to go wrong, at the same time that it turns out to have produced a correct/true belief. The issue derives from there being a gap between a proposition being justified and it being true (Linda Zagzebski has a great paper that shows that whenever that is the case, you will end up with an analogous problem).

GTK3 isn't deprecated (like GTK2 is), and there is no rush to port things to GTK4 yet. In terms of it being 'pre-alpha' (besides the docs, which in my experience before was always lagging behind), everything in the roadmap is basically done: https://wiki.gnome.org/Projects/GTK/Roadmap/GTK4

On the other hand, the changes in Gnome 40 were not as massive as the change from 2 to 3, and to me at least the change felt more incremental than disruptive (of course, the transition period is always a bit rough, some non-essential extensions for gnome-shell didn't work for me after the change, but eventually everything I needed was ported--I even dropped some extensions). I feel that saying that 'a lot of the work from 3 was thrown away' is an overstatement.

I had no connection to the ZZT community, and I loved the ZZT book. I think it captures very well the feeling of being a sort of outcast and trying to express oneself through art. I always remember the bit about being excited about a project and then waking up to the next day and feeling just so... inadequate to the task.

First, you check if the instance that you are subscribing to caters to your interests - signing up to a random instance is bound to be useless. Then you can just follow people from the local feed, or something that catches your fancy from the global feed. And if you find a mastodon user from a different instance that you are interested in (maybe in a google search), you can follow them and the system will redirect you so your instance connects you to them.

Just tried recording from my laptop's mic - the reported latency from Ardour was 5,3ms (with 256 samples/buffer). It crashed when I went down to 128 samples/buffer.

'normal' shifts with what people get away with, but 'acceptable' does not.

> the study of philosophy is to a significant degree concerned with a survey of the historic development of certain traditions of thought, and ideas.

Have you actually been exposed to any high-level contemporary philosophical research? While it is true that many philosophers do care about the history of ideas, this is quite often done in order to treat various philosophical questions systematically (for many philosophers, it's all about the questions, not about any 'philosophy' that needs to be studied). Besides, for many philosophers there is also some interest to integrate their work with the work of researchers in many other disciplines. If you work in philosophy of language, it would be ridiculous not to try to acquire some working knowledge of linguistics and cognitive science. If you work in epistemology (aka the theory of knowledge), you have to have some knowledge of cognitive science, game theory, computer science, psychology, evolutionary theory, and so on, just to know what other philosophers might be discussing.

GP's claim could be parsed in many different ways (what is 'understanding'? what is 'the structure of knowledge'?), and the suggestion that whatever that is is 'predominantly done' in computer science betrays some ignorance (or perhaps some willing obtuseness) about the alternatives. That you think that their claim was meaningless says more about you than about the claim. Why, instead of disagreeing with GP immediately, don't you ask them what they mean? You know, engage with a philosophical thought?

It's funny how these things go. In my circles at the beginning of the 2000s it was somewhat of a mantra that Radiohead's OK Computer or My Bloody Valentine's Loveless were the best albums from the 90s (I would go for the latter). Loveless was somewhat of a rediscovered thing; before that, I imagine that Nirvana's Nevermind was one of the most beloved.

That was the exact thing that caught my attention.

For him, even the single square would not exist, only its many many ways it could be. And each separately.

> "No sólo le costaba comprender que el símbolo genérico perro abarcara tantos individuos dispares de diversos tamaños y diversa forma; le molestaba que el perro de las tres y catorce (visto de perfil) tuviera el mismo nombre que el perro de las tres y cuarto (visto de frente)."

> "Not only he struggled to understand that the generic symbol for dog would encompass so many disparate individuals of many sizes and diverse shapes; he was upset that the dog at three and fourteen (from the side) had the same name that the dog at quarter past three (from the front)."

"The challenge that the novel of ideas faces: how does one integrate the exposition and discussion of ideas in the context of a novel (when the origin of those ideas is not the novel itself)?"

"[The techniques used in the novel of ideas] are in conflict with some expectations [enumerated here...] about how a novel works, that in turn were established as novels became more than historical retellings and romances stories".

It is stuffy, but not meaningless.

> First of all, the introduction which bashes the paper which applying social network techniques to fiction? If the author had bothered to look it up, they would have realized the authors are an applied mathematician and theoretical physicist. Not humanities.

Nonsense. Whether a piece of research belongs to the humanities doesn't have to do with the credentials of the researchers but with the subject matter. If we genuinely want to say that scientific and mathematical methods are fruitful to explore questions in the humanities (contra the main claim of the article), we have to at least allow this. Or would you say that the paper on the network structures in fictions is a piece of theoretical physics?

I second the recommendation of checking the Teach Yourself Logic guides by Peter Smith, but I will give some more specific recommendations:

- Greg Restall - Logic (and he also gives some recommendations of his own that are worth checking out). If you use this, check the errata in Restall's website.

- Richard Jeffrey - Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits (Smith has a textbook that is modelled largely after this, but Jeffrey's book is more to the point and fun to follow along)

- Daniel Velleman - How to Prove It, which has tons of good exercises for practicing symbolig logic in the context of the construction of proofs, and introduces some mathematics along the way.

It's the difference between:

- There is no evidence that P

- There is evidence that NOT-P

(without accounting for whether higher order evidence [evidence of evidence] counts as first-order evidence).