Seems like they could have potentially gotten access to the weights if they weren’t concerned about not doing crimes.
2,635 karma · joined August 22, 2013
Seems like they could have potentially gotten access to the weights if they weren’t concerned about not doing crimes.
Also, “sadist”? What?
The people you are talking about have not advocated mass murder via nuclear weapons. The idea was precisely targeted non-nuclear strikes against only the servers themselves. (Which, would have plenty of forewarning to allow people to leave the building.)
The claim that they advocated for the use of nuclear weapons is a lie.
This doesn’t seem like an unreasonable requirement to me. People do this all the time?
Sure, a request might not always be perfectly unambiguous. But people can generally estimate pretty well whether someone making a request is expecting the agent fulfilling the request to commit a crime in order to fulfill the request.
I was saying that human pursuit of understanding of things provides value beyond survival and resources.
Joint pursuit of a common goal is a way for people to better be-in-relation-with one-another.
If you mean individual particles, fundamental particles don't really have distinct individual identities (as shown by fermi and bose statistics).
As for types of particles: Well, photons surely move at the speed photons move at.
Special relativity is derived from the assumption/observation that light travels at the same speed in all inertial reference frames, and generally that the laws of physics work the same in any inertial reference frame.
What you are proposing sounds pretty vague and unclear to me, but, is what you are trying to say compatible with this?
If we take ZFC (or some other set theory) as our meta theory, we can easily see that the axiom of infinity (of ZFC) gives a set of natural numbers (using the von Neumann encoding), which, when equipped with the successor function, is a model of the natural numbers.
But there are also many cognitive tasks that the typical educated person would do better at than these models.
Like, e.g. long-term managing what a vending machine gets stocked with and what prices the items should be sold for. Or, various things like that.
When there are essentially no more tasks like that, then we’ve reached AGI.
They are still different concepts of course, but I imagine that once one is achieved, the others aren’t far off.
But I don’t think it is possible for us. At least, for strict senses of visualization. I suspect that the architecture of our brains doesn’t support it. This is rather speculative because I don’t know basically any neuroscience, but I wonder if the whole “the brain is largely a very wrinkled surface (though with several layers to this surface), and the retinas are also surfaces” may have something to do with this. A retina in a eye-4-ball would have a 3D boundary (I.e. hypersurface), and I imagine that the amount of information that it would take in if it had an at all similar angular resolution, would be too great for our visual cortex to be able to represent all of it.
Of course, our vision only really has the high resolution it seems to everywhere in the narrow region we’re directly looking at, but still.
Huh? Do you mean “isn’t especially conscious of the ingredients”?
Though, that interpretation seems confusing, because it seems to be meant to be contrasting with “macro slicing dicing stacking them” which doesn’t sound more attentive to what the ingredients are than “micro level spice and heat”.
So, I’m having trouble understanding. (This might be a me problem.)
Because they can’t use Chinese to speak about things they encounter in the world?
Like, someone asks them in Chinese whether they are hungry and want some food, and they answer based on the program, not based on whether they are actually hungry, because they don’t understand the words in a way that lets them use them as a person who understood Chinese would.
Again, I don’t mean to say that in such a situation that there is no understanding of Chinese happening in their head, only that this doesn’t constitute that person understanding Chinese.
It seems to me very strange to want to say that the person with the simulation in their head understands Chinese. They can’t do the things that understanding Chinese lets people do.
Perhaps the program the person has running in their head is even a person, a moral patient and a moral agent, and one who understands Chinese. But the person who is running (by rote) the program, doesn’t thereby understand Chinese. They may “contain understanding of Chinese”. The understanding is definitely happening in their brain. But they don’t understand Chinese.
It seems more likely to me that e.g. the individual fibers of the teddy bear are conscious than that there is a consciousness associated with the teddy bear as a whole. And I don’t find it particularly likely that the fibers do.
Like, by what mechanism is the teddy bear “one thing” in a way relevant for consciousness to be associated with that thing.
When people have stuff happen to their brain, this has an effect on their conscious experience in a way that isn’t true of e.g. their hair being cut, or their nails being clipped. In this way, the consciousness of a person seems associated more with their brain than to parts of their hair or nails. But, the way that a persons hair and nails is related to the rest of a person’s body (including their brain) seems more similar to how one bit of fluff is related to the rest of a teddy bear, than the way a part of someone’s brain is related to the rest of their body (including the rest of their brain).
Like, [bit of fluff]:[rest of bear]::[bit of hair or nail]:[rest of body (including brain)] is a better analogy than [bit of fluff]:[rest of bear]::[bit of brain]:[rest of body (including rest of brain)] is, and so, in the same way that removing a bit of someone’s hair or nail in a way that they don’t notice does not seem to alter that person’s conscious experience, while removing or altering a bit of their brain very much can alter their conscious experience, I would expect that removing a bit of a teddy bear would have no impact on any conscious experience it might have, and this goes for, every part of it? Like, any way that you cut it in a (n/(2n+1)), ((n+1)/(2n+1)) split, I would expect that to be more like the “removing some hair” to whatever conscious experience it might have, and so, I expect that it probably has no overall conscious experience?
I find the idea that a single thread has an overall conscious experience to be a little more likely than a teddy bear having one. Like, if you cut a thread, that’s always a pretty fundamental change.. idk. Again, I don’t think that’s like either.
That’s not to say that I think the Chinese Room Argument is convincing. I don’t think it is. Or, I guess it might demonstrate something, but not what it aims to show.
I would argue that if, say, the person who has memorized this program and mentally executes it, and if this program also includes actuating some levers to control a mech or something, and the program (running via the person mentally going through the instructions by rote) takes actions to pursue some goals (e.g. purchasing some wood by conversing in Chinese and building a tower with that wood), while the person on whom the program is running wouldn’t know how to order a cheeseburger in Chinese,
Then, the program running in that person’s head might well understand Chinese even though the person doesn’t. (Whether or not the program actually understands Chinese, I think probably depends on the specific of the program in ways that I don’t think anyone knows. I don’t expect that any program that would understand could be small enough that a human person could memorize it and execute it by rote in this way, but this is a thought experiment and such issues can be disregarded I think.)
It is in this sense that, AIUI, electrons are modeled as point particles.
Of course, that doesn’t mean that if we zoom in enough, probing at higher and higher energy scales, that it can’t turn out to have some non-zero fundamental size outside of just uncertainty in its center of mass position. I think string theory would say that at the string scale it would be a string.
But, AIUI, no experiment has shown it to have the kind of extent that would make it be called not a point particle (an extent in a sense beyond just uncertainty in COM position)
Suppose the plaintext, ciphertext, and key, are each a natural number modulo 5.
The key is selected uniformly at random. The ciphertext is obtained by adding the key to the plaintext (and as a result is also uniform random).
Then the ciphertext is sent to the server. The server only has the ciphertext, which is uniform random. The server then adds some integer mod 5 to the ciphertext, producing a new ciphertext, and sends it back to the user. The user then subtracts their key from the new ciphertext to obtain the new plaintext, which is their original plaintext plus the number the server added.
At no point in this process did the server learn anything about the user’s plaintext.
This is clearly secure.
It is also useless, because just adding a number isn’t a useful thing for a server to do (they may as well just send the user the number and let them add it themselves), but that’s because it is a toy example.
I suppose if mind uploading were possible, then under FHE it would in principle be possible to take the ciphertext and run the computation of “this mind upload of this person reads the data and provides some output”, and then presumably that uploaded person would have the experience of seeing the plaintext? But it wouldn’t be possible to get any information about the plaintext without the key (or enough brute force to find the key, but that’s why we use big enough keys to make this infeasible).