Let me try to reconstruct what has been said. You seem to be reacting to points different from the one I tried to make.
bjornsing: All of mathematics can in principle be derived from ZFC.
morelisp: not all, there are independent statements. Mathematics is beyond formalization.
bjornsing: like what? are you saying that formalization is futile? or not?
me: CH is an example. formalizing is not futile, but affected by incompleteness theorems in the sense that all those proof assistants, when used for developing some theory, will require something else to prove the consistency of that theory.
dwohnitmok: the point of incompleteness is not that it requires a stronger system, but that a weaker system cannot prove a stronger system, killing the idea of trusted computing base.
See, I was not trying to expound the significance of the Second Incompleteness Theorem; I do not really care what mathematicians consider as in or out of "all mathematics," but I noticed that "being able to formalize all mathematics" has become a somewhat technical expression in logic.
I like very much what you're writing in that comment. I have also seen Gentzen's consistency argument for PA and think the qualification that you include at the end about weaker systems sometimes being able to show the consistency of stronger ones is needed.
I did not imply that proving consistency of X within X is desirable.
However, I am intrigued by Artemov using a provability operator to prove consistency of PA in PA: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.07404 Provability logic is interesting, a modal logic that adds Loeb's theorem as axiom (maybe Carl Hewitt would consider it a foundation of computer science? but I digress.)
Now, the reason I feel compelled to comment back: I do not understand why you bring up completeness. What are you reacting to? Are you trying to imply that using incomplete foundations is the key to ignore the challenge of proving consistency?
Saying "ZFC is enough for all mathematics" is a commitment to ZFC axioms and to first-order logic.
First order logic is compact and complete.
As such, it is very much affected by the First Incompleteness Theorem and also the Second, and there will also be non-standard models and the Skolem paradox.
I don't have a horse in the foundation and formalization race, just curious what you mean. As far as I can tell (and I may well be off, not a mathematician), it seems quite desirable that foundations worthy of the name would let us prove all theorems of arithmetic and natural numbers.