7,275 karma · joined October 14, 2018
https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/apples-poor-patchin...
https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/issues/14404
https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/issues/33186
See also previous HN discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45358980
For now, I think existing exclaves such as the one that displays the camera indicator do not really apply to macOS (since MacBooks have dedicated hardware for that), but in the future there might be exclaves that do.
Do you have a source on that? I'm interested.
However, in the case of Spectre, I think the OS should try to prevent exploitation rather than end programs, with a user-facing toggle to disable mitigations per-program for compatibility reasons.
[1] https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/08/macos-11s-hid...
I haven't found any language usage numbers for recent versions of Windows, but Microsoft is using Rust for both new development and rewriting old features [1] [2].
[0] Refer to section "Evolution of the programming languages" https://blog.timac.org/2023/1128-state-of-appkit-catalyst-sw...
[1] https://www.theregister.com/2023/04/27/microsoft_windows_rus...
[2] https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/31/microsoft_seeks_rust_...
https://9to5mac.com/2024/08/06/macos-sequoia-screen-recordin...
Now, whether his GitHub account is currently being controlled by him is another question.
Also, for some more context: In 2022, Lasse said he was struggling to work on xz and was looking for maintainers, and mentioned Jia Tan: https://www.mail-archive.com/xz-devel@tukaani.org/msg00567.h...
--js-flags="--jitless"
You can also disable JIT in Firefox by setting javascript.options.baselinejit, javascript.options.ion and javascript.options.native_regexp to false in about:config, although you won't get CET.[1] https://github.com/chromium/chromium/blob/12c232c43ce7324d30...
- There is no real concept of base system because distros are usually a patchwork of software from diverse sources. This means stuff like proper secure boot is not really feasible on any distro (although AFAIK the systemd/Fedora people are working on it with signed UKIs and immutable OS images).
- Some features that could live in userland for improved security are instead implemented in the kernel, while both Windows and macOS generally keep moving exploitable features like font rendering to userland.
- Distros often disable or disregard security features such as SELinux or mitigations like CFI.
Here [2] is a more detailed article examining the lack of security of Linux desktops in case you're interested.
[1] https://grapheneos.org/build#reproducible-builds
> Stock Pixel OS has it as a developer option which isn't usable in practice since it breaks far too much. The implementation is also much less powerful than hardened_malloc.
> We integrated it into hardened_malloc where it's able to provide stronger security properties than the experimental stock OS implementation.
> When fully integrated into the compiler and each heap allocator, MTE enforces a form of memory safety. It detects memory corruption as it happens. 4 bit tags limit it to probabilistic detection for the general case, but deterministic guarantees are possible via reserving tags. In hardened_malloc, we deterministically prevent sequential overflows by excluding adjacent tags.
Also, currently it's not clear if it makes sense to enable kernel MTE:
> MTE support for protecting the Linux kernel isn't enabled yet, but we can likely enable that by default too. However, it's currently part of kasan and is more oriented towards debugging than hardening. It's not entirely clear that enabling it in the current state is a good idea.
musl (used by default on Alpine and Chimera Linux) and the BSD libc’s on the other hand are much more minimal and conservative.
If you mean a true capability-based OS, there is Fuchsia, which doesn't seem to be used yet, and RedoxOS, which is in development.
Could you elaborate? I didn't know Macs send local file hashes to Apple even if you don't use iCloud.