352 karma · joined January 18, 2021
I'm currently on macOS, and while I can cross-compile applications, I can't actually bundle them as Flatpaks. For that, I need `flatpak-builder`, which is so deeply coupled to Linux itself that I don't think it can realistically run on other platforms.
Snaps have a similar issue with `snapcraft`. However, you can still build a snap manually with `mksquashfs`, whereas I haven't found an equivalent low-level option for Flatpak. I may be missing something, though, and I'm still looking.
To make such testing strategy to work data structures need to be small. It is better to have multiple small data structures rather than one big universal one where methods are defined at the ctx level making exhaustive tests difficult.
Perhaps, I haven’t been clear. I agree with Pike’s advice strongly. What I am trying to say here is that the Perl’s rule 9 is diametrically opposite of what Pike says.
What I am getting at is that when one has such gigantic data structure there is no separation of concerns.
How does one approach collaborators in this situation? Like, hey, I have this idea that solves the problem you have been trying to solve in a fundamentally different way that invalidates all the legacy approaches you have invested in, BTW. My emails that follow this spirit tend to get ghosted.
You may be interested in looking into AppBundler. Apart from the full application packaging it also offers ability to make Julia image bundles. While offering sysimage compilation option it also enables to bundle an application via compiled pkgimages which requires less RAM and is much faster to compile.
This is the literal definition of receipt freeness. It’s hard to ensure that the receipt you receive to verify your vote had not already been forged by the malware.
Actually, Benaloh's challenge also does not offer receipt freeness. The adversarial strategy in such a model is to outsource the challenger itself in a hash function which decides whether to accept or discard the vote. It may look impractical at first, but one can build an app that could do that efficiently.
It can be said that all existing end-to-end verifiable remote e-voting systems compromise individual verifiability when reconciling it with receipt-freeness by introducing an assumption about the hardware-based protection of voters' secrets. If they leak or are predetermined by a corrupt vendor implementation, the malware on the voter's client can manipulate the vote at submission, and the adversary later fakes verification for the voter by exploiting that knowledge.
Still, I believe it's a solvable problem which needs more attention. Bingo evoting system is almost there, for instance, with verifiably random generated trackers, but needs a voting booth with a Bingo machine taken at home.