436 karma · joined May 24, 2017
The core point made regarding why IDA is a superior product despite license unfairness is vendor support. However, the authors seem to miss that the target audience of IDA are tinkerers, who would be fine with fixing their own tools as long as the issues are only on the surface.
Hex-Rays is not Oracle, who can afford to live from license unfairness because their product is embedded deeply into the livelihood of so many large companies. Hex-Rays provides just a tool, which I have already replaced by Cutter with Radare2 and Ghidra's decompiler in my workflow.
I would not use IDA Home even if it was free due to its limitations and lack of Hex-Rays' Decompiler.
[1] https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/compelling-reasons-to-...
- U2F Tokens cost $8-$25 and are significantly cheaper than full-blown Yubikeys
- U2F Tokens do not have a key limit, which enables using a unique public key per server for privacy/anonymity
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROT...
Note that it is not apparent whether some of data listed under "end-to-end encrypted" is also included with iCloud Backups.
I have tried to reproduce the issue and found that even though you can create provisioning profiles for direct distribution with the Network Extension entitlement, and the UI shows that all is fine, the provisioning profile does NOT contain the required entitlement.
After some digging I found a FAQ on network extensions by Apple [1]. Point #8 clearly says:
> #8 — On the Mac, can Developer ID apps host Network Extension providers?
> Currently this is not possible; only Mac App Store apps can host Network Extension providers.
Thus the missing entitlement is most likely not a bug (and the cert UI is just bad). This is not a technical limitation, just Apple with questionable politics.
Personally I'm happy to see WireGuard in the App Store, but would be concerned if Apple indeed limits the API to it. Could you elaborate on if distribution outside of the App Store is impossible?
However, the article only mentioned that decompilation is easier with LLVM IR, because it is a more high-level language. It certainly is a valid point, but addresses the topic of binary obfuscation instead for algorithmic security.
I'm thus wondering if anyone can shed some light on the real security aspects. For example, let's say that I compile C that is supposed to run in constant time to LLVM IR and submit it to Apple. Does Apple guarantee that their blackbox optimizations do not introduce branches or other factors that may result in variable timing into a constant time algorithm? Can I do anything to ensure that my code will always run in constant time despite unknown optimizations being applied to it in the future?
On macOS, applications address spaces are isolated and code signing certificates are used for identifying application requests to the keychain.