I was talking about the root cause, not about the symptoms. The article claims that the alarms were caused by a "checklist error", when in reality, it was an analog interface mismatch caused by incomplete specification which two different teams interpreted sufficiently differently to cause a hard-to-debug hardware problem.

If Eyles doesn't mention Hamilton, it's probably because she wasn't involved in the particular functionality of the Apollo software that is being ascribed to her by many articles on the Internet and that is relevant to the Apollo 11 incident. In this particular article, it's not claimed explicitly by the author, but it is insinuated by the statement "I read that the Apollo would not have been able to land without your software." Well, of course, if she was a team lead on the software effort, the whole software is "hers" from a certain point of view, but that's sort of like giving whole credit to Bill Gates for writing Microsoft Windows. Mindell does mention her on several occasions, but in the software resilience area, he connects her to rigorous checking and prevention of erroneous user inputs, not to executive fault-tolerance. This functionality has proven critical on at least one occasion (when Apollo 8 astronauts mistakenly attempted to initiate pre-start sequence in mid-flight) but not in the incident in question.