First, you have the problem that legislators have to outdo themselves in their "tough on crime" poses, leading to ever more draconian laws and potential sentences. Don't see a trivial way out of that apart from changing the political climate, but it's probably the biggest factor. Without the risk of completely out-of-whack penalties, the leverage of prosecutors diminishes.
'"We now have an incredible concentration of power in the hands of prosecutors," said Richard E. Myers II, a former assistant United States attorney who is now an associate professor of law at the University of North Carolina. He said that so much influence now resides with prosecutors that "in the wrong hands, the criminal justice system can be held hostage."'
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-pr...
Of course, the media could help by not hyping "ever increasing" criminality, which isn't true. Crime levels have been dropping not just in recent times, but pretty much throughout history, and are at historically unprecedented lows. Civic activism/awareness?
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/books/review/the-better-an...
Reduce or eliminate plea bargains. Justice should be justice, not a grimy barter deal. The ratio of guilty pleas to verdicts is now 30:1(!)
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?artic...
Adjust the incentives for prosecutors. Make these sorts of convictions and/or pleas less positive and/or drastically increase the disincentives for shenanigans that are found out.
EDIT: Have prosecutors, as public servants, be responsible for finding the truth, not for getting convictions. It is in the public's interest to get to the truth, not to convict or force guilty pleas of innocents.
I'm very curious about something that I read in Lessig's post about not being able to reach out to others for funds without incurring the ire of the District Court Judge. I wonder what that is about?
Since pleading out is much less expensive that jury trial, the current trend of forcing defendant to plead out will become overwhelming - basically, a mere fact jury trial would mean complete failure for a prosecutor ("you let that sucker have jury trial and cost our department whole next year budget?! good luck getting promotion anytime this century!"). They would behave accordingly - given that by now we have 5000 federal crimes and more will be inevitably created just for this purpose, standard scenario would be "we got you for 95 counts of federal crimes, summarily you could get 280 years in jail. Even if jury throws out 90% of them, you are still in for 30 years. How about accepting this one 2 year charge on the cheap and we are done here and now?"
Also, government wouldn't usually spend a million. Locking down someone's assets costs nothing do the government. Setting excessive bail and denying him opportunities to defend himself is also very cheap. So this measure would create incentive to concentrate on such methods of winning the case - why bother with expensive forensics if you can bankrupt him with asset forfeiture and he'd have no money to pay for a lawyer that would ask questions requiring expensive forensics? It's not the question of money, unfortunately. It's the question of vastly asymmetric power.
Additionally I would propose that in some random subset of accepted plea bargains, a trial is forced and if the plea is consistently unreasonably far from the plea, there should be some negative consequence for the prosecutor.
>>>> Additionally I would propose that in some random subset of accepted plea bargains, a trial is forced
So, let's say the defendant pleads out and the jury can not convict him because of whatever stupid thing. How it makes prosecutor necessarily bad? Remember in the recent case of Blagoyevich outright selling senate seat the jury could not convict him because one of the jurors thought it's just politics as usual and there's nothing criminal was going on? How something like that makes prosecutor bad? Juries are never certain. It would be hugely unfair and would definitely drive good ones from the job, because good people are usually sensitive to unfairness. Bad people would stay and manipulate the system so that their cases either don't get randomly selected somehow or get to a sympathetic judge, or some such.
I don't see how that makes sense.. If the prosecutor completely relies on having far more resources than the defendant, then surely the case is weak enough to lose?
It would definitely mean that prosecutors give up on more of their weaker cases.
> So, let's say the defendant pleads out and the jury can not convict him because of whatever stupid thing. How it makes prosecutor necessarily bad?
That's why I mentioned "consistently" bad...
This is difficult because the copyright lobby has some of the finest politicians money can buy, and because both legislators and the general public don't understand computers and are firmly convinced that anyone who understands computers has godlike powers.
Require federally funded research to be public domain.
This might actually be politically feasible. On or near the front page of this writing is a White House petition to do it.
You're part of the problem of course. You and everyone like you. By rejecting philosophy you reject ethics and therefore any possible means of addressing these systematic problems.
The difference between most democracies and dictatorships is that a dictatorship is despotism by minority and most democracies despotism by majority, not often are democracies systems of fairness.
What do you think the rational purpose of philosophy is?
I don't think philosophy has taught you much about being careful with ideas. That too is ironic. I shouldn't have to disclaim your ignorant presumptions every time you open your ignorant, presumptuous mouth.
Also, I asked you a basic question. I asked you what the purpose of philosophy was. Why are you evading the question?