Comment by PreInternet01 | Hacker News Reader

Comment by PreInternet01 | Hacker News Reader

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So, I think this article, like many others, does not really answer the question? Everyone can agree that "well, this airplane almost dropped from the sky because we apparently forgot to tighten some bolts" is a really really bad thing, but the cause seems less than clear?

1. Yeah sure, outsourcing bad, union-busting worse, but the fact remains that Spirit AeroSystems (the contractor that Boeing outsourced to, possibly for union-busting reasons) also assembles lots and lots of airframes for Airbus. Apparently without major issues?

2. The MCAS disaster was also really, really bad, but seems mostly unrelated, at least from a process point of view, from what has happened here (since it was fixed by updating the documentation, pretty much, and ultimately possibly not that different from initial Airbus struggles with flight automation)?

3. The 737-MAX (and 787, which is assembled using pretty much the same supply chain) seem, statistically speaking, much safer than older aircraft generations. It surely does not feel that way, but incidents-per-flight, not to mention incidents-per-flight-hour and incidents-per-flight-mile, strongly disagree.

The only facts that I can gather from amidst the wreckage of speculation, are that, yes, Boeing does seem to have an issue with basic tooling, which should definitely be corrected ASAP, but they're in the process of doing so, and then will be be pretty much as good and/or bad as their competition for the foreseeable future?

I would like to see the deep-dive on the cause of this (which we definitely will get, some months or years from now) before judging. And, for the record: I'm a huge Embraer 19x-E2 fan, love the A22x as well (engine issues notwithstanding), and will fly any version of the 737 as required.

The MCAS problem also involved:

• developing MCAS in the first place as a scheme to deny pilots simulator time on the novel flight characteristics introduced by the changed engine size and position (as a matter of marketing policy)

• deliberately failing to document the MCAS system to avoid attracting regulatory attention

• designing the system such that it only received data from the current pilot seat's ipsilateral air speed sensor, instead of reading redundantly from both air speed sensors, creating a single point of failure

it was a case of engineering incompetence upon moral incompetence.

Deny is a strong word. If Boeing's customers ask for a product that minimizes their staff retraining costs, is it simply Boeing at fault here? They found a clever way to shove a square peg into a round hole, which worked most of the time. Where it failed is when competing demands of "make it cheaper too" conflicted with the "minimize pilot training." The lowest cost trim was not designed to meet that demand.

When you're in the aviation industry, you're not allowed to "minimize pilot training" and "make it cheaper" if it interferes with the safety of the airplane.

I'm not eliminating Boeing's culpability here, merely pointing out a systemic problem in the industry. Boeing is competing with other aircraft manufacturers. The airlines are competing with other airlines. The standards bodies are comprised of individuals that in large part either belong to a manufacturer, or a supplier or the airlines themselves, with a few seats reserved for academics and the public sector.

Boeing did not break any rules with the MCAS. The implementation was in accordance with existing aviation regulations, passed inspection and was safely implemented throughout most of the world.

Yes they did break rules. They misclassified it's failure as hazardous instead of catastrophic, and deliberately implemented a SPOF architecture that had to get refactored to include both sensors. Then they misrepresented it as requiring no additional training.

There was a lot done against regulations at a minimum, and damn well don in bad faith with respect to the public.

What's the proof that they broke any rules? Is the FAA charging them with a regulatory failure? None, and no. The NY Times has a nice expose on the matter [1].

Quote from TFA: Boeing did not submit a formal review of MCAS after the overhaul. It wasn't required by F.A.A. rules.

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-f...

two planes fell out of the sky.

If you are to be believed, that they broke no regulation, rules, or laws, that's a damnation on the existing body of regulation, rules, and laws, not a defense of Boeing.

That's exactly what I'm trying to say. It's not a question of belief, but rather of fact. If Boeing had broken laws and regulations, they would be charged with a crime.

Yes. Boeing customers ask for a lot of things and it's Boeing's legal obligation to only provide them safe airplanes, no matter what they ask for.

Also worth mentioning that the Air Alaska flight revealed more undocumented functions, with the cockpit door opening as a pressure relief.

MCAS didn't cause the whole fleet to be grounded for months on end due to a simple documentation error. There were several instances of misconduct by Boeing, including misleading pilots about how the aircraf works, pressuring internal staff to certify procedures without enough time to validate them, offering configuration with only one angle of attack sensor. Worst of all, the whole MAX program was only intended to sidestep pilot and aircraft certification requirements by pretending that this brand new aircraft is just a small iteration in a 40 year old model.

It's wild that no one went to jail for this.

Was there ever an answer about why the one AoA sensor failed, on each of those planes? Even though there was only one per plane, it was basically new.

Well, the resolution of the MCAS disaster was... pretty much a documentation update?

There is now a warning sticker on the 737-MAX that says "CAUTION: this aircraft is equipped with a stick pusher. See owners manual (updated versions only) for details. MAY CAUSE DEATH OR OTHER SIDE EFFECTS."

Oh, and possibly the stick pusher has been made less aggressive in situations that only occur outside North America. But the public record is, eh, sketchy on that. Best-case, pilots now at least know about it.

The number or the configuration of the air flow/angle-of-attack sensors on the 737-MAX was not changed, nor were there any changes to how these sensors are connected to the flight control systems. And probably rightfully so: the 737 platform is simply not about fly-by-wire, and retrofitting is not a realistic option. Whether the MCAS update(s) fit within those constraints remains to be seen, but has no bearing on the current discussion.

Spirit does smaller assemblies for Airbus, whose production is mostly in Europe. They don't do whole airframes for them afaik.

The client still has the responsibility of doing quality controls at reception, or have good reasons to lighten them. Boeing has a lot to answer, especially since FAA gave them (after a ton of lobbying) the right to self-control themselves.

To clarify, as it's slightly ambiguous, Spirit has two factories in the UK that do most of their work for Airbus. They were originally British businesses. It's easily possible for there to be a very different culture there.

https://www.spiritaero.com/company/programs/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirit_AeroSystems

> Boeing has a lot to answer, especially since FAA gave them (after a ton of lobbying) the right to self-control themselves.

Then the FAA has a lot to answer for as well.

Assuming FAA's final safety check would've caught the issue at the time of inspection and not during the operating period when it malfunctioned.

FAA's delegation is common. For this instance, FAA has already launched a probe and revoked Boeing's DOA for final safety checks.[0]

[0] https://www.wsj.com/business/airlines/boeing-manufacturing-7...

FAA's delegatory structure used to involve Boeing-paid employees that reported to the FAA but that changed in 2004 (ODA instead of DER) such that the FAA put itself out of the loop. Here's the pre-2004 situation:

> "Since at least 1927, the FAA has delegated certain safety certification responsibilities to qualified individuals within the aviation industry. Until 2004, the FAA regulated the production of new Boeing aircraft through a web of Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs), employees of Boeing charged with ensuring that new aircraft met regulatory standards. These DERs, though paid by Boeing, were selected by and reported to the FAA, which signed off on all certification decisions. “We knew we’d lose our livelihood if we didn’t maintain the integrity of making decisions the way the FAA would do it,” said a former DER. The FAA retained final authority and possessed a clear view of new aircraft’s certification process."

Regulatory Capture at the FAA By Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy, Leo Kalb Bourke, November 12, 2021

https://www.5clpp.com/?p=4026

Rolling back that 2004 ODA program to the DER structure would be the rational response at this point.

> Rolling back that 2004 ODA program to the DER structure would be the rational response at this point.

What's the rationale, again?

I'm not seeing any root cause analysis or justification in your text that reverting to a (still conflicted) secondee concept would prevent similar outcomes.

The rationale is that Boeing got an exception from best practices, so they should revert to best practices.

Respectfully, you're repeating the parent and not addressing my question.

What "best practice" from before, albeit which had a secondee structure, would've caught this malfunction?

> statistically speaking, much safer than older aircraft generations. It surely does not feel that way, but incidents-per-flight, not to mention incidents-per-flight-hour and incidents-per-flight-mile, strongly disagree

777 enters that chat. Over the 30 year lifetime of the aircraft there have been a total of 242 fatalities excluding terrorism. The first major incident resulting in a hull loss, happened over 10 years after the aircraft was introduced.

You mentioned that you're a huge Embraer 19x-E2 fan. I'm not well informed on that airframe, but a former co-worker of mine (two different companies -- one of them Boeing) told me about a horrible lack of engineering oversight, failure to meet specifications, and a lack of concern for insufficient test coverage on the Embraer. He swore that he would never fly in one.

Spirit AeroSystems’s plant in Wichita was previously owned and operated by Boeing until they divested it in 2005. This plant builds airframes for Boeing but not Airbus. It’s a culture issue through and through.

Lot of strong opinions based on feelings and bad research. There are even books and leaked internal studies that describe the change of culture and engineering at Boeing. You can't just use the last incident and it's circumstances to come to a conclusion. It's systemic failure.

Look up interviews of Spirit AeroSystems CEOs or their counterparts at Airbus and Boeing and you'll see that they get handled differently.

The information is out there you'll just need to take it. 5 mins of googling is just not enough for a topic like this.

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