Comment by richardw | Hacker News Reader

Comment by richardw | Hacker News Reader

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> China needs a large amount of ships and cargo planes

We're watching warfare change right now. There are many paths to success for China, given enough attention and focus.

Just one: 100 million drones to deal with all the fixed defences, and then you arrive to negotiate once you've repeatedly overwhelmed the enemy for 6 months. We've spent the last few decades helping China build the biggest manufacturing engine in history, and Ukraine has shown us what "cheap and accurate" can do. No doubt in my mind that China will be able to innovate further once it has a very good reason to do so.

If the West tries to copy this, surely it's mostly relying on chips produced in Taiwan? Give that 6 months, because I'm pretty sure China can restrict chip flow faster than the West can build backup capability. And once China owns that chip production it could easily result in 20 years (or indefinite) tech dominance. Sure, experts will be fleeing in droves but factories and supply chains don't just spring up overnight.

China simply does not have the amphibious capabilities for an invasion let alone sustainment of an invading force. All the estimates I've looked at says they won't have that capability for around another ten years or so. A blockade favors the west and neighborhing friendly powers like Japan, since that would give it time to bring its mass to bear. All that talk about drones ignores that there are easy hard counters to drones (I.e. electronic warfare). They're not some unstoppable force. They're like any other weapon, they have their uses, but there are no silver bullets.

PRC civilian (RO/RO) fleet used to augment landing is enough to bring 7 full Group Armies (300K+ troops) & their equipment in about 10 days. Go look at Shugarts estimates which is incomplete undercount while PRC increased auto export means sealift cap massively expanding. His outdated estimates = PRC can deliver every Brigade Combat Team in the U.S. Army in a little over 5 days for years now. It's been clear for years PLA hasn't pursued massive dedicated amphib capabilities because every RMB spent on purpose built sealift is one not spent on deterring USN. Building civilian RO/RO to military standards and employing civilian assets, which at PRC scale is massive, was always part of the plan.

Blockade wouldn't favour west because PRC mass dramatically outweights what west can bring in theatre which itself is currently deemed unlikely to survive since it's contesting entire PRC land based hardware, i.e. everything PLA has. Like PRC doesn't even need mass drones as rocket force and glide munitions enough to hit every inch of TW from mainland positions.

The Chinese would have to pull off the most difficult military operation in the books (i.e., a contested amphibious landing into heavily defended shores), with a force that has never conducted a major operation of any kind, while using uncle's modifed freighter and dad's fishing vessel in place of built for purpose amphibious assault vessels. All in a sector who's commander has turned over 4-5 times (I forget the exact count at this point) in the past 24 months. It would take the miracle of a lifetime for the Chinese to be able to land such a force let alone sustain such an effort if Taiwan is paying any attention at all. I don't know of any successful amphibious landing in circumstances anywhere near that challenging. Unless China can catch Taiwan asleep at the switch, their loses would be catastrophic.

Blockade favors the west because they only need enough mass for denial of area operations. That center of mass is growing as we speak with Japan arming up and larger US forces in the Philippines and Japan. This includes new Marine litorral forces built specifically for the Asian theater and the new breed of warfare we're seeing in some of the Russian/Ukraine War. China imports most of it's food and oil. It is difficult to see how their economy can sustain a blockade and sanctions, especially considering their debt crisis that will take 10 years or more to unwind the way China is currently handling things. In a prolonged comflict, their losses would be horrendous in both human, material, and capital terms.

Mass drone attacks are whiteboard fantasies with present day capabilities. Why even bring them up? I would point out that Taiwan also has plenty air, surface, and anti-ship missles. This includes long range, supersonic surface to surface cruise missles. While traditionally Taiwan has opted for for area denial operations that makes them a very unappealing target, they now have the ability to strike China's mainland at will, and there is little China can do about it.

The way Ukraine (and the West) is taking it to Russia I would imagine would give Xi pause. I would think twice if I were him, assuming the west maintains their support. From a geopolitical perspective, after Russia, China is the biggest potential loser in the Ukrainian War. The west and partners in the East are revving up their defense industrial capacity and arming up in a big way. If the Ukrainian war keeps going the way it is, the Russians will be far less help if they're able to provide any significant help at all. China can't take on the entire free world by themselves without major help.

>pull off the most difficult military operation in the books (i.e., a contested amphibious landing into heavily defended shores)

West keeps insisting on this outdated Normandy comparison with the PLA from the 60s, PLA WILL NOT be doing a contested landing because they're not stupid like west keeps assuming. Modern precise modern munitions = there won't be Normandy beach heads. If anything an uncontested maritime transit is much easier than say US logistic ops in MENA because open ocean sensor environment makes contesting mid transition difficult. Uncles modified RO/RO is literally just a military amphib ship with defenses stripped out, i.e it does 90% of the job. The actual defense platforms will be on the plethora of dedicated grey hulls. As for ambush, PRC rockets / mlrs can give TW max 10minutes warning even according to TW can stand alone shills like Ian Easton. The reality is TW ISTAR/command will be gone in opening salvo and major hardware that can contest actual maritime transit will be gone within hours, while light forces like infantry will be picked from stand off distances. It won't be Normany where millions of tons of preshelling couldn't dislodge defenders.

>mass

Did you read any of the analysis for token force reorientation in theatre? Japan merely committed southern islands, i.e. basically the minimum concession vs opening up main islands of ACE basing and AOs already in previous PLA war planning. Marine MLR in Okinawa death even less supportable death sentence. PH doesn't allow perm deployment, i.e. they're basically the minimum US analysts have hoped for in their PRC containment vision.

As for blockading PRC, who's going to do that anymore? Hint no one. Reality is the US has just as much energy and food _security_ as PRC. This isn't Zeihan koolaid from the 2010s, the second PRC energy is disrupted, they'll run blockade and if intervened, start hitting comparable CONUS infra like refineries that support energy and ag output. That's the fundamental new security reality with PLA modernization, US may have better resource autarky, but it has lost resource security, basically Saudi at this point. All the Malacca blockade / wank only works when US has unilateral ability to enforce without homeland vulnerability. That era has closed, blockading PRC is unlikely once PRC has the ability to inflict mutual US homeland disruption.

>Mass drone

Because PRC actually has mass drone options and mass industrial production to make mass drone feasible, they're not Turkey who brags about delivering a handful of low performance MALE drones that depend on western components. Meanwhile TW literally doesn't have "plenty" of missile inventory, that wouldn't barely make a dent in mainland infra. Like the amount of concrete in PRC and the sheer scale of hardened targets is staggering, sinking limited TW missiles is an easy trade if they can even be launched in first place. Which again, every inch can be preempted with less than 10 minutes of warning before ISTAR gone and most missile stockpiles become paperweight. The mistake is thinking TW will be defending as a modern country (currently state of preparedness is not remotely true), functionally TW's "modern" defense will exist for a few hours before reverting to the capabilities of taliban.

>UKR

PRC is a large winner, cheap energy and commodities for a long time. Meanwhile the EU dramatically weakened that they can't substantively back up the US even if they go all in atlanticist camp. As much as RU is a reduced state, so is the EU as a block. Have you seen west "ramped up" proposals, nothing that affects IndoPac theater in a meaningful way, if they even get realized (ditto with JP) with direction economies are trending. DE is already stalling. JP with their 400 tomahawks, enough to destroy 3 medium sized air fields with 50%+ interception rates using 80s Soviet anti-air. Of course that's backstop, but one needs to actually put headlines / developments into perspective. Force balance is trending towards the free world not having a chance in PRC's backyard even if they band together. Like if actually follow the developments closely, it's hard to overstate the preponderance of mass PRC building out, relative to everyone else. Like PRC alone is ~50% of global ship building capacity and testing more advanced missiles per year than most countries acquire. What they learned from UKR is the entire west can supply UKR and an incompetent RU can still fight them to relative stand still with limited special operations tier commitment.

> Uncles modified RO/RO is literally just a military amphib ship with defenses stripped out, i.e it does 90% of the job.

Uncle has converted his private ferry [0] and other vessels to act as amphibious assault and support vessels. Certainly, China is on a building binge regarding amphibious assault vessels (e.g., Type 075), but it will take years to build, train, and crew these warships and others like it.

> As much as RU is a reduced state, so is the EU as a block.

These two things are not remotely the same. Russia has all but burned through their enormous inheritance of equipment from the Soviet days. That equipment can never be replaced, as Russia is no longer a superpower. Russia will become a second or third rate power among European countries, depending on how long the war drags out. Meanwhile, Europe is mostly sending old kit out of their warehouses and stockyards, with some notable exceptions. Europe has the economy to rearm, while Russia does not. Most importantly, Europe's military industrial base ought to be in a strong position before China is ready to invade.

[0] https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/08/04/china-reportedl...

No, private ferries are duo use hulls EXPLICITYLY built to military standards "disguised" as / duo used for civilian purpose. As I've said, these RO/ROs will likely do brunt of the hulling because mil amphib including 075s are NOT being massively procured. Proponents of PRC not having enough dedicated amphib is not accepting the fact that massive dedicated amphib is NOT part of sealift strategy. Hasn't been for 10+ years for those that study PLA acquistion. Duo use civil/military sealift IS the strategy, and currently what has been built, trained, crewed is able to move massive amount of troops already. Yes they'll build, train, crew more, but that only extends the already gargantuan sealift capability that is more than enough for TW scenarios that most credible western analysts previously thought PRC needed. 7 group armies is an ABSURD amount of sealift.

>Europe

Europe already showed a lot of their acquisition hand, nothing meaningful for IndoPac and like AUKUS, big pieces like naval combatants are decades away while PRC dropping them like dumplings. RU, going through an active war is actually/literally has relevant industrial base to rearm, while also burning through legacy hardware just like EU, but with more and cheaper resource autarky and motivation to acquire at industrial scale for active war. Meanwhile Europe is TALKING about rearming, which is acquiring token SRK/US hardware as stop gab before figuring out indigenous efforts that will take decades. DE promises to raise spending already stalling, and they're key supplier in EU defense whose entire industrial base in general will have to deal with more expensive inputs. This is nothing like PRC who has massive industrial base and now cheap RU resources, hence EU prognosis being overall reduced. Like don't get me wrong, EU will likely increase defense capabilities relative to RU, but will be long and not smooth process, and questionable if their acquistions will be effective in the first place, especially for IndoPac. Two things can be true, EU can become a stronger bloc against RU, but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour because while it prefers independant EU vs US+EU, writing off a weak EU that can't substantively boost US even if they wanted to is more reliable for planning because less need to transatlantic consider political shifts.

> RU, going through an active war is actually/literally has relevant industrial base to rearm

Russia doesn't have any money to rearm. Their economy is smaller than Canada, is about the same size as Italy, and ~9X smaller than the EU+UK. Russia will not be able to help China in any significant way. China is on its own if it attacks Taiwan, without a large power to support it.

> but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour

The Europeans need to scale up their existing industrial base, not completely reimagine their forces from the ground up. That will take years, not decades. They can rearm rather quickly, considering the EU+UK's economy is larger than China's. Also, you misunderstand part of the real value of a more muscular EU; it frees up even more US resources in the Pacific.

>RU

RU has already established (and now increasingly streamlined due to actually building for war) defense industrial base + PPP and autarkic resource advantages + will be forced maintain beyond 2% to rearm. Canada maybe richer but they're also squandering 6.5B buying a few coast guard patrol ships, which is arguably more incompetent than RU who at least have deficient hardware in numbers to prosecute war, and also more closely reflects current broken state of EU/NATO defense which has dwarfed RU for decades but couldn't sustain a few weeks of war that RU can. That said, RU rearming not enough to threaten NATO again, as if revealed RU capabilities were, but enough to keep NATO occupied.

RU help to PRC is significant cheap resources, no one expected RU to help in any other way except maybe provide overflight rights (big for lobbing missiles over NORAD) and playing nuclear brinksmanship against SKR/JP. Just like US is going to be largely on her own in terms of force commitment for PRC war, without large power support outside of potential basing, because realistically there are no other "large" powers to rival US/PRC in TW scenario. Except maybe JP, but questionable if their defense bump fundable, or level of commitment in actual TW scenario.

>Europeans need to scale up

Yes, but "need to" being operating word, post Trump + basic historic EU/NATO coordination issues means they're pivotting towards indigenous programs like 4.5/5/6g fighters (JP/SKR as well) - stuff that will take decades. Major capital platform like surface combatants also going to be decade+ timeline due to politics. All the big ticket / long term expensive things they plan to either do indigenously or wean off US. Meanwhile issues with hollowed out defense base and lack of common market / per country acquisitions = it's not going to be a smooth or well coordinated process for long time. EU has potential to rearm but I have serious doubts they will / are systemically capable for doing it quick. EU+UK economy is smaller than PRC by PPP but more important is defense base and industrial efficiency simply not there. I would bet that actual urgency to rearm will decrease now that RU is diminished, I don't see west EU stopping free riding anytime soon especially with structural changes like expensive energy that's already deindustrializing like in DE. Smaller/poorer east EU near frontlines likely, but little savings there.

Which ties to more "muscular EU" freeing up US resources for IndoPac, which IMO is more rhetoric than sensible analysis. Beside hardware relevant EU defense not relevant for IndoPac, the primary issue of US resourcing is dominantly domestic US interservice politics, where despite all voices screaming for PRC pivot, relatively useless army is still getting largest branch funding and pouring stupid resources into CENTCOM - ~8X USEUCOM, down from ~12X after AFG withdrawl, that's where US is freeing up meaningful resources. Apart from funding UKR war now, EU defense post GWOT was relatively insignificant committment, there wasn't much juice to squeeze. Compare to PRC gains, quick napkin math suggests PRC is _saving_ 3x USEUCOM budget buying cheaper RU oil last year, add in long term cheaper gas, less competitive EU exports, years delay in TW arms shipment and structurally PRC is coming out ahead, at least short/medium term.

On drones, fair points but a missile is easy to hide.

I suspect those chip factories would have been destroyed before China takes control of them. China’s leverage is more about denying access to those chips to the west.

Outcomes aren't binary. You can burn a few factories and many will escape but the vast majority of humans will want to get on with life and rebuild the jobs they had.

"It's been two years of no work and little food. China offers you a great salary to do what you did before the war. Do you A) Say no! B) Feed your kid and rebuild the factory."

I mean TSMC would likely burn everything to the ground. It seems more like no one would have the chips, until the US onshores the capability, which seems much less than 20 years away.

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