What I don't get is that to invade Taiwan, China needs a large amount of ships and cargo planes, both of which seem very vulnerable to modern missiles (as the Russian army found out in Ukraine). Do the chinese have a solution for that?
Taiwan has major political factions that already favor closer ties with China. Put under stress, Taiwan may be more inclined to reunify than most western spectators would like to assume.
Which political parties?
The Berlin airlift had a similar dynamic. The USSR could have shot down the planes - but they did not as it would have brought them too close to war. If the US/Japan sends an escorted "relief" convoy via air or sea - China is unlikely to intercept without triggering a direct conflict.
A direct war between the US/Japan/Australia/EU(?) and China benefits no one and runs dangerously close to a world war. In a similar way that Russia could attempt to stop arms flows from Poland and Germany into Ukraine - they don't really have the option without risking a full war which they cannot win.
In a hypothetical "narrow" conflict over the Taiwan straight between the US and China, a Chinese victory would mean 20k+ American casualties and an absent Pacific/Indian Ocean fleet. In the best case, China will no longer enjoy US protected global shipping lanes due to an absent USN. Worst case, the US threatens nuclear escalation to arrest the conflict (or follows through on the threat). A US victory would mean that the Chinese mainland is under direct attack from US carrier groups - Nuclear escalation would be almost inevitable.
The likely outcome is that the US and other Taiwan allies would be allowed to supply Taiwan without intervention in order to avoid a wider war.
Past studies have shown that even nukes have trouble knocking out rail and port infrastructure. It’s highly unlikely that china would be capable of achieving and holding full air supremacy in Taiwan. Particularly if SAM systems are readily replaced.
The two thousand cruise missiles launched by Russia into Ukraine have failed to degrade infrastructure. Even with 20k+ cruise missiles - makeshift ports were constructed in days during ww2.
China has over 100,000 rockets and missiles estimated to be in their inventory, and the best manufacturing system in the world to produce more. A 747 cannot land on a ripped up and shredded runway, and it cannot offload goods into burning warehouses.
Not to mention the ridiculous idea of trying to feed, clothe, and care for 25 million people living on the island of Taiwan with aircraft. It cannot be compared to the berlin airlift which supplied a fraction of the people with a fraction of the goods, and whose flights lasted less than an hour. Flights to Taiwan would likely come from Tokyo, which is an 8 hour round trip. And they would probably need complex refueling operations on at least one of the legs, because Taiwan would run out of jet fuel immediately. The US doesn't have enough of a tanker fleet to support something like this, or enough cargo aircraft fitted with refueling probes.
As for ports, China does need to level them, they just need to place some of their 200,000+ sea mines in the approaches to Taiwan. They can do this with subs, aircraft, high speed watercraft and even with rocket launchers. Luckily for China, the major Taiwanese ports are on the coast which faces the strait rather than the open pacific, simplifying matters.
While china may have many mines - it is not unreasonable that an open seas mission could bring up to 5 carrier strike groups to the pacific coast of Taiwan. Enough to deter mine laying operations as well as conduct mine clearing operations.
Based on the game theory outlined above, the optimal strategy would be for Taiwan Allie’s to deploy enough military power that a Chinese strike on naval assets would immediately translate to full scale war.
5 carrier strike groups is also sufficient to block sea trade into china from further out than land based missiles can reach. This was also part of the nato strategy with Ukraine. There is enough military on standby in Eastern Europe to dissuade any attack against nato territory.
China needs a fast war that doesn’t escalate to win. Taiwan needs only not to lose. I don’t think china can simultaneously target food and American aircraft carriers without triggering a full war.
>they cannot win
PRC can very well win against US regional allies, and in many ways, a broader war is preferable because limited war means US IndoPac security infra remains untouched and others in region free to hedge with US security after TW damocles off the table. The greatest PRC strategic vision is to kick US security out of east asia and for that she needs a broad war where PRC demonstrates US cannot fulfill security commitments by destroying a protectorate so utterly that no one else would consider bandwagoning under US security umbrella after TW. Even in case of draw/loss, having opportunity to knock out extensive US IndoPac military infra (i.e. PineGap in AU) cripples US threatre capability for potentially decades. Who wins is relative, one side can win more. PRC and US both losing similar amount of blue water hulls = PRC can STILL assert military projection in her backyard with land based air assets, VS US basically gets kicked out of the Asian power projection and perhaps global hegemony game. The loss is not symmetric.
Also PRC doesn't need USN to protect global shipping, that's more Zeihan wank that hasn't been relevant for decade+. What PRC has been doing is freeloading off US, but it's more than capable to assuming own protection duties.
I've wrote elsewhere about how seriously PRC historically takes nuclear escalation with respect to security interests - it doesn't - having fought with US, USSR, IND, threatened UK, proxy FR over things much less important in TW. US carrier groups are unlikely to threaten mainland with PRC a2ad which again extends to Guam, well past even CSG sprint + stand off extended range. And even lul recent balloon drama aside, PRC rocket force can reciprocate hitting CONUS infra conventionally. If the US takes war to PRC mainland, expect critical infra to be gone on CONUS. It will take a few years for mutual vulnerability to filter way through western analysis, but all the US wank expeditionary warfare is contingent on it being unilateral, with homeland remaining un-disrupted. That's not true with PRC anymore, with PRC ability to strike CONUS only increasing with time, which will greatly circumscribe what the US will do in the TW scenario. And with precise rapid strikes being developed (PRC parlance for prompt global strike), we're talking about every US capital asset being a port visit away from being scrap. Including upcoming B21s that still needs hanger dramaqueen time. West keeps focusing on US deterrence efforts around TW without realizing PRC is also simultaneously building up intervention deterrence. Except PRC deterrence development is much more significant - US could always hit targets in mainland, that calculation was baked it. It's when PRC can hit CONUS that real deterrence math changes.
Like direct strikes to mainland china - direct strikes to continental us/ us territories imply a global conflict. Article 5 would be called on, and NATO would be drawn into the conflict. China would struggle against a G7 boycott.
It’s plausible that EU stays neutral in a narrow war, but a broad war with expansive war goals would lead to a broad response. Chinas past behavior towards nuclear powers occurred before they had indigenous weapons and while they had a nuclear protector.
The only limiter to nuclear escalation in a modern global conflict is willingness and alternatives. When alternatives have been removed and civilian targets are targeted nuclear options will be on the table. In a broad conflict this process could occur within days.
Current hardware delivery aren't coming through during active hostilities. Unlike RU who doesn't have capabilities to deny vast UKR + EU land logistics, PRC can proactively deny air+maritime around TW. Optics of PRC allowing foreign powers to actively support seperatist gov on Chinese territory during active Chinese civil war which includes TW soil and 12nm territorial waters is not something tolerable for domestic PRC politics. Or that TW cannot be supplied during war time without invading legal Chinese soil something PRC sovereignty politics won't allow due to history. That's the significant political consideration, UKR supporters moving supplies through soverign UKR territory aren't legal belligerants, supplyiers of TW that necessarily involves what PRC percieves to be invading Chinese territory are.
>imply a global conflict
Yes as does blockading PRC, that's where the entire US can choke PRC strategy falls apart, it now feasibly escalates to CONUS war. If US blockades PRC (i.e. US initiates legal war), then PRC reciprocating attack on CONUS no longer falls under art5. Of course NATO could still join, but with what hardware, based where? Even G7 boycott weatherable, this isn't 2010s when PRC was relatively export dependent, export GDP to west is now barely 10%, with mutual knock on supply chains. Most of G7+ are MUCH more trade dependant than PRC as well and will hurt more, i.e. even least trade dependant US is going to have to contest with trillions lost in advanced industries because TW leading edge semi gone, and likely crippled domestic US semi because they will still be dependant on east asian semi supply chains that's not going to survive a broad war. Meanwhile most of that hardware is already sanctioned / denied to PRC. This doesn't suggest PRC wants a broader war, but broader war does open up host of strategic reach goals and opportunities that asymmetrically devastates PRC containers.
>before they had indigenous weapons and while they had a nuclear protector
Yes, PRC had no issue tussling with nuclear powers while not being nuclear power herself. And she tussled with her alleged nuclear protector USSR as well. Multiple times + other geopolitical drama, all less important than TW.
> civilian targets are targeted
This excludes TW civilian targets (and likely strategic targets on JP, SKR, PH, AU etc), as old addage goes, is US willing to trade nukes for Los Angeles over Taipei. Proxies can fight to the last man / brick. If US doesn't want to escalate to nuclear with PRC then the point of CONUS retaliatory strikes is to deter US from dirupting PRC civilian homefront, which includes PRC shipping. But really I'd say esclation ladder jumps near nuclear once homeland attacks, even if just military are happening, which many US war planners still think is allowable - plenty of entrenched hubris thinking unilaterally attacking PRC mainland targets would not invite proportional retaliation on CONUS or other belligerants against PRC. Chance of US blockading PRC or hitting mainland PRC increasingly unlikely as PRC fills out conventional CONUS escalation rungs. Intervention calculus changes when there's homeland vunerability, this includes US allies whose critical infra is vunerable to PRC global strike as well. If anything home land vunerability limit nuclear escalation by stopping escalation at critical conventional rungs and limit broadness of response. Alternatively this is also a world where conventional escalation can reach near existential levels of mutually assured destruction. Imagine escalation ladder with rung where US+co refinery goes boom and first world economies simply ceases to be viable. That's what's skewing escalation dominance towards PRC over core PRC concerns over TW, which starts at preventing foreign aid to speed up TW collapse/capitulation.
Why do people lie so much on the Internet? There are some Taiwanese boomers who are more interested in removing communist rule in China than in gaining Taiwanese independence. But I doubt that is what you meant with "favor closer ties with China".
We're watching warfare change right now. There are many paths to success for China, given enough attention and focus.
Just one: 100 million drones to deal with all the fixed defences, and then you arrive to negotiate once you've repeatedly overwhelmed the enemy for 6 months. We've spent the last few decades helping China build the biggest manufacturing engine in history, and Ukraine has shown us what "cheap and accurate" can do. No doubt in my mind that China will be able to innovate further once it has a very good reason to do so.
If the West tries to copy this, surely it's mostly relying on chips produced in Taiwan? Give that 6 months, because I'm pretty sure China can restrict chip flow faster than the West can build backup capability. And once China owns that chip production it could easily result in 20 years (or indefinite) tech dominance. Sure, experts will be fleeing in droves but factories and supply chains don't just spring up overnight.
I suspect those chip factories would have been destroyed before China takes control of them. China’s leverage is more about denying access to those chips to the west.
"It's been two years of no work and little food. China offers you a great salary to do what you did before the war. Do you A) Say no! B) Feed your kid and rebuild the factory."
Blockade wouldn't favour west because PRC mass dramatically outweights what west can bring in theatre which itself is currently deemed unlikely to survive since it's contesting entire PRC land based hardware, i.e. everything PLA has. Like PRC doesn't even need mass drones as rocket force and glide munitions enough to hit every inch of TW from mainland positions.
Blockade favors the west because they only need enough mass for denial of area operations. That center of mass is growing as we speak with Japan arming up and larger US forces in the Philippines and Japan. This includes new Marine litorral forces built specifically for the Asian theater and the new breed of warfare we're seeing in some of the Russian/Ukraine War. China imports most of it's food and oil. It is difficult to see how their economy can sustain a blockade and sanctions, especially considering their debt crisis that will take 10 years or more to unwind the way China is currently handling things. In a prolonged comflict, their losses would be horrendous in both human, material, and capital terms.
Mass drone attacks are whiteboard fantasies with present day capabilities. Why even bring them up? I would point out that Taiwan also has plenty air, surface, and anti-ship missles. This includes long range, supersonic surface to surface cruise missles. While traditionally Taiwan has opted for for area denial operations that makes them a very unappealing target, they now have the ability to strike China's mainland at will, and there is little China can do about it.
The way Ukraine (and the West) is taking it to Russia I would imagine would give Xi pause. I would think twice if I were him, assuming the west maintains their support. From a geopolitical perspective, after Russia, China is the biggest potential loser in the Ukrainian War. The west and partners in the East are revving up their defense industrial capacity and arming up in a big way. If the Ukrainian war keeps going the way it is, the Russians will be far less help if they're able to provide any significant help at all. China can't take on the entire free world by themselves without major help.
West keeps insisting on this outdated Normandy comparison with the PLA from the 60s, PLA WILL NOT be doing a contested landing because they're not stupid like west keeps assuming. Modern precise modern munitions = there won't be Normandy beach heads. If anything an uncontested maritime transit is much easier than say US logistic ops in MENA because open ocean sensor environment makes contesting mid transition difficult. Uncles modified RO/RO is literally just a military amphib ship with defenses stripped out, i.e it does 90% of the job. The actual defense platforms will be on the plethora of dedicated grey hulls. As for ambush, PRC rockets / mlrs can give TW max 10minutes warning even according to TW can stand alone shills like Ian Easton. The reality is TW ISTAR/command will be gone in opening salvo and major hardware that can contest actual maritime transit will be gone within hours, while light forces like infantry will be picked from stand off distances. It won't be Normany where millions of tons of preshelling couldn't dislodge defenders.
>mass
Did you read any of the analysis for token force reorientation in theatre? Japan merely committed southern islands, i.e. basically the minimum concession vs opening up main islands of ACE basing and AOs already in previous PLA war planning. Marine MLR in Okinawa death even less supportable death sentence. PH doesn't allow perm deployment, i.e. they're basically the minimum US analysts have hoped for in their PRC containment vision.
As for blockading PRC, who's going to do that anymore? Hint no one. Reality is the US has just as much energy and food _security_ as PRC. This isn't Zeihan koolaid from the 2010s, the second PRC energy is disrupted, they'll run blockade and if intervened, start hitting comparable CONUS infra like refineries that support energy and ag output. That's the fundamental new security reality with PLA modernization, US may have better resource autarky, but it has lost resource security, basically Saudi at this point. All the Malacca blockade / wank only works when US has unilateral ability to enforce without homeland vulnerability. That era has closed, blockading PRC is unlikely once PRC has the ability to inflict mutual US homeland disruption.
>Mass drone
Because PRC actually has mass drone options and mass industrial production to make mass drone feasible, they're not Turkey who brags about delivering a handful of low performance MALE drones that depend on western components. Meanwhile TW literally doesn't have "plenty" of missile inventory, that wouldn't barely make a dent in mainland infra. Like the amount of concrete in PRC and the sheer scale of hardened targets is staggering, sinking limited TW missiles is an easy trade if they can even be launched in first place. Which again, every inch can be preempted with less than 10 minutes of warning before ISTAR gone and most missile stockpiles become paperweight. The mistake is thinking TW will be defending as a modern country (currently state of preparedness is not remotely true), functionally TW's "modern" defense will exist for a few hours before reverting to the capabilities of taliban.
>UKR
PRC is a large winner, cheap energy and commodities for a long time. Meanwhile the EU dramatically weakened that they can't substantively back up the US even if they go all in atlanticist camp. As much as RU is a reduced state, so is the EU as a block. Have you seen west "ramped up" proposals, nothing that affects IndoPac theater in a meaningful way, if they even get realized (ditto with JP) with direction economies are trending. DE is already stalling. JP with their 400 tomahawks, enough to destroy 3 medium sized air fields with 50%+ interception rates using 80s Soviet anti-air. Of course that's backstop, but one needs to actually put headlines / developments into perspective. Force balance is trending towards the free world not having a chance in PRC's backyard even if they band together. Like if actually follow the developments closely, it's hard to overstate the preponderance of mass PRC building out, relative to everyone else. Like PRC alone is ~50% of global ship building capacity and testing more advanced missiles per year than most countries acquire. What they learned from UKR is the entire west can supply UKR and an incompetent RU can still fight them to relative stand still with limited special operations tier commitment.
Uncle has converted his private ferry [0] and other vessels to act as amphibious assault and support vessels. Certainly, China is on a building binge regarding amphibious assault vessels (e.g., Type 075), but it will take years to build, train, and crew these warships and others like it.
> As much as RU is a reduced state, so is the EU as a block.
These two things are not remotely the same. Russia has all but burned through their enormous inheritance of equipment from the Soviet days. That equipment can never be replaced, as Russia is no longer a superpower. Russia will become a second or third rate power among European countries, depending on how long the war drags out. Meanwhile, Europe is mostly sending old kit out of their warehouses and stockyards, with some notable exceptions. Europe has the economy to rearm, while Russia does not. Most importantly, Europe's military industrial base ought to be in a strong position before China is ready to invade.
[0] https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/08/04/china-reportedl...
>Europe
Europe already showed a lot of their acquisition hand, nothing meaningful for IndoPac and like AUKUS, big pieces like naval combatants are decades away while PRC dropping them like dumplings. RU, going through an active war is actually/literally has relevant industrial base to rearm, while also burning through legacy hardware just like EU, but with more and cheaper resource autarky and motivation to acquire at industrial scale for active war. Meanwhile Europe is TALKING about rearming, which is acquiring token SRK/US hardware as stop gab before figuring out indigenous efforts that will take decades. DE promises to raise spending already stalling, and they're key supplier in EU defense whose entire industrial base in general will have to deal with more expensive inputs. This is nothing like PRC who has massive industrial base and now cheap RU resources, hence EU prognosis being overall reduced. Like don't get me wrong, EU will likely increase defense capabilities relative to RU, but will be long and not smooth process, and questionable if their acquistions will be effective in the first place, especially for IndoPac. Two things can be true, EU can become a stronger bloc against RU, but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour because while it prefers independant EU vs US+EU, writing off a weak EU that can't substantively boost US even if they wanted to is more reliable for planning because less need to transatlantic consider political shifts.
Russia doesn't have any money to rearm. Their economy is smaller than Canada, is about the same size as Italy, and ~9X smaller than the EU+UK. Russia will not be able to help China in any significant way. China is on its own if it attacks Taiwan, without a large power to support it.
> but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour
The Europeans need to scale up their existing industrial base, not completely reimagine their forces from the ground up. That will take years, not decades. They can rearm rather quickly, considering the EU+UK's economy is larger than China's. Also, you misunderstand part of the real value of a more muscular EU; it frees up even more US resources in the Pacific.
RU has already established (and now increasingly streamlined due to actually building for war) defense industrial base + PPP and autarkic resource advantages + will be forced maintain beyond 2% to rearm. Canada maybe richer but they're also squandering 6.5B buying a few coast guard patrol ships, which is arguably more incompetent than RU who at least have deficient hardware in numbers to prosecute war, and also more closely reflects current broken state of EU/NATO defense which has dwarfed RU for decades but couldn't sustain a few weeks of war that RU can. That said, RU rearming not enough to threaten NATO again, as if revealed RU capabilities were, but enough to keep NATO occupied.
RU help to PRC is significant cheap resources, no one expected RU to help in any other way except maybe provide overflight rights (big for lobbing missiles over NORAD) and playing nuclear brinksmanship against SKR/JP. Just like US is going to be largely on her own in terms of force commitment for PRC war, without large power support outside of potential basing, because realistically there are no other "large" powers to rival US/PRC in TW scenario. Except maybe JP, but questionable if their defense bump fundable, or level of commitment in actual TW scenario.
>Europeans need to scale up
Yes, but "need to" being operating word, post Trump + basic historic EU/NATO coordination issues means they're pivotting towards indigenous programs like 4.5/5/6g fighters (JP/SKR as well) - stuff that will take decades. Major capital platform like surface combatants also going to be decade+ timeline due to politics. All the big ticket / long term expensive things they plan to either do indigenously or wean off US. Meanwhile issues with hollowed out defense base and lack of common market / per country acquisitions = it's not going to be a smooth or well coordinated process for long time. EU has potential to rearm but I have serious doubts they will / are systemically capable for doing it quick. EU+UK economy is smaller than PRC by PPP but more important is defense base and industrial efficiency simply not there. I would bet that actual urgency to rearm will decrease now that RU is diminished, I don't see west EU stopping free riding anytime soon especially with structural changes like expensive energy that's already deindustrializing like in DE. Smaller/poorer east EU near frontlines likely, but little savings there.
Which ties to more "muscular EU" freeing up US resources for IndoPac, which IMO is more rhetoric than sensible analysis. Beside hardware relevant EU defense not relevant for IndoPac, the primary issue of US resourcing is dominantly domestic US interservice politics, where despite all voices screaming for PRC pivot, relatively useless army is still getting largest branch funding and pouring stupid resources into CENTCOM - ~8X USEUCOM, down from ~12X after AFG withdrawl, that's where US is freeing up meaningful resources. Apart from funding UKR war now, EU defense post GWOT was relatively insignificant committment, there wasn't much juice to squeeze. Compare to PRC gains, quick napkin math suggests PRC is _saving_ 3x USEUCOM budget buying cheaper RU oil last year, add in long term cheaper gas, less competitive EU exports, years delay in TW arms shipment and structurally PRC is coming out ahead, at least short/medium term.
That would be too late, by definition, for China to invade. The US would likely be very wary of letting their missiles fall into enemy hands.
The PRC don't have a huge amount of time to take Taiwan. Their median age at 2020 was 37.5, their projected median age in 2030 is 42.7. For every two years that passes, their current demographic trajectory suggests their median age will grow by 1 year.
Unless they wish to fight an "old man" war, with all the societal tensions that arise from essentially sending the only grandchild of four grandparents to their death+, then the PRC need to hurry up and take Taiwan to allow them the force projection into the deep pacific.
Otherwise the Chinese century will be delayed another 100 years (or probably longer).
+Or the only great-grandchild of eight great-grandparents