Taiwan is a vital island that is under serious threat
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If China did not do what they did in Hong Kong, Taiwan may be headed to some kind on unification. Now, they would be crazy to even entertain that thought.
This issue lies directly on China and no one else. If I had a say in Taiwan, I would announce it is now a independent Country.
Maybe I am diving too much into the weeds here, but my understanding with HK is when the UK left and setup autonomous region with China in 1984, China/UK agree to leave the gov unchanged for 50 years after 1997 [0]. This interim government that was setup is controlled by CCP members.
My understanding is the Taiwan gov has always been completely separate from HK's.
[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-British_Joint_Declaration
My understanding as an outsider:
Taiwan is governed by the Republic of China (ROC), which regained control of Taiwan in 1945 after the Japanese pulled out. ROC was overthrown my Mao's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Chinese Civil War and lost control of the Chinese mainland allowing the CCP to form the People's Republic of China (PRC). The ROC retained control of Taiwan. Taiwan has always been independent from the PRC and CCP.
This completely ignores the actual native Taiwanese people who may or may not consider themselves Chinese. That is a topic I can't even begin to comment on.
The takeaway from HK in the context of Taiwan is that the People's Republic of China did not hold up their end of the bargain with the UK in HK so there is no reason to trust them in any agreement of "reunification" in Taiwan if the terms are anything other than complete submission to PRC rule.
This. PRC's talk of "reunification" reads like a trojan horse played with a long hand which was what happened in HK.
The Taiwanese faction supporting unification (usually the KMT) does not envision a world where Taiwan is/becomes a province of the PRC, they envision a world where the ROC governs all current PRC provinces, that is where they are in the seat of power in Beijing. I.e. this is something going in the opposite direction.
The opposing faction rejects these ambitions and wants Taiwan to go its own way.
EDIT: Since it's not necessarily military intervention.
It's just that now the DPP (their opposition) is in power.
I’ve never heard of this stance. I’ve only heard of your stance on Reddit and Twitter within the past two years.
The KMT has never officially given up the reconquest position, but it has been decades since that that was anymore than lip service to the one China idea. In practice KMT policies have been pro-unification in the EU or HK sense.
> 中共當局認為『一個中國』即為『中華人民共和國』...，我方則認為『一個中國』應指1912年成立迄今之中華民國
> The CCP authorities believe "One China" to be the "People's Republic of China"..., we believe "One China" should refer to the Republic of China, founded in 1912 and persisting to this day.
and its affirmation in 2012 by the then KMT administration:
> 兩岸確已達成「一中各表」的共識，這是客觀的事實，我們主張的「一中」當然是中華民國。
> The two coasts have already reached a mutual understanding on "One China, Said Differently," of course the "One China" we support is the Republic of China.
From the Taiwanese government MAC: https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=B383123AEADAEE52&...
It's very much the idea that the ROC should control everything.
Now as other comments point out, public perception among KMT detractors is that this is a sham, and even among KMT supporters there's not a clear message on how this situation would ever come about (and the main criticism in Taiwan against the KMT is that the only way that the KMT could ever hope to make this happen and indeed is/was doing in effect is by essentially capitulating to the PRC), but this is what the KMT puts out on official channels on what "reunification" means for the ROC.
> I've never heard this take, even while in Taiwan. They aren't deluded, they know they aren't retaking the mainland.
I wouldn't be surprised if that's still the KMT's "official" position, and it's probably one they genuinely held for a long time after they retreated to Taiwan. The Taiwan issue is interesting, because China's power and sensitivity means literally none of the important players except China officially says what they really mean, and maintain these ridiculous diplomatic fictions to avoid crossing China's lines.
For example, a Taiwanese person travelling to the PRC needs a "Mainland travel permit for residents of the island of Taiwan", which is most emphatically neither a visa nor a passport despite fulfilling exactly those two functions.
This is important because it allows the "policy of deliberate ambiguity":
> There is deliberate ambiguity regarding the government of the country of 'China' (as well as what land this country constitutes). Currently, two governments claim legitimate rule and sovereignty over all of China, which they claim includes Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, as well as some other islands.
> those from Taiwan who attend the Olympic Games and other various international organizations and events participate under the deliberately ambiguous name of "Chinese Taipei"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Policy_of_deliberate_ambiguity
I'm pretty sure that the Chinese government is actually scared shitless that Taiwan declaring independence would reinvigorate independence movements in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and probably half a dozen more.
A new civil war in China would make WWII look like a minor scuffle.
Why would they be "scared shitless"? They've demonstrated the ability to crack down hard and defeat those movements. For instance: the Hong Kong protests ended almost immediately once China decided to take the gloves off.
Maybe they could control simultaneous large scale insurrections. But it would be wise not to be overconfident in that regard.
Why do you think they'd have to deal with any "large scale insurrections"? They easily delt with one HK, once they imposed a Mainland-style security law, because fear evaporated the protests. Those protests also didn't inspire much of a response in the Mainland. They also didn't have to deal with on in Xinjiang, where they implemented so much direct oppression that you'd think they'd have inspired a response if one were possible.
The PRC security apparatus is strong, well organized, and its actions aren't constrained by liberal sensibilities. The PRC population is thoroughly disarmed, disorganized, and dis-informed, so cannot resist it. I think you're indulging in wishful thinking and fantasy.
Is this really true? Sure, recapturing the mainland was the ideology of the KMT at the end of the Chinese Civil War, but KMT politicians would have to be extremely delusional to believe it's possible now. My understanding is that the modern KMT believes in increased economic integration with China and the maintenance of Chinese cultural idenity, while leaving the door open to future reunification under favorable political circumstances. The KMT is definitely considered the "pro-Beijing" major Taiwanese party in the 21st century.
It's quite difficult to separate out what the KMT really believes from what its detractors say it believes, real differences among its individual members, what it puts out in official statements, and what can be inferred from its actions.
What you're saying is valid, especially the part about not believing it's possible (one thing I didn't emphasize in my original reply is that no one in Taiwan believes that reunification was ever going to happen any time soon, and focused more on just what "reunification" means) but "favorable political circumstances" is doing a lot of work there. That can span the gamut from "the PRC turns into a clone of the ROC and is immediately replaced" to "the ROC disappears altogether."
There are also a lot of people who do view the KMT as toadies of the CCP.
But the official party line unless they've come out with something more recent that I'm missing is that reunification means the ROC controls everything.
My original point was that Taiwanese rhetoric on "reunification" has always been very very different than what reunification has meant for Hong Kong.
The official position of all Taiwanese parties is that Taiwan and China are one nation divided by temporary difficulties, because China has threatened war if they say anything else.
The inofficial position of the DPP (current government party) is that of fucking course Taiwan is de facto a separate sovereign country, and we like it that way, so let's not do anything to risk it.
The inofficial position of the KMT is that they are in the pocket of the CCP, and a big fan of every possible concession that won't scare their voters too much.
As for Taiwan, if they declared independence it will be an act of war.
Don't forget that US protects Taiwan on the basis it does not declare itself a sovereign country.
Also, don't forget this is the official map of the Republic of China (Taiwan):
- Taiwan clearly has the outward appearance of a full-fledged nation
- There are (few) countries that have recognized it as a sovereign nation
- Taiwan maintains some form of diplomatic relations, and Nancy Pelosi's recent visit was a very public sign of that
- Taiwan and the PRC have been at war in the past
Some might take this to say that the official status is contested.
No, they sound like Taiwan is part of China, something the entire world and Taiwan itself officially recognizes.
It's like the US had a civil war and the losing side flees to Hawaii and in 2090 we still arguing whether it is part of not of US or should it declare independence.
That actually sounds like a very plausible counterfactual to someone outside the US.
That presumes the "official" position is the genuine position, which is often not the case.
With regards to Taiwan, "official" positions are often lies tied in knots to appease Mainland China's sensibilities.
Only in the context of the PRC. The reality of US-Taiwan relations would be much clearer if it was not PRC policy to sever diplomatic relationship with any country that recognizes Taiwan.
On the topic of Taiwan, it's a mistake to reason about de facto relationships from de jure "official positions." Basically, the "official positions" are lies, and the actual positions are not directly stated. For instance, if the US really considered Taiwan as "part of China," it wouldn't be war-gaming how to militarily repel an invasion from the PRC.
>The colony faced an uncertain future as the end of the New Territories lease approached, and Governor Murray MacLehose raised the question of Hong Kong's status with Deng Xiaoping in 1979.[84] Diplomatic negotiations with China resulted in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, in which the United Kingdom agreed to transfer the colony in 1997 and China would guarantee Hong Kong's economic and political systems for 50 years after the transfer.
This is not accurate. The Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula were ceded to Britain in perpetuity, not leased.
I am disappointed to see HN devolve into armchair general territory. In this specific case, the constitution ruling over Taiwan is the Constitution of Republic of China adopted in 1946 in Nanjing, before the PRC was a thing.
In general most of Taiwan does not believe it needs to do anything to "proclaim" their independence, only a tiny minority want to change the constitution (not just an amendment, the name of the constitution itself), which would be rather difficult on almost all levels..
Then you have war, and China attacks Taiwan and probably conquers it. What did your announcement gain?
I believe pretty much every recent US wargame about Taiwan has ended in a US loss, and the US military has only recently started to reconfigure itself to fight great-power wars again and it is far from done. Also, the US has already emptied its existing stockpiles to help Ukraine, and the logistics to get war material to Taiwan are much more challenging. China also gets to learn from Russia's mistakes, and it would also be foolish to assume China will be as incompetent as Russia proved to be.
Basically, such an announcement would be a "Go directly to jail. Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200," move on Taiwan's part.
That the majority of Taiwanese want to become Chinese?
That it doesn’t matter what the Taiwan population wants because China has the right to claim it?
I would say that the majority of the people of China are much like the majority of the people of any land, they don't directly care about the issue. Someone on the other side of the country in Karamay probably doesn't even think about Taiwan for most of their days.
However, according to the government of China, Taiwan is an island occupied by a rogue government, the last remnants of the losing side of a Civil War. That island is part of China.
The people of Taiwan have different opinions. Three major ones last I looked. There's the opinion of the natives who think Taiwan should be its own country, independent of any other country's influence. Control of the area has alternated between China and Japan. With China getting control back in 1945 after WWII.
Then there's the people who believe that the ROC should be reinstated on the mainland.
And finally, some people who think they should just become members of the PRC and get all over with.
I mean, it's not an opinion, it's a fact of how things went.
Personally, the PRC has been the de facto government of China for long enough that the ROC loyalists in Taiwan should accept that the war is lost.
The big question is to what to do about the island of Taiwan. After the end of WWII, it was surrendered to China. If the Chinese Civil War hadn't resumed, Taiwan would be part of China. But the ROC occupies that territory. And they were the China it was surrendered to. But if we accept that the PRC is China, then we do need to consider their position that by being China, they should be all of China. But sometimes, the resolution of a Civil War is that a nation fractures into multiple.
But there isn't a big enough faction on either side of the strait to accept any solution. And even if Taiwan would accept a two state solution, getting China to accept that is a big ask. I think if China ever accepts a two state solution, Taiwan jumps on it. I think even the restorationists in Taiwan would accept that as a way to end the tension.
Russia has the advantage with Ukraine that there are no major Russian population or industrial centers in range of Ukraine. That's not true of China and Taiwan.
A generation that never fought is likely to be confronted with a very harsh reality on the field.
Luckily, China has not been fighting much during the past few decades.
On the other hand, neither has Taiwan.
That would be too late, by definition, for China to invade. The US would likely be very wary of letting their missiles fall into enemy hands.
The PRC don't have a huge amount of time to take Taiwan. Their median age at 2020 was 37.5, their projected median age in 2030 is 42.7. For every two years that passes, their current demographic trajectory suggests their median age will grow by 1 year.
Unless they wish to fight an "old man" war, with all the societal tensions that arise from essentially sending the only grandchild of four grandparents to their death+, then the PRC need to hurry up and take Taiwan to allow them the force projection into the deep pacific.
Otherwise the Chinese century will be delayed another 100 years (or probably longer).
+Or the only great-grandchild of eight great-grandparents
Taiwan has major political factions that already favor closer ties with China. Put under stress, Taiwan may be more inclined to reunify than most western spectators would like to assume.
Which political parties?
The Berlin airlift had a similar dynamic. The USSR could have shot down the planes - but they did not as it would have brought them too close to war. If the US/Japan sends an escorted "relief" convoy via air or sea - China is unlikely to intercept without triggering a direct conflict.
A direct war between the US/Japan/Australia/EU(?) and China benefits no one and runs dangerously close to a world war. In a similar way that Russia could attempt to stop arms flows from Poland and Germany into Ukraine - they don't really have the option without risking a full war which they cannot win.
In a hypothetical "narrow" conflict over the Taiwan straight between the US and China, a Chinese victory would mean 20k+ American casualties and an absent Pacific/Indian Ocean fleet. In the best case, China will no longer enjoy US protected global shipping lanes due to an absent USN. Worst case, the US threatens nuclear escalation to arrest the conflict (or follows through on the threat). A US victory would mean that the Chinese mainland is under direct attack from US carrier groups - Nuclear escalation would be almost inevitable.
The likely outcome is that the US and other Taiwan allies would be allowed to supply Taiwan without intervention in order to avoid a wider war.
Past studies have shown that even nukes have trouble knocking out rail and port infrastructure. It’s highly unlikely that china would be capable of achieving and holding full air supremacy in Taiwan. Particularly if SAM systems are readily replaced.
The two thousand cruise missiles launched by Russia into Ukraine have failed to degrade infrastructure. Even with 20k+ cruise missiles - makeshift ports were constructed in days during ww2.
China has over 100,000 rockets and missiles estimated to be in their inventory, and the best manufacturing system in the world to produce more. A 747 cannot land on a ripped up and shredded runway, and it cannot offload goods into burning warehouses.
Not to mention the ridiculous idea of trying to feed, clothe, and care for 25 million people living on the island of Taiwan with aircraft. It cannot be compared to the berlin airlift which supplied a fraction of the people with a fraction of the goods, and whose flights lasted less than an hour. Flights to Taiwan would likely come from Tokyo, which is an 8 hour round trip. And they would probably need complex refueling operations on at least one of the legs, because Taiwan would run out of jet fuel immediately. The US doesn't have enough of a tanker fleet to support something like this, or enough cargo aircraft fitted with refueling probes.
As for ports, China does need to level them, they just need to place some of their 200,000+ sea mines in the approaches to Taiwan. They can do this with subs, aircraft, high speed watercraft and even with rocket launchers. Luckily for China, the major Taiwanese ports are on the coast which faces the strait rather than the open pacific, simplifying matters.
While china may have many mines - it is not unreasonable that an open seas mission could bring up to 5 carrier strike groups to the pacific coast of Taiwan. Enough to deter mine laying operations as well as conduct mine clearing operations.
Based on the game theory outlined above, the optimal strategy would be for Taiwan Allie’s to deploy enough military power that a Chinese strike on naval assets would immediately translate to full scale war.
5 carrier strike groups is also sufficient to block sea trade into china from further out than land based missiles can reach. This was also part of the nato strategy with Ukraine. There is enough military on standby in Eastern Europe to dissuade any attack against nato territory.
China needs a fast war that doesn’t escalate to win. Taiwan needs only not to lose. I don’t think china can simultaneously target food and American aircraft carriers without triggering a full war.
>they cannot win
PRC can very well win against US regional allies, and in many ways, a broader war is preferable because limited war means US IndoPac security infra remains untouched and others in region free to hedge with US security after TW damocles off the table. The greatest PRC strategic vision is to kick US security out of east asia and for that she needs a broad war where PRC demonstrates US cannot fulfill security commitments by destroying a protectorate so utterly that no one else would consider bandwagoning under US security umbrella after TW. Even in case of draw/loss, having opportunity to knock out extensive US IndoPac military infra (i.e. PineGap in AU) cripples US threatre capability for potentially decades. Who wins is relative, one side can win more. PRC and US both losing similar amount of blue water hulls = PRC can STILL assert military projection in her backyard with land based air assets, VS US basically gets kicked out of the Asian power projection and perhaps global hegemony game. The loss is not symmetric.
Also PRC doesn't need USN to protect global shipping, that's more Zeihan wank that hasn't been relevant for decade+. What PRC has been doing is freeloading off US, but it's more than capable to assuming own protection duties.
I've wrote elsewhere about how seriously PRC historically takes nuclear escalation with respect to security interests - it doesn't - having fought with US, USSR, IND, threatened UK, proxy FR over things much less important in TW. US carrier groups are unlikely to threaten mainland with PRC a2ad which again extends to Guam, well past even CSG sprint + stand off extended range. And even lul recent balloon drama aside, PRC rocket force can reciprocate hitting CONUS infra conventionally. If the US takes war to PRC mainland, expect critical infra to be gone on CONUS. It will take a few years for mutual vulnerability to filter way through western analysis, but all the US wank expeditionary warfare is contingent on it being unilateral, with homeland remaining un-disrupted. That's not true with PRC anymore, with PRC ability to strike CONUS only increasing with time, which will greatly circumscribe what the US will do in the TW scenario. And with precise rapid strikes being developed (PRC parlance for prompt global strike), we're talking about every US capital asset being a port visit away from being scrap. Including upcoming B21s that still needs hanger dramaqueen time. West keeps focusing on US deterrence efforts around TW without realizing PRC is also simultaneously building up intervention deterrence. Except PRC deterrence development is much more significant - US could always hit targets in mainland, that calculation was baked it. It's when PRC can hit CONUS that real deterrence math changes.
Like direct strikes to mainland china - direct strikes to continental us/ us territories imply a global conflict. Article 5 would be called on, and NATO would be drawn into the conflict. China would struggle against a G7 boycott.
It’s plausible that EU stays neutral in a narrow war, but a broad war with expansive war goals would lead to a broad response. Chinas past behavior towards nuclear powers occurred before they had indigenous weapons and while they had a nuclear protector.
The only limiter to nuclear escalation in a modern global conflict is willingness and alternatives. When alternatives have been removed and civilian targets are targeted nuclear options will be on the table. In a broad conflict this process could occur within days.
Current hardware delivery aren't coming through during active hostilities. Unlike RU who doesn't have capabilities to deny vast UKR + EU land logistics, PRC can proactively deny air+maritime around TW. Optics of PRC allowing foreign powers to actively support seperatist gov on Chinese territory during active Chinese civil war which includes TW soil and 12nm territorial waters is not something tolerable for domestic PRC politics. Or that TW cannot be supplied during war time without invading legal Chinese soil something PRC sovereignty politics won't allow due to history. That's the significant political consideration, UKR supporters moving supplies through soverign UKR territory aren't legal belligerants, supplyiers of TW that necessarily involves what PRC percieves to be invading Chinese territory are.
>imply a global conflict
Yes as does blockading PRC, that's where the entire US can choke PRC strategy falls apart, it now feasibly escalates to CONUS war. If US blockades PRC (i.e. US initiates legal war), then PRC reciprocating attack on CONUS no longer falls under art5. Of course NATO could still join, but with what hardware, based where? Even G7 boycott weatherable, this isn't 2010s when PRC was relatively export dependent, export GDP to west is now barely 10%, with mutual knock on supply chains. Most of G7+ are MUCH more trade dependant than PRC as well and will hurt more, i.e. even least trade dependant US is going to have to contest with trillions lost in advanced industries because TW leading edge semi gone, and likely crippled domestic US semi because they will still be dependant on east asian semi supply chains that's not going to survive a broad war. Meanwhile most of that hardware is already sanctioned / denied to PRC. This doesn't suggest PRC wants a broader war, but broader war does open up host of strategic reach goals and opportunities that asymmetrically devastates PRC containers.
>before they had indigenous weapons and while they had a nuclear protector
Yes, PRC had no issue tussling with nuclear powers while not being nuclear power herself. And she tussled with her alleged nuclear protector USSR as well. Multiple times + other geopolitical drama, all less important than TW.
> civilian targets are targeted
This excludes TW civilian targets (and likely strategic targets on JP, SKR, PH, AU etc), as old addage goes, is US willing to trade nukes for Los Angeles over Taipei. Proxies can fight to the last man / brick. If US doesn't want to escalate to nuclear with PRC then the point of CONUS retaliatory strikes is to deter US from dirupting PRC civilian homefront, which includes PRC shipping. But really I'd say esclation ladder jumps near nuclear once homeland attacks, even if just military are happening, which many US war planners still think is allowable - plenty of entrenched hubris thinking unilaterally attacking PRC mainland targets would not invite proportional retaliation on CONUS or other belligerants against PRC. Chance of US blockading PRC or hitting mainland PRC increasingly unlikely as PRC fills out conventional CONUS escalation rungs. Intervention calculus changes when there's homeland vunerability, this includes US allies whose critical infra is vunerable to PRC global strike as well. If anything home land vunerability limit nuclear escalation by stopping escalation at critical conventional rungs and limit broadness of response. Alternatively this is also a world where conventional escalation can reach near existential levels of mutually assured destruction. Imagine escalation ladder with rung where US+co refinery goes boom and first world economies simply ceases to be viable. That's what's skewing escalation dominance towards PRC over core PRC concerns over TW, which starts at preventing foreign aid to speed up TW collapse/capitulation.
Why do people lie so much on the Internet? There are some Taiwanese boomers who are more interested in removing communist rule in China than in gaining Taiwanese independence. But I doubt that is what you meant with "favor closer ties with China".
We're watching warfare change right now. There are many paths to success for China, given enough attention and focus.
Just one: 100 million drones to deal with all the fixed defences, and then you arrive to negotiate once you've repeatedly overwhelmed the enemy for 6 months. We've spent the last few decades helping China build the biggest manufacturing engine in history, and Ukraine has shown us what "cheap and accurate" can do. No doubt in my mind that China will be able to innovate further once it has a very good reason to do so.
If the West tries to copy this, surely it's mostly relying on chips produced in Taiwan? Give that 6 months, because I'm pretty sure China can restrict chip flow faster than the West can build backup capability. And once China owns that chip production it could easily result in 20 years (or indefinite) tech dominance. Sure, experts will be fleeing in droves but factories and supply chains don't just spring up overnight.
I suspect those chip factories would have been destroyed before China takes control of them. China’s leverage is more about denying access to those chips to the west.
"It's been two years of no work and little food. China offers you a great salary to do what you did before the war. Do you A) Say no! B) Feed your kid and rebuild the factory."
Blockade wouldn't favour west because PRC mass dramatically outweights what west can bring in theatre which itself is currently deemed unlikely to survive since it's contesting entire PRC land based hardware, i.e. everything PLA has. Like PRC doesn't even need mass drones as rocket force and glide munitions enough to hit every inch of TW from mainland positions.
Blockade favors the west because they only need enough mass for denial of area operations. That center of mass is growing as we speak with Japan arming up and larger US forces in the Philippines and Japan. This includes new Marine litorral forces built specifically for the Asian theater and the new breed of warfare we're seeing in some of the Russian/Ukraine War. China imports most of it's food and oil. It is difficult to see how their economy can sustain a blockade and sanctions, especially considering their debt crisis that will take 10 years or more to unwind the way China is currently handling things. In a prolonged comflict, their losses would be horrendous in both human, material, and capital terms.
Mass drone attacks are whiteboard fantasies with present day capabilities. Why even bring them up? I would point out that Taiwan also has plenty air, surface, and anti-ship missles. This includes long range, supersonic surface to surface cruise missles. While traditionally Taiwan has opted for for area denial operations that makes them a very unappealing target, they now have the ability to strike China's mainland at will, and there is little China can do about it.
The way Ukraine (and the West) is taking it to Russia I would imagine would give Xi pause. I would think twice if I were him, assuming the west maintains their support. From a geopolitical perspective, after Russia, China is the biggest potential loser in the Ukrainian War. The west and partners in the East are revving up their defense industrial capacity and arming up in a big way. If the Ukrainian war keeps going the way it is, the Russians will be far less help if they're able to provide any significant help at all. China can't take on the entire free world by themselves without major help.
West keeps insisting on this outdated Normandy comparison with the PLA from the 60s, PLA WILL NOT be doing a contested landing because they're not stupid like west keeps assuming. Modern precise modern munitions = there won't be Normandy beach heads. If anything an uncontested maritime transit is much easier than say US logistic ops in MENA because open ocean sensor environment makes contesting mid transition difficult. Uncles modified RO/RO is literally just a military amphib ship with defenses stripped out, i.e it does 90% of the job. The actual defense platforms will be on the plethora of dedicated grey hulls. As for ambush, PRC rockets / mlrs can give TW max 10minutes warning even according to TW can stand alone shills like Ian Easton. The reality is TW ISTAR/command will be gone in opening salvo and major hardware that can contest actual maritime transit will be gone within hours, while light forces like infantry will be picked from stand off distances. It won't be Normany where millions of tons of preshelling couldn't dislodge defenders.
>mass
Did you read any of the analysis for token force reorientation in theatre? Japan merely committed southern islands, i.e. basically the minimum concession vs opening up main islands of ACE basing and AOs already in previous PLA war planning. Marine MLR in Okinawa death even less supportable death sentence. PH doesn't allow perm deployment, i.e. they're basically the minimum US analysts have hoped for in their PRC containment vision.
As for blockading PRC, who's going to do that anymore? Hint no one. Reality is the US has just as much energy and food _security_ as PRC. This isn't Zeihan koolaid from the 2010s, the second PRC energy is disrupted, they'll run blockade and if intervened, start hitting comparable CONUS infra like refineries that support energy and ag output. That's the fundamental new security reality with PLA modernization, US may have better resource autarky, but it has lost resource security, basically Saudi at this point. All the Malacca blockade / wank only works when US has unilateral ability to enforce without homeland vulnerability. That era has closed, blockading PRC is unlikely once PRC has the ability to inflict mutual US homeland disruption.
>Mass drone
Because PRC actually has mass drone options and mass industrial production to make mass drone feasible, they're not Turkey who brags about delivering a handful of low performance MALE drones that depend on western components. Meanwhile TW literally doesn't have "plenty" of missile inventory, that wouldn't barely make a dent in mainland infra. Like the amount of concrete in PRC and the sheer scale of hardened targets is staggering, sinking limited TW missiles is an easy trade if they can even be launched in first place. Which again, every inch can be preempted with less than 10 minutes of warning before ISTAR gone and most missile stockpiles become paperweight. The mistake is thinking TW will be defending as a modern country (currently state of preparedness is not remotely true), functionally TW's "modern" defense will exist for a few hours before reverting to the capabilities of taliban.
>UKR
PRC is a large winner, cheap energy and commodities for a long time. Meanwhile the EU dramatically weakened that they can't substantively back up the US even if they go all in atlanticist camp. As much as RU is a reduced state, so is the EU as a block. Have you seen west "ramped up" proposals, nothing that affects IndoPac theater in a meaningful way, if they even get realized (ditto with JP) with direction economies are trending. DE is already stalling. JP with their 400 tomahawks, enough to destroy 3 medium sized air fields with 50%+ interception rates using 80s Soviet anti-air. Of course that's backstop, but one needs to actually put headlines / developments into perspective. Force balance is trending towards the free world not having a chance in PRC's backyard even if they band together. Like if actually follow the developments closely, it's hard to overstate the preponderance of mass PRC building out, relative to everyone else. Like PRC alone is ~50% of global ship building capacity and testing more advanced missiles per year than most countries acquire. What they learned from UKR is the entire west can supply UKR and an incompetent RU can still fight them to relative stand still with limited special operations tier commitment.
Uncle has converted his private ferry [0] and other vessels to act as amphibious assault and support vessels. Certainly, China is on a building binge regarding amphibious assault vessels (e.g., Type 075), but it will take years to build, train, and crew these warships and others like it.
> As much as RU is a reduced state, so is the EU as a block.
These two things are not remotely the same. Russia has all but burned through their enormous inheritance of equipment from the Soviet days. That equipment can never be replaced, as Russia is no longer a superpower. Russia will become a second or third rate power among European countries, depending on how long the war drags out. Meanwhile, Europe is mostly sending old kit out of their warehouses and stockyards, with some notable exceptions. Europe has the economy to rearm, while Russia does not. Most importantly, Europe's military industrial base ought to be in a strong position before China is ready to invade.
[0] https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/08/04/china-reportedl...
>Europe
Europe already showed a lot of their acquisition hand, nothing meaningful for IndoPac and like AUKUS, big pieces like naval combatants are decades away while PRC dropping them like dumplings. RU, going through an active war is actually/literally has relevant industrial base to rearm, while also burning through legacy hardware just like EU, but with more and cheaper resource autarky and motivation to acquire at industrial scale for active war. Meanwhile Europe is TALKING about rearming, which is acquiring token SRK/US hardware as stop gab before figuring out indigenous efforts that will take decades. DE promises to raise spending already stalling, and they're key supplier in EU defense whose entire industrial base in general will have to deal with more expensive inputs. This is nothing like PRC who has massive industrial base and now cheap RU resources, hence EU prognosis being overall reduced. Like don't get me wrong, EU will likely increase defense capabilities relative to RU, but will be long and not smooth process, and questionable if their acquistions will be effective in the first place, especially for IndoPac. Two things can be true, EU can become a stronger bloc against RU, but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour because while it prefers independant EU vs US+EU, writing off a weak EU that can't substantively boost US even if they wanted to is more reliable for planning because less need to transatlantic consider political shifts.
Russia doesn't have any money to rearm. Their economy is smaller than Canada, is about the same size as Italy, and ~9X smaller than the EU+UK. Russia will not be able to help China in any significant way. China is on its own if it attacks Taiwan, without a large power to support it.
> but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour
The Europeans need to scale up their existing industrial base, not completely reimagine their forces from the ground up. That will take years, not decades. They can rearm rather quickly, considering the EU+UK's economy is larger than China's. Also, you misunderstand part of the real value of a more muscular EU; it frees up even more US resources in the Pacific.
RU has already established (and now increasingly streamlined due to actually building for war) defense industrial base + PPP and autarkic resource advantages + will be forced maintain beyond 2% to rearm. Canada maybe richer but they're also squandering 6.5B buying a few coast guard patrol ships, which is arguably more incompetent than RU who at least have deficient hardware in numbers to prosecute war, and also more closely reflects current broken state of EU/NATO defense which has dwarfed RU for decades but couldn't sustain a few weeks of war that RU can. That said, RU rearming not enough to threaten NATO again, as if revealed RU capabilities were, but enough to keep NATO occupied.
RU help to PRC is significant cheap resources, no one expected RU to help in any other way except maybe provide overflight rights (big for lobbing missiles over NORAD) and playing nuclear brinksmanship against SKR/JP. Just like US is going to be largely on her own in terms of force commitment for PRC war, without large power support outside of potential basing, because realistically there are no other "large" powers to rival US/PRC in TW scenario. Except maybe JP, but questionable if their defense bump fundable, or level of commitment in actual TW scenario.
>Europeans need to scale up
Yes, but "need to" being operating word, post Trump + basic historic EU/NATO coordination issues means they're pivotting towards indigenous programs like 4.5/5/6g fighters (JP/SKR as well) - stuff that will take decades. Major capital platform like surface combatants also going to be decade+ timeline due to politics. All the big ticket / long term expensive things they plan to either do indigenously or wean off US. Meanwhile issues with hollowed out defense base and lack of common market / per country acquisitions = it's not going to be a smooth or well coordinated process for long time. EU has potential to rearm but I have serious doubts they will / are systemically capable for doing it quick. EU+UK economy is smaller than PRC by PPP but more important is defense base and industrial efficiency simply not there. I would bet that actual urgency to rearm will decrease now that RU is diminished, I don't see west EU stopping free riding anytime soon especially with structural changes like expensive energy that's already deindustrializing like in DE. Smaller/poorer east EU near frontlines likely, but little savings there.
Which ties to more "muscular EU" freeing up US resources for IndoPac, which IMO is more rhetoric than sensible analysis. Beside hardware relevant EU defense not relevant for IndoPac, the primary issue of US resourcing is dominantly domestic US interservice politics, where despite all voices screaming for PRC pivot, relatively useless army is still getting largest branch funding and pouring stupid resources into CENTCOM - ~8X USEUCOM, down from ~12X after AFG withdrawl, that's where US is freeing up meaningful resources. Apart from funding UKR war now, EU defense post GWOT was relatively insignificant committment, there wasn't much juice to squeeze. Compare to PRC gains, quick napkin math suggests PRC is _saving_ 3x USEUCOM budget buying cheaper RU oil last year, add in long term cheaper gas, less competitive EU exports, years delay in TW arms shipment and structurally PRC is coming out ahead, at least short/medium term.
China has never laid a finger on the west, we did, yet we keep demonizing them, meddling in their own business (HK, e.g.) all while we fight wars all around the globe, spy everyone and overthrow governments left and right.
Also, the US were there under UNSC resolution. Not so much for the PRC.
Do you know where Italian fisheries are all of the time? North African and turkish coasts. African debt? We're kings of it as of stealing every african resource and abusing those people. Spying, really? You even barely aware how far we go with that?
The problem with modern geopolitics is that very few lead by the example.
That is effectively the point.
They probably assumed that sanctions would not be all that severe, given their pivotal position in the world economy. Perhaps they'll reconsider after seeing the level of sanctions against Russia.
>> Also they import about 90% of their oil.
> They probably assumed that sanctions would not be all that severe, given their pivotal position in the world economy. Perhaps they'll reconsider after seeing the level of sanctions against Russia.
Why? Russia has successfully bypassed most of those sanctions. There have been many articles about that.
Sanctions like that will only work if the entire rest of the world lines up behind what leading western nations want, and the Ukraine war show that probably won't happen.
Russia's big exports also happen to be food and oil...
I think you missed my point: there's synergy between the West's two pariahs. Russia can provide the food and oil China needs, and China can supply manufactured goods to Russia (and Africa and all kinds of other places that won't fall in line behind whatever the West wants them to do).
I believe Russia is already working on building new pipelines to fix that. The Chinese also know how to build things fast, so that doesn't seem like an insurmountable problem.
> To get the oil from other regions, they'd have to rely on ships...
Is that a problem or just a small inefficiency? Because it doesn't look like a problem to me, short of an all-out war where you've got submarines attacking commercial shipping.
I do wonder if those kind of people actually lived in a communist country..
You mean just like what the US did during the 90s and 2000s?
https://www.nknews.org/2021/10/reckless-interference-in-taiw...
The United States approach to Taiwan has remained consistent across decades and administrations.
The United States has a longstanding one China policy**, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act,
the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. We oppose any unilateral changes
to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-Strait
differences to be resolved by peaceful means.
I believe you haven't read the link you yourself posted.
The first link doesn't say what you thing it does, though. It is even written by the de facto ambassador of Taiwan to Japan.
But even ignoring all those links, Taiwan is de facto an independent country. The PRC cannot assert any sort of power in the island, and PRC citizens are not considered Taiwanese nationals.
Are you willing to say it is wrong for China to support Russia violating Ukraine's territorial integrity, and that they should condemn Russia without delay?
Why should China side with US over Ukraine's territorial integrity as US violates Chinese territorial integrity?
Furthermore, your entire position is incoherent here. Seems like when it comes to Taiwan you are supporting separatism, while when it comes to Ukraine you're supporting territorial integrity. Perhaps try and pick a lane first?
I'm asking you and the CCP to stand for Ukraine's territorial integrity and to rebuke Russia. If territorial integrity and international norms are to be respected, shouldn't you and the CCP do that because it is the morale and consistent thing to do? A code of morality is not dependent on what others do, so talking about the US is a red herring.
> Furthermore, your entire position is incoherent here. Seems like when it comes to Taiwan you are supporting separatism,
I wish for the status quo and peace between China and Taiwan for as long as is practically possible. I think that major figures like Pelosi and others visiting Taiwan is pointlessly provocative and idiotic. On the other hand, Xi and the CCP constantly yelling at everyone to respect what China's territorial integrity, while condoning Putin's invasion is irreconcilable, competely devoid of morality, and oozes the worst kind of cynicism. It is detestable and you should repudiate it without delay.
https://ecfr.eu/publication/united-west-divided-from-the-res...
https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/02/27/the-global-south-ref...
https://usrussiaaccord.org/acura-viewpoint-krishen-mehta-the...
https://archive.is/2023.02.23-211202/https://www.nytimes.com...
Second, China released a position paper where they make their position on Ukraine pretty clear. I encourage you to read it https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t2023022...
>I wish for the status quo and peace between China and Taiwan for as long as is practically possible.
Literally the only reason there is tension is because US is interfering in internal affairs of a country half way across the world from it.
Finally, what Russia is doing in Ukraine is literally modelled on what US and NATO did in Yugoslavia. Following the exact same rationale. NATO recognized the independence of the separatist regions and then had them invite NATO to assist them militarily. This is precisely what Russia did. NATO literally established the precedent here.
How is that remotely comparable when there were zero the separatists movements in the Kherson and Zaphorizia Oblasts before Russia invaded those regions? Yet Russia declared them independent anyhow, and then annexed four Oblasts, which was Russia's original goal in the first place. Will you condemn Russia for all that? If not, we have nothing left to discuss.
https://www.quora.com/Is-there-any-credible-evidence-that-Uk... (https://archive.ph/BAxYc)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4
https://truthout.org/articles/us-approach-to-ukraine-and-rus...
https://truthout.org/articles/noam-chomsky-us-military-escal...
If you won't acknowledge that what Russia is doing in Ukraine is precisely what NATO was doing in Yugoslavia then there really isn't anything left to discuss.
I'll just leave you with this quote from NATO during the war in Yugoslavia:
If President Milosevic really wants all of his population to have water and
electricity all he has to do is accept NATO’s five conditions and we will
stop this campaign.
Says who? How many UN members out of 193 hold this position?
My latest count is that this view is held by only 3 UN members out of 193: Russia, Syria, North Korea. The list speaks for itself.
Could you define what you mean by "vast majority" here?
What I'm seeing is:
March 2022: "The United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday overwhelmingly voted to reprimand Russia for invading Ukraine and demanded that Moscow stop fighting and withdraw its military forces, an action that aims to diplomatically isolate Russia at the world body. The resolution, supported by 141 of the assembly's 193 members"
https://www.reuters.com/world/un-general-assembly-set-censur...
March 2023: "With a thumping majority of 141 in favour, only 7 against and 32 abstentions, the assembly again issued a non-binding resolution demanding Russia's military withdrawal from Ukraine and calling for a "comprehensive, just and lasting peace".
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2517499/un-slams...
It seems disingenuous to leave it at "vast majority of the world"
> 6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
No, it explicitly references the Six Assurances right there, which says it doesn't:
> The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Policy_of_deliberate_ambigui...
United Nations - Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (October 1971): https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en
UN - Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook (2003): https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/publications/fc/english.p...
US policy is one of "deliberate ambiguity"[1].
As the quote above says:
> we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.
An uniformed reader might take that to mean that the US doesn't support the Taiwanese government.
An informed reader realizes what it is saying is that the US does not expect the Taiwanese government to give up a claim to be the government of mainland China. Obviously this is quite a different interpretation, and what "deliberate ambiguity" means.
To quote the Wikipedia article above:
> There is deliberate ambiguity regarding the government of the country of 'China' (as well as what land this country constitutes). Currently, two governments claim legitimate rule and sovereignty over all of China, which they claim includes Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, as well as some other islands.
The "six assurances" noted in the comment above also include this "deliberate ambiguity":
> 5: The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China
> 6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Policy_of_deliberate_ambiguity
It hasn't been successful every time the US has gone to a country's aid, but some countries just can't be helped.
US also supported dictators in South Korea and the Philippines, as well as in Latin America.
https://ia800309.us.archive.org/26/items/fp_Killing_Hope-US_...
https://bylinetimes.com/2021/09/15/up-to-six-million-people-...
"Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances". In particular: "The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan"[1].
So the US supports a "One China policy", "does not support Taiwanese independence" and "does not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan." And it will supply Taiwan with weapons to defend itself, giving defacto independence. And, as you quote, the US opposed any unilateral changes to the status quo.
Confusing? Yes. Yet you're misleading people with your post, frankly speaking, if you telling people to "Just read the defence department's website".
Morally, China is trying to remove Taiwan's defacto independence, for reasons that completely ignore any idea of self-determination, whereas the US is supplying Taiwan with the weapons to choose.
There's nothing stopping Taiwan's democratic government and its people from choosing to give China control, since there are pro PRC parties in Taiwan, and even so--they have decided to resist PRC control.
You can, of course, argue the US should not give Taiwan the right of self-determination, that it should stay out of the affairs of other countries, since there are obviously economic reasons in addition to moral; but nonetheless issues of self-determination are at the heart--since the people and their well-being are always at the heart.
you sound like an apologist for fascism
Or is the consent of the governed? And if so, I think saying Taiwan belongs to anyone else except the Taiwanese is a big mistake.
Amusingly, reference [1] that you point at is arguing that Taiwan is an independent country (the opposite to what you are saying):
> Hence, the restoration of Taiwan, Penghu, and all other appurtenant islands as an integral part of the ROC’s territory is without question legally binding. The ROC government and the majority of its people strongly disagree that Taiwan’s position is uncertain.
ROC = Republic of China, ie, Taiwan. And the author is "Director of Press & Information Dept. of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan." (Taipei = Taiwan of course)
[1] https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/no-taiwans-status-is-not-unc...
Which is to say, the legal position on Taiwan is frankly insignificant compared to the interests of China and the US (not to mention the people of ROC themselves), as either party will end up doing whatever they can get away with. They may cherry pick some international law arguments, or make up something, but it's only a talking point either way.
And of course, you're right that we live in a might makes right world, but there in lies the problem for US. As China becomes more powerful and assertive, this kind of behavior will lead to a confrontation sooner or later.
the rhetoric in the west has gotten so intense in this area that i'm feeling like talking about it online is pointless - i'd rather put my money down.
There is nothing ‘thankfully’ about watching millions of people be vaporised or their skin melting off and children with cancers?
NATO has been all fired up to balkanize Russia and start WWIII. I won't hear any whining and moaning when the dream comes true. I won't stand for it no matter HOW many people die.
If war is still preventable showing the nukes will just escalate things.
I am sure we have provided them some weapons. Not sure conventional or nuclear.
Ok, they reveal them. What is next? Nukes are not magic. They are just weapons. What do you think would happen once they are “revealed”?
What delivery mechanism are you proposing? Should they be aimed counter-force or counter-value? (Meaning are they trying to shoot the chinese nuclear launchers or are they lobbing them into chinese cities?) How are you protecting the nukes in Taiwan?
If they do, problem solved. If they don't, at that stage it probably didn't hurt.
Then China detonates ten over open waters, and tells "you" to back down and not go there.
The magic deterrent value of nukes (mutually assured destruction) doesn't work if one side can't assure destruction of the other. Even if Taiwan can manage such a show of nuclear force, China can (credibly) threaten to annihilate it if it attacks, but the reverse isn't true.
Exactly!
China has ~350 warheads, and they play a shell game where they have more silos than ICBMs and they are swapping the ICBMs around the empty silos and nobody knows which one is full and which one is empty. Which means if you are targeting their nuclear forces you need to spend much more warheads to knock out all of theirs. That is a lot of warheads (and delivery mechanism) to “secretly smuggle in”. And even after you somehow knock out all their nukes China has their conventional forces, they are angry and fair to say justified in tearing Taiwan apart.
If Taiwan decides to target chinese cities. Do you think China will say “whoohooo, you won”? They will be very angry, the Chinese people will demand the attacker’s head, on top of Tawain just lost significant international support for basically killing civilians by the millions.
Of course they can also aim at invading conventional forces, but if China is just a little bit competent they won’t bunch up enough of their troops to make a nuke justified. Meaning that Taiwan would waste a whole warhead and delivery mechanism to sink a single ship, or knock out an enemy harbour. They can do it, but they can also probably do it conventionaly.
I don’t think brandishing nukes is going to help the Taiwanese government here.
And more every day. I've read they're estimated to have 1000 by the end of the decade.
The question is, can Taiwan get there? I doubt it, and if it tries and fails to reach the threshold, it will only provoke China (or more specifically, the Chinese leadership).
Limited nuclear war is an automatic loss condition for Taiwan, but it's only very costly to China. I believe nuclear weapons in Taiwan is one of China's stated red lines that will trigger war.
If it is some ideological goal then I agree the threshold might be impossible to get to, but if the goal is to become the worlds super power than a few strategic nukes can definitely makes a big impact.
Now I don't view the CCP as being fanatic, they have power based goals, and if those goals are made impossible by a few nukes then that should change things.
Taiwan can also draw a giant jellyfish in the sand on a beach and tell China to back down. If they do, problem solved. If they don't, at that stage it probably didn't hurt.
The trick is that once you demonstrated your capability (either nuke detonation or giant jellyfish drawing) you need to explain to your adversary how this capability is going to cause them pain they cannot bear. This part is unclear with your plan and mine too!
So why even bother with defending Taiwan if the number of Chinese casualties doesn't matter to the chinese?
being a fairly calculated player I believe that there exists some threshold of pain that even china would think twice before shrugging it off.
> being a fairly calculated player I believe that there exists some threshold of pain that even china would think twice before shrugging it off.
This is not in doubt. It just that nukes are not magic. They are not an automatic “you won” card.
The most sensible thing I can think of with nukes regarding the protection of Taiwan is to hit Chinese deep sea harbours. If you can distrupt enough of them then maybe they can’t board their troops. But that is a lot of warheads, and I wouldn’t be surprised if they can restore some semblance of operations even in a nuked harbour.
I'd wager that if you're amassing forces to conduct an invasion and midway through you discovered your target has nukes pointed at you, the very least you'd do is rethink your strategy and put a pause on operations.
I don't follow. What exactly leads you to believe that lobbing nukes at an invasion force's staging area and/or neighboring military bases "does not have a credible chance of hurting" the invader?
I hope you will believe me without proper citations that they just have a lot of troops.[1] And there is no reason to think they would need to bunch them up. How many smuggled in nukes are we imagining here?
1: this is the orbat of the Chinese rocket forces from 2020 https://www.aboyandhis.blog/post/mapping-the-people-s-libera...
They don't need to do that quite yet though, as despite the media panic, an invasion of Taiwan is years, is not decades away from being attempted.
China is a real threat, but it's more over the long term, than any immediate concerns.
Seems consistent enough with decades
What do you think would be the point of Taiwan having secret nukes? What would they do with them?
Or for that matter non-secret nukes?