491 karma · joined August 11, 2016
Google now wants to bind credentials to a device by storing the secret in the TPM: https://blog.google/security/protecting-cookies-with-device-...
Additionally, MITRE doesn’t coordinate a release date with you. They can be slow to respond sometimes but in the end you just tell them to set the CVE to public at some date and they’ll do it. You’re also free to publish information on the vulnerability before MITRE assigned a CVE.
There's an IOMMU:
> Is the baseband isolated? > Yes, the baseband is isolated on all of the officially supported devices. Memory access is partitioned by the IOMMU and limited to internal memory and memory shared by the driver implementations. [...]
https://grapheneos.org/faq#baseband-isolation
> GrapheneOS cannot really influence this, but hardened_malloc could conceivably help.
They can and do, see above. But I don't see how hardened_malloc is related to the baseband doing DMA.
by strcat, Graphene OS founder https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44679100
Just because it can’t be “appreciated” by all users doesn’t mean it’s only “for” a small sub-group.
It seems to me they’re just trying to minimise the data they have access to — similar to private cloud compute — while keeping up with the features competitors provide in a less privacy-respecting way. Them not asking for permission makes it even more obvious to me that it’s not built for any small super privacy-conscious group of people but the vast majority of their customers instead.
„In 2018, the German Federal Criminal Police Office uncovered a plot involving unknown KSK soldiers to murder prominent German politicians such as Claudia Roth, Heiko Maas and Joachim Gauck among others, and carry out attacks against immigrants living in Germany.[7] Also, earlier that same year in a separate investigation, the State prosecutors in the city of Tübingen investigated whether neo-Nazi symbols were used at a "farewell" event involving members of KSK.[8][9]
In June 2020, German defence minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer announced that the unit would be partially disbanded due to growing far-right extremism within the ranks.[10] The KSK had become partially independent from the chain of command, with a toxic leadership culture. One of the force's four companies where extremism is said to be the most rife was to be dissolved and not replaced.[11]“
However, I don't know whether it's possible to delete only a single resident key you no longer need.
If you’re remembering all your passwords there’s a good chance they’re terrible, you frequently re-use them or both. That really helps attackers e.g. when they use leaked passwords to run credential stuffing attacks on your employer.
You just wrote two comments bashing a technology you admit you didn’t properly educate yourself about.
Additionally, “the kind of person who's prone to non-targeted phishing attacks” is actually everyone — including infosec professionals spending lots of time on phishing campaigns for red team engagements. You just need to be lucky enough to reach them at the right (emotional, stressful, …) moment. Getting grammar and spelling correct and even potentially even slightly customising each email is made much easier by AI. Knowledgeable users might, however, stop once their passkey doesn’t work and try to understand why.
Scanning a QR code: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102680
The time investment could even be worth it, since "Signing in with a passkey is three times faster than using a traditional password and eight times faster than a password and traditional MFA", according to the article.
They do provide extra security, in that they ensure that you're on the correct domain instead of a phishing site.
Does it then become not a full OS anymore? Mirage is what I linked to above.
When I clicked the link I was expecting something like a unikernel, eg https://roscidus.com/blog/blog/2016/01/01/a-unikernel-firewa...
You certainly can “prove” and “disprove” “security” by reverse engineering, to the same extent a source code review can (or even more, since you’re looking at what’s actually running on the device). It can often require a bigger time investment, but even that’s not always the case in my experience, especially if you’re working with a really bad code base.
They have indirect control over the user’s backup folder via the app, but meta would need to distribute a malicious update to everyone that causes the user’s apps to download the backup and send it to meta, at which point they could just skip trying to access the backup and directly upload the chats from the app.
It’s impressive how much misinfo you’re spreading.
Edit: Meta’s actions over the years clearly show that they don’t want to know the contents of your messages. Not knowing their contents means, for example, that they don’t have to run scanners to detect illegal content (but users can report messages). They benefit from making WhatsApp a secure platform, as it allows them to collect everyone’s metadata, which apparently has lots of value to them.