108 karma · joined December 23, 2013
If I use the DDG TOR hidden service, 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion, do a search and click on a search result the link goes via a DDG redirect from r.duckduckgo.com. This should be using the hidden service domain, not the duckduckgo.com domain. As it is the redirect goes over a tor exit node rather than directly via the hidden service.
[1] https://github.com/clearcrypt/clearcrypt/pull/3#issue-327877...
Most projects start with this as an implicit goal. Unfortunately they tend to grow out of control as the code base gets larger.
You can have multiple different versions of packages installed and other packages can depend on the different versions. The management of the 'shared library hell' is done behind the scenes using symbolic links in a GNU Stow like manner.
You can create 'environments' that are collections of installed packages and switch between them so tools needed for one task don't pollute the namespace for other tasks. For example, I create an environment for working on Firefox. It uses specific GCC versions and libraries. Only that environment sees them. I then switch to another environment when working on another project which uses clang - that environment can't see the library versions from the firefox environment, etc.
You can build package from source or download from a binary cache. You can modify configure flags and other build settings and the correct packages will rebuild - or download from cache if they are built with the same flags.
It installs easily on top of other Linux distros.
It would also make trades a little more difficult in that users that are slow in signing off a transaction slows the trade down. The buyer has to wait until the seller has performed an action. Could you DoS an exchange with multiple buy/sells that you don't release?
It's unfortunate that those that have deposited since then have subsidised those that withdrew after the hacks.
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https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.servo/-dmlVwMknJ...
That said I'd hope that systems like ATS, Mercury, MLTon and OCaml being open source make it easier to contribute to the implementation for issues that come up and this would offset any 'not enough real world' problems that they have. If you don't like those languages, pick another (eg. Haskell).
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prince_XML
[2] http://www.missioncriticalit.com/technology.html
[3] http://mmpool.bitparking.com/pool
[4] https://blogs.janestreet.com/category/ocaml/
[6] https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2013/04/03/mozilla-and-samsung...
Neither is C++. People writing new systems level code should seriously consider safer languages. ATS, Rust, Mercury, OCaml, SML, and many others.
Eligius have some mining rules which one could regard as not acting in good faith (rejecting gambling site transactions, etc) depending on your point of view. This can prevent some from using them and limits their hashrate somewhat.
If you look at the top pools list compared to 6 months ago that landscape has changed quite a bit. The pools outside of the top 5 have less market share and there are less pools. Mining power is slowly centralizing: https://web.archive.org/web/20130215040845/http://blockorigi...
It is not "lose money" exploitable (unless combined with social engineering) but is definitely "lose time, lose effort" exploitable.
I would be more inclined to believe that the majority of sites use the reference client and this is why issues are appearing.
This is why many sites are having issues. It is in fact a problem with the reference client.
Basically the reference client allows an edge case where it allows spending an unconfirmed output if that output was generated by the wallet itself as change. This can form a chain of unconfirmed transactions. When the malleable bot modifies the original one they all become invalid. The reference client does not handle this case well, it gets balances wrong, and clogs the wallet up.
It's unfortunate that Mt Gox got a lot of heat for calling out the issue from the foundation and core developers saying that malleability was known and wasn't a bit issue. in fact it is an issue due to this edge case in the reference client.
This is not correct. The original client gets one edge case wrong and it is this that is causing the issue with most of the exchanges that use it: http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1xm49o/due_to_activ...
Spending unconfirmed outputs in the presence of malleable transactions is unsafe. The reference client allows spending unconfirmed change outputs as they used to be considered safe. But if the original transactions is modified then the chain of unconfirmed transactions becomes double spent and the reference client gets confused about balances.