18 karma · joined March 18, 2016
Also HNS is a coin, not a token.
If this behavior is easily configurable/shared and open source, then people can opt into whatever configuration that best suites their needs.
Blockchains are good for timestamping. The records on chain can be tracked over time but this doesn't solve the problem of when the blockchain authoritative name server delegates to the tld's authoritative name server. Maybe the tld nameserver could index the records in a git like data structure and be able to serve queries with a time parameter
Businesses can own a cryptographic asset (their domain name) that can accrue value based on services provided.
Potentially people may try to use their domains as collateral or experiment in collective ownership of public services through multisig or DAO like constructions.
Hopefully it helps push forward innovation on the chain of trust, opening it up to be something more configurable and dynamic.
It binds to libunbound but you are right that you would want a lower level language for it to be more scalable. There is a rust implemention work in progress here: https://github.com/UrkelLabs/rsd
There is also a C light client here: https://github.com/handshake-org/hnsd
For the consensus, there are C bindings for the cryptography and a workerpool that really speeds things up.
It could also be possible to dump the Handshake zone into a zone file and serve from behind unbound.
Not implemented yet, but this is where one would implement it https://github.com/handshake-org/hsd/blob/master/lib/dns/ser... https://github.com/handshake-org/hnsd/blob/master/src/ns.c#L...
In the case where keys are lost, there are 2 options
1) Let the domain expire after 1 year, there is a protocol rule in which the domain must be updated and without the private key it would be impossible to update it, and then rebuy it
or
2) Gain support from the community and fork the protocol such that the domain is reassigned to a different private key
There is a process for trademark dispute resolution, it's been going on for awhile now. The Alexa Top 100k domains are reserved and can be claimed using a DNSSEC Proof, so dot google on Handshake can be claimed by the owner of google dot com
1) Eclipse attack the client, meaning that the client is on a partitioned network with an alternative chain tip. This grows more expensive as the records were written further in the past
or
2) Steal the top level domain owners private key and update the database