That's a neat visualisation.
n^2 = sum(1..n) - sum(1..n-1) = 2sum(1..n-1) + n
=> n^2 - n = 2sum(1..n-1) => n(n-1) = 2*sum(1..n-1) => sum(1..n-1) = n(n-1)/2
And you can rewrite that as... sum(1..n) = n(n+1)/2
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n^2 = sum(1..n) - sum(1..n-1) = 2sum(1..n-1) + n
=> n^2 - n = 2sum(1..n-1) => n(n-1) = 2*sum(1..n-1) => sum(1..n-1) = n(n-1)/2
And you can rewrite that as... sum(1..n) = n(n+1)/2
Is this true for A records too?
If so, neither haproxy nor nginx expire cached A records.
Nginx Plus does, and a few nginx plugins do, however.
https://github.com/airbnb/synapse is a process that polls DNS, and updates haproxy config accordingly and SIGHUPs haproxy I've used synapse to solve this issue, but it's a moving piece I'd rather not have involved.
https://robertheaton.com/2014/07/14/getting-nothing-done-a-m...
This stops the proxy attack you describe getting a session key, but not getting your password. Of course, the password alone is insufficient.
You might argue "well why bother with U2F, if you are going to set up TOTP anyway", to which I respond that using U2F is still a net win, because for the times you use U2F, you are safe from phishing attacks.
That in an emergency situation you have to use TOTP, and thus be vigilant that you aren't being phished, does not negate the benefits from having used U2F previously.
I can see that by enabling TOTP as a second-factor, it increases your attack surface. That is, you now have to care about whether your TOTP secret has been leaked. I consider this cost to be small, compared to the benefit of being able to fallback to TOTP. Others may decide this tradeoff isn't worth it.
Sweet!
Though I'm skeptical of how much a 3m42s interview can be said to represent the entirety of her views, I'd say she alludes to the harms by referring to such access as "warranted". That is, authorisation is restricted [because of the costs of unrestricted access].
> Second, that the spying will be used asymmetrically - you, dear citizen, will have all your communications recorded, stored indefinitely, and subject to discovery when some prosecutor or large corporation decides to do away with you.
This law would apply to politicians too, right? If they're suspected of a crime, a warrant could be issued for their communication details.
> But try and find out which corporations are sponsoring which politicians, who owns them, and what kind of deals those politicians are making in your name, and you'll meet a stone wall of silence - just like in the TTIP negotiations.
As mentioned, if those are crimes I expect them to be investigated similarly.
> I don't think this is a stronger argument. In fact, I don't think this is an argument at all.
Sorry yes, my single sentence wasn't the entirety of the argument. I was referring to arguments that rely on the benefits of privacy, rather than defeating a strawman (my, as you say, literal reading of top-level comment).
GP?
> Whether [...] you are simply pointing out that those in authority have a default duty/right to an individual's private conversations
Certainly not. Whether they do ought to should be decided by society and its representatives via the legislature.
I can see targetted spying is possible today. It sounds like she wants targeted spying to be cheaper, and restricted by the judicial system.
> But pointing out the harms of pervasive spying is a weak argument, because she didn't deny (or even address) those harms?
The argument I replied to wasn't pointing out the harms of pervasive spying. Nor was your argument.
"If she wants law enforcement to be able to see other's metadata, she should expose her metadata" is weak. We needn't waste time with that.
There are stronger arguments, such as asserting our right to privacy, or perhaps that it isn't technically possible without critically compromising encryption for everybody.
We ought to use strong arguments. This thread's arguments aren't strong.
I use it, though I'm not a heavy emacs user.
This style of network has the property that you can take two independent CJDNS networks, link them together, and all nodes are mutually addressable/routable. This is in contrast to The Internet, whose addressing is centralised on IANA.
cjdns is moderately active, though most links between nodes are via an overlay on top of the public Internet. The goal is to have physical/wireless links between geographically close nodes.
Use https://peers.fc00.io/ to find a cjdns node geographically close to you.
Decentralized protocols such as ipfs/scuttlebutt work particularly well on cjdns, as a file shared on ipfs in one network, will automagically become available on another network, once those networks are linked.
casync does not act as a server. Its on-disk representation and client behaviour is designed in such a way that the server need only serve static files. This makes deployment easy.
As far as I can tell, the advantages compared to Borgbackup seem to be:
* casync offers control over which FS metadata is included
* casync, the server, exposes chunks over HTTP
* casync, the library, is written in C so is more easily used by systems software.
I'm betting we'll see machinectl integration. Excellent!
Range.closed(1,5) is the syntax used to refer to what a mathematician would call [1,5].
Guava is just a Java library. In Java 9, a two-Integer-element list literal will be List.of(9000, 9001).
Range.closed(1,5) == [1,5]
Range.open(1,5) == (1,5)
Range.openClosed(1,5) == (1,5]
Range.closedOpen(1,5) == [1,5)
Range.greaterThan(1) == (1,infinity)
Range.atLeast(1) == [1,infinity)
That class always strikes me as having high power-to-weight. It has methods like encloses(anotherRange), contains(aValue), and others.
https://google.github.io/guava/releases/19.0/api/docs/com/go...
When I see "0..<n" I know the range is exclusive of n.
* Netty's: https://netty.io/4.0/api/io/netty/buffer/ByteBuf.html as used by Netty
* Agrona's, as used by Aeron and SBE: http://insightfullogic.com/2015/Apr/18/agronas-threadsafe-of...