37 karma · joined October 18, 2025
I was also unable to find any Flatpak that has access to the home directory when installed, you may well be right but I couldn't find any. I used Flatseal to verify the permissions: https://flathub.org/en/apps/com.github.tchx84.Flatseal
I'm also of the opinion that we generally shouldn't use software that we don't absolutely trust. That has kept my .bashrc (and other files) safe so far.
I would suggest you have your physician submit a Expanded access request immediately, because the same page says that they will close this program after FDA approval as they transition to commercial use, but the timeline for that is unclear.
If the TPM signs the original image taken by the camera, then even the slightest image processing on another device would invalidate the signature. Routine changes like cropping, scaling, converting between image formats / quality levels, or applying image filters would invalidate the signature.
An adversary can manipulate the date/time settings on the camera and forge evidence to frame someone. "This cryptographically signed photo, with timestamp, proves that you were here at this time!"
And camera sensors can get damaged and need replacement. But if replacement of the TPM-and-sensor chip is allowed, then you can just as well replace it with a sensor from another camera. In which case a signature from a specific TPM+sensor doesn't prove that a specific camera took the photo, at best it might be evidence that a specific camera model took the photo.
If the manufacturer will happily ship a replacement TPM+sensor for a specific camera, someone can fraudulently claim that their sensor is broken and be given a new TPM+sensor for the same camera. And there will now be multiple TPM+sensors in existence that have the same key. Since this module can be switched between cameras, there could be multiple cameras that signed a given picture.
To ship (identical) replacement TPMs, the manufacturer would also need to know the private keys of all the cameras, so the manufacturer could forge arbitrary signatures at will.
Finally maybe the manufacturer doesn't want to deal with the above problems and decides that repairing the camera's TPM is not allowed after all, or that only the manufacturer is allowed to repair a camera, but then they may be in violation of right-to-repair laws in several jurisdictions.
It's normal in the videogame ROM hacking community to distribute this kind of binary patches (known as IPS patches) so as to avoid legal trouble, since the binary patch is useless if the user doesn't have access to the original videogame ROM. Distributing the ROM or even its patched version would be illegal, but a patch of the kind I mentioned is fine.
I think a better analogy for this situation is: The public donates food, then the recipient, after being fed, sells access to (infinite cheaply replicable copies of) said food for a profit. The public in this case just wants to have said food.
In later years Google generally published the details of a system after they moved to the next one, to stay ahead of their competition, or if they didn't see it as important to their business (most infamously the Transformer language model). It was still generous of them to share their research at all though, and this allowed their scientists to talk publicly about their research which is a huge plus.
I like this idea in principle but I think it could become a workaround that the same malicious entities would be willing to exploit, by just coercing their victims to "reset" their phones to access that toggle.
From the article I understood this to be a one-time delay, as opposed to having to go through the same waiting process for every single "unlicensed" app I want to install (which I would not accept). I'm just waiting 24 hours once to permanently change my device into a mode where I can install any app I like without any restrictions/delays whatsoever.
Nonetheless I still think it's impressive that we have LLMs that can just do this now.