42 karma · joined November 8, 2012
I cannot recommend either, but I would note that in your link they do seem to state 'Anyway, not so many people seem to do use a tunnel before they connect to Tor, therefore it's not so well tested, do not rely on it too much.'. So I'd be wary of their advice for anything you need to bet your life on.
Mentally, the google search box has a very different contract than a textbox to communicate with support staff, the user generally gets immediate feedback and understands their data is being sent as they type.
VPN -> TOR = DANGER,
TOR -> VPN = PROBABLY_OK
You should probably make the 'Lahana is not super secure' really BIG and BOLD for the reader so they can understand their risk.If not, I think there is potential for a timing attack here?
if usr == _admin_usr && pw == _admin_pw { return RootMode, nil }
Perhaps there could be open whitelists where sites could nominate their sites as 'https only'. Wouldn't even need to be built into the browsers, could just be a thing people do when they launch a clean browser install, hit up https://blahsitelist.com and click a button that fires off https requests to all of those sites which would cache the HTST header? (I've only stumbled on HTST headers today, so I may be overly flamboyant as to their usefulness)
Although, come to think of it, isn't that just basically what the HttpsEverywhere extension does?
My understanding is that the HTST header would make this attack less useful. But it's still a concern if you used Private Browsing/Incognito. The initial request will still hit a 301 (vulnerable to interception by MITM). I've just verified this with Facebook.com on my machine (Chrome 26, OSX).
I think it's quite fair to expect a user using this kind of site is likely to use Incognito.
I'm actually kind of surprised as I thought Chrome had a standard list of sites that use https only such as Facebook. (Woah.. seems the preload list is TINY http://www.chromium.org/sts )
But the parent comment is still valid, there's nothing to stop Moxie registering another domain even note-crypt.com or notecrypt.org or anything like that and the average user will be complacent with that. (same applies for appspot, note-crypt.appspot.com vs notecrypt.appspot.com vs notecrypto.appspot.com)
It only takes a single lapse in checking the domain and they've lost their login details and encryption key to the attacker.
Point is, the JS crypto does not add anything to the situation. All the security is provided by SSL, and once it goes, the JS doesn't help. It just gives the users a fake sense of an additional layer of security, which is dangerous.
Moxie broke the current SSL usage, and therefore, he broke the JS crypto (as he controls the communication channel). He beat the current state of the challenge.
Not sure how valid that still is (as the talk is a couple of years old? I only watched it today), but it has to be assumed that a portion of users are going to fall for even a badly mimicked url.
Gotta say the IDN stuff is impressive in how generalised it could be. Terrifying. I'm convinced he's owed the $1,000.
They seemed to have a pretty manual system already up and running and were working on automating a lot of the churn, not sure how well that would translate to English markets, but I'd bet some companies would pay for it to save themselves hiring 'that social media guy/gal'.
I don't see much use in profanity filters on the net these days, but it is definitely useful for businesses working with external teams just to sanity check content before publishing :)
Wish more people understood this aspect of web scale! well said :)