1,879 karma · joined December 13, 2015
I think this is a decent analogy, but it works better the other way. If my neighbour offers to mow my lawn, I accept, and then he destroys the flower bed adjacent to the lawn, I will be upset, and I will have every right to complain about what he did. If he reacts by blithely dismissing my concern, then I certainly have the right (and arguably the obligation) to warn others that they should think twice about accepting his offers of gardening assistance.
Some expectations reasonably go without saying; "don't destroy my flower bed when mowing my lawn" is one, and IMO "don't destroy my data without a clear warning and a chance to back out" is another, though of course we might disagree about exactly where this does and doesn't apply.
What stops the company from being responsible regardless? They created this entity, it's running on servers they own or rent, and (in these cases) it's acting on their instructions.
If it's also conscious, then IMO that greatly broadens their moral responsibility, because now model welfare matters. But we're talking about their responsibility for the model's actions, and I don't see how this could be weakened by model consciousness, given all of the above. As for their legal responsibility, the models don't have legal personhood, so who else but the company could be responsible?
It gets more complicated when the person who sets the model in motion (i.e. prompts it) is a third party, but in cases of internal models committing cybercrime during testing, surely the locus of responsibility is obvious.
It's a pisstake, but (in the bits I read, and based on my own personal experience) the writing style is barely exaggerated, while the behaviour doesn't ring true at all.
> Genuinely, at that moment, I was trying to care for him and do a last ditch attempt to get a chance to give them all the credits that they deserve.
The allegation he is responding to, and which he does not seem to have disputed, is the following passage from Buckmaster's statement (https://cims.nyu.edu/~tristanb/statement.pdf):
> I said that if OpenAI released its result in the way proposed I would go public with what happened. The reply was, “Why would you ruin your career?” I replied that I am an academic, and asked why he thought going public would ruin my career. The reply was, “If you don’t want me to be nice, then I don’t have to be nice.”
I know semantic shift is inevitable, but can we put the brakes on this one at least a little? This doesn't even connect to the original meaning.
Personally, my worry about anonymous donation matching would be that the anonymous (to me) funder is influencing the recipient (to whom their identity is known), and without knowing who they are I can't know the nature of this influence or whether it should cause me to reconsider my support. But I don't see any extra reason to care about anonymous donation matching in particular, as distinct from any other funding whose source is opaque to me.
edit: actually, and this is just a tangential point, I don't think 'content' covers plays or other live experiences. It's usually screen-based, and the main possible exceptions are things that are almost interchangeable with their screen-mediated forms, like books or magazines.
When the criticisms relate to correctness bugs, I don't think 'try it out and see how you like it' is sufficient. I might love the syntax and the design and so on, but that doesn't tell me whether I'm going to run into serious bugs some time in the future.
(As for whether it's a good thing, I'm conflicted. It's cool to see more stuff like this, but if it crowds out the more intense passion projects, we lose something too.)
If reality has irreducible randomness (an open question afaik), and we're talking about theories and explanations (so we're not necessarily trying to describe the actual state of every particle in the universe, but only the rules governing their interactions), couldn't we have a complete, correct theory that was much smaller than the universe and contained terms for the random elements?
There would always be the possibility that it would turn out to be wrong, but it could be complete and correct, so it seems like the original claim must depend heavily on the word 'provable' and not on the impossibility of describing a system via a map smaller than the territory.
edit: but also, surely 'the territory is randomized' is a contingent physical fact, and not a necessary truth of information theory. Until we know for sure that there is irreducible randomness, we can't know that the information content of the universe (including the actual state of all particles at all times) isn't losslessly compressible, right?
Why couldn't the territory be losslessly compressible?
(Just kidding! I think it is simply an annoying affectation.)
Can you give some examples of predictions he got roughly right where this applies?
(Not a gotcha, I'm genuinely interested, because this is the key for me when thinking about whether to give credit for 'close' or 'right but early' predictions. If you're predicting things that most others have dismissed as impossible, or nobody has even thought of, then it's pretty impressive and interesting when you turn out be even roughly correct. (I'll still ding your credibility if you are overconfident about dates and details, but I'll do that while paying plenty of attention to what you say next.) If you're predicting things that are already suspected to be possible, though, and what makes you stand out is your confidence and your timelines, then I'm not going to be very interested when some of your predictions turn out to be fairly close to the truth.)
If he was often right-but-early about things that weren't even in the hypothesis space for everyone else, that would be huge, even though his dated predictions would technically be wrong. But this example seems way less exciting. Facial recognition was not a new or impossible-seeming idea, so the remarkable thing about his prediction was the part where he said "by 2009". (And yeah, 15 years is a short time compared to 2000 years, but 'recorded history of people making predictions' is not really a serious reference class for his predictions. He's a guy in the computer age making predictions about what computers will do.)
Obviously there's some hyperbole there, and I'm not really sure what serious point was being made, but it does seem to depend on the anti-bubble guy having some very confident and specific beliefs...
I dunno, I think this example kind of works in the opposite direction. If we're talking about memorising tables of logarithms or something, then yeah that was a complete waste of time. But a lot of the stuff kids would like to skip because calculators can do it is the absolute basics. IMO it is still important to have a solid grasp of arithmetic, useful to have enough trigonometry that you intuitively understand where it can be useful, and so on. (Much more so if you want to leave open the possibility of studying further mathematics.) And for people to whom these things don't come naturally, you really need to drill it a bit in order to develop the conceptual understanding.
I don't know exactly where this does and doesn't apply to programming/CS, though. I would like to think that a lot of the fundamentals will remain useful, but maybe that will only be true for a few specialised workers and self-motivated hobbyists.
Or are you perhaps defining true intelligence as that which computers do not have (yet)?
(Also, often they're trying to copy multiple things simultaneously, which means their goal is something a bit more complex and interesting than a pure ripoff. But I think their originality really is related to the ways in which they 'fail', or, in more positive terms, the ways in which their own individuality forces its way through.)
I don't think this is obvious at all. There's enough competition that this would at least arguably be a silly, self-destructive approach. And it's not like it's the only plausible explanation.
I guess they were not optimising for a satisfying solving experience! (I'm not sure what 'expansion' means in this context, but it sounds like maybe the 'expansion strategy' referred to in the paper involved padding out problems with red herring premises?)