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The 'in general' part is important: of course, you can trisect specific angles like a 90 degree angle.
(The construction of number field extensions is happening because let's say you construct a 90 degree angle, well that allows you to construct an isosceles triangle with equal sides length 1, and therefore you construct the square root of 2, so the extension Q(sqrt(2))
Those are the special points you are interested in when you want to distinguish between vertices and other points on the boundary.
But I would say as a mathematical process, pretty likely once you have the basic ingredients. Richard Dawkins has written some good popular science books like 'Climbing Mount Improbable' that talks about evolution in this light. His 'Selfish Gene' is also an excellent read. It is slightly more technical but definitely understandable without an immense technical background.
As you begin to do so, you can keep a record of them in a spreadsheet or notebook. Look up their biological classifications. All of a sudden the classification system will start to make sense, and help you understand the diversity of the organisms around you.
Biology is one of those subjects where part of the context comes from being outdoors and trying to understand ecological relationships yourself. You don't have to get to the level of a pro biologist, but there is so much you can find out by experiencing nature and trying to understand the basics that anyone can do it.
It's much easier to understand if we take an example. An example of a theory is the single sentence:
"There exists an X and there exists a Y such that X is not equal to Y."
(Of course typically in logic you would use logic symbols, but here I am writing out in an English sentence.)
Now, a model of this theory is the set {1,2}. Another model is the set {1,2,3}. More generally: any set with at least two elements is a model of that theory. The "function symbols" and "relation symbols" can be introduced in the language to talk about operations like addition and multiplication.
For example, the theory of groups uses the language of groups with a binary function symbol representing group multiplication. Any group (such as the integers with addition or invertible matrices with matrix multiplication) is a model of that theory.
So: theories are sets of axioms in some language, and models are sets together with actual functions/relations that satisfy those axioms.
Models of ZFC are a little bit counterintuitive. But they are single sets that interpret all the axioms of ZFC, rather than actual sets that we use in informal mathematics. Models of ZFC can be quite unusual because of the incompleteness theorem, and there are infinitely many models because of this (such as some in which CH is true, etc.).
CH is independent of ZFC, period, as proved by Cohen. Talking about 'semantic level' does not make sense.
CH is an example of the incompleteness of ZFC. There are models of ZFC in which CH is true and models in which CH is false.
Also, the incompleteness theorem doesn't say anything about the nonexistence of a model. It gives the existence of at least one sentence X (for sufficiently nice theories that include enough arithmetic) such that there ARE two models where X is true in one and false in the other.
The completeness theorem says simply: if T is a first-order theory (list of axioms in first-order logic), any sentence true in every model of T is provable by logical deduction in T.
The first incompleteness theorem says: if T is a consistent recursively enumerable theory that can contains a sufficient amount of Peano arithmetic, then there exists a sentence which is neither true in all models nor false in all models. In other words, there is a sentence which is true in at least one model of T, and false in another.
The second incompleteness theorem says that if T can interpret Peano arithmetic, then we cannot prove the consistency of T within T.
So a tl;dr:
-Completeness: any SENTENCE true in ALL models is PROVABLE - applies to all first order theories
-1st Incompleteness: there EXISTS sentences which are TRUE in some models, FALSE in others. - Applies to theories that contain enough arithmetic
-2nd Incompleteness: if a sufficiently strong system is CONSISTENT, we CANNOT PROVE that CONSISTENCY within the system.
NB: of course, if you have a sufficiently WEAK system, like the axioms of group theory together with "FOR ALL x FOR ALL y (x=y)", then that theory would be COMPLETE and Godel's incompleteness theorem does not apply here.
The upshot is twofold: (1) we have a rigorous foundation of mathematics in formal logic which CAN be used to prove nontrivial statements, as in the application of model theory to mathematics, and (2) we can now build proof assistants that allow us to use computers to better understand proofs.
Both applications of formal reasoning are equally interesting and have wide ramifications in mathematics.
1. Mathematicians often use relatively powerful systems, like reasoning in ZFC about Peano arithmetic. The consistency and completeness of axiomatic systems is what this article is about
2. Mathematicians pretty much exclusively use informal systems (compared to formal logic) for reasoning. The reason why that is is because it is just infeasible to reason typical mathematics using formal logic for most cases.
However, it's important to realize that these two are orthogonal.