Have you... ever tried talking to Microsoft support?
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I'm an IT consultant working for a private company in the Chicagoland area. My views are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of my employer. I have no financial interests in any major tech companies.
Have you... ever tried talking to Microsoft support?
But yeah, the lock-in effect is huge. Microsoft cloud products deliberately don't work well with anything but more of their own cloud products. And as soon as you start a migration to it based on what you need, you suddenly realize how much other stuff you also need to pay them for. And you can't escape without replacing all of it.
It remains really wild people think Office is worth $30/month/user. Anything that erodes that belief is a net positive.
In the past a long-lived EV certificate changing was notable/interesting from a security standpoint. Short-lived certificates just mean anyone who can break into your domain registrar (easy) can create an identical certificate and none of your key storage or security matters.
The CA/B is the embodiment of the phrase "if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail".
But every one of these plays with all sorts of collisions of user expectations. "word.cloud.microsoft" is one of those URLs that will never look right to me, but is now a corporate staple.
On the enterprise scale, the question I think everyone should be asking is: Do they have LTO tapes on a shelf? Fundamentally the same issue (but larger), in terms of needing to ensure it's physically separate, and secure, and tamper evident. =)
Anything in the cloud or connected to your network can be hacked. The backup of last resort must be on a shelf.
Just as a not-insignificant portion of the world still relies on a handful of ancient AS/400 systems, a pretty big portion of society depends on the good running of hand-configured Windows Server.
Larger organizations come with more specialization and greater resources, but you will never find a jack of all trades there.
The core problem with Flock is that it tracks innocent citizens on the off chance it helps catch a criminal, when it could be designed to only track already known wanted vehicles.
Bear in mind this is not meaningfully different than previous mechanisms of issuing BOLOs. Law enforcement widely distributes information about plates of interest. In my area, those plates are often on digital billboards already.
- You want to know this before water is on the floor.
- Sump pits tend to be splashy in heavy water flow.
- The float switch will correctly return to "it's fine" status when the problem is no longer occurring.
Liquid sensors are great for "my basement is flooding", float switches are great for "I need to fix my pumps before my basement floods.
And a key aspect that modern setups often forget: Every single different UI your users see makes them easier to phish. One of the reasons Entra is so easily phishable is Microsoft uses like 500 different domains for their cloud platform, so the one in the mix they don't actually own isn't obvious to the average user.
1. Finding out a company wants several grand to flip the "allow SAML" switch on the tenant config, and a few thousand a year in additional licensing to leave it on. (I had a vendor both tell me it "takes five minutes" to get it set up, and then quote me $4,800 to "implement" it.)
2. Having to yell at the SaaS vendor for routing the identity connection between two or three other identity providers in different various clouds because, you know "modern stuff". (A vendor I am working with has not less than five different accounts to access various parts of their infrastructure, none of which are connected at all. I assume people there listened to "switch to OIDC" nonsense, completed half the job, and now have OIDC sites and SAML sites forever.)
3. Discovering the SaaS vendor knows how Entra works, how Okta works, and how Google auth works, and having no idea how SAML works. Or OIDC or anything else for that matter.
4. Eventually finding an engineer far enough from the sales and implementation teams who can answer how the product actually works. :D This point is reached after a lot of yelling.
https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/428899... (Microsoft has solely discontinued this practice for the DoD tier. Commercial, GCC, and GCC High are still impacted because foreign labor is cheaper than the risk to your security.)
(Or to be more clear, it is mostly unacceptable for an enterprise product to have opinionated decisions about what authentication it works with. You either work with what we use or you are not viable as a product for our need. It's kinda simple. I would expect someone whose authentication was OIDC-based to be similarly dismissive if you told them you only would do SAML.)