2,183 karma · joined December 6, 2017
That is a huge claim to make with no evidence.
I researched what you said, and I have found no statement to that effect in their paper[0], on huggingface[1], twitter[2], WeChat[3], or in their news release[4].
They only mention as a footnote in only the Chinese version of their news release that they plan to reduce inference costs with the Ascend 950 supernode when it releases[5]. The only mention of Huawei in their paper is that they validated a technique to lower interconnect bandwidth on Ascend NPUs and Nvidia GPUs[6].
[0] https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Pro/blob/main...
[1] https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Pro
[2] https://xcancel.com/deepseek_ai/status/2047516922263285776
[3] https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/8bxXqS2R8Fx5-1TLDBiEDg
[4] https://api-docs.deepseek.com/news/news260424
[5] https://api-docs.deepseek.com/zh-cn/img/v4-price.png
[6] Page 16
Electrons themselves don't move at the speed of light, but information transfer (i.e. communication) via electrons does happen close to the speed of light.
A subtle, but important, distinction that's often misunderstood and means computational performance gains would probably come from bandwidth, not latency.
Looking around, SWE Rebench seems to have decent protection against training data leaks[1]. Kagi has one that is fully private[2]. One on HuggingFace that claims to be fully private[3]. SimpleBench[4]. HLE has a private test set apparently[5]. LiveBench[6]. Scale has some private benchmarks but not a lot of models tested[7]. vals.ai[8]. FrontierMath[9]. Terminal Bench Pro[10]. AA-Omniscience[11].
So I guess we do have some decent private benchmarks out there.
[0] https://arcprize.org/leaderboard
[1] https://swe-rebench.com/about
[2] https://help.kagi.com/kagi/ai/llm-benchmark.html
[3] https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard
[7] https://labs.scale.com/leaderboard
[9] https://epoch.ai/frontiermath/
[10] https://github.com/alibaba/terminal-bench-pro
[11] https://artificialanalysis.ai/articles/aa-omniscience-knowle...
I agree it's misleading for them to hyper-focus on one metric, but public benchmarks are far from the only thing that matters. I place more weight on Lmarena scores and private benchmarks.
[1] https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-to-use-the-new-linux-termi...
https://translate.google.com/translate?tl=en&hl=en&u=https:/...
Additional context:
https://grapheneos.social/deck/@GrapheneOS/11557599710445618... https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115583866253016416 https://grapheneos.social/@LaQuadrature@mamot.fr/11558177594... https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115589833471347871 https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115594002434998739
@dang or other mods, could you change it?
Google Translated text:
> Two articles in Le Parisien yesterday, followed today by one in Le Figaro, have launched a shameful attack against GrapheneOS, a free and accessible open-source operating system for phones. At La Quadrature du Net, it's one of the tools we favor and regularly recommend for protecting against advertising tracking and spyware.
> Echoing the propaganda of the Ministry of the Interior, newspapers describe GrapheneOS as a "crime-related phone solution," and a police officer adds that its use is suspicious in itself because it indicates an "intention to conceal." By portraying GrapheneOS as a technology linked to drug trafficking, this attack aims to criminalize what is actually a secure privacy-preserving tool.
> In these articles, the head of the cybercrime section of the Paris prosecutor's office – who was behind the arrest of Pavel Durov – also threatens the developers of GrapheneOS. In an interview, she warns that she will "not hesitate to prosecute the publishers if links are discovered with a criminal organization and they do not cooperate with the justice system." https://archive.is/20251119110251/https://www.leparisien.fr/...
> The government regularly tries to link privacy technologies, particularly encryption, to criminal behavior in order to undermine them and justify surveillance policies. This was the case in the so-called "December 8th" case, where a police narrative was constructed around the (secure) digital practices of the accused to portray a "clandestine" and "conspiratorial" group. https://www.laquadrature.net/2023/06/05/affaire-du-8-decembr...
> Now, drug trafficking is being used to attack these technologies and justify the surveillance of communications. The so-called "Drug Trafficking" law was thus used as a pretext to try to legalize "backdoors" in encrypted applications like Signal or WhatsApp, without success. https://www.laquadrature.net/2025/03/18/le-gouvernement-pret...
> An article in Le Monde diplomatique from November extensively examines the history of the political exploitation of drug trafficking to justify security and surveillance policies. The police attack on GrapheneOS fits perfectly within this pattern. https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2025/11/BONELLI/68915
> In its response published yesterday, GrapheneOS points to the authoritarian tendencies of the French government, one of the most fervent supporters of the "ChatControl" regulation under discussion at the European level, one of whose goals is to put an end to end-to-end encryption. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115575997104456188
Additional context:
https://grapheneos.social/deck/@GrapheneOS/11557599710445618...
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115583866253016416
https://grapheneos.social/@LaQuadrature@mamot.fr/11558177594...