So yes, banned in China (Hong Kong)
2,162 karma · joined November 14, 2012
So yes, banned in China (Hong Kong)
If it's any incentive, if the status page had any inkling that something was wrong, I'd be first on here posting "omg their status page is real".
”"”sauldcosta 4 days ago [-]
We use downdetector.com because status pages tend to take up to an hour or so to update, if they ever do. reply
jgrahamc 4 days ago [-]
1042 UTC First alert of global traffic problem 1057 UTC Internal group chat room up and running 1102 UTC Status page updated So, first alert to status page was 20 minutes.”””
In those 20m we had repeatedly checked your status page, realised it was our issue and started pulling engineers to deal with it as per procedure. People are on call, it's highly disruptive.
Surely you knew within those 20m that something was up?
In the end we realised it wasn't our issue because we checked Twitter.
Edit - added quotes
Also don't get me wrong, you do a great service. It's just a pet peeve that it seems invariably status pages are a lie.
For example, Amgen reporting that of landmark cancer papers they reviewed, 47 of the 53 could not be replicated [1]. I would have assumed that most of them didn't involve 'machine learning'
[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-science-cancer/in-cancer-...
1) The source of the data is cleanup on beaches, not ocean trash. If anything it's more likely to be representative of items discarded on beaches or waterways.
2) Cigarette butts are greatest purely in number of individual pieces, not in terms of weight or volume.
The following paper reports fishing nets to be the largest contributor to ocean plastic (by volume). Cigarette butts aren't even worthy of a mention in their report (see Supplementary Table 4 which lists the top 5 items per item size group).
PCCW the main local telco uses Hong Kong ID numbers as passwords by default, or at least they used to do so. This means that this database contains usernames and passwords in cleartext for a significant number of users who have never changed their accounts.
Source: I worked in a related field for five years, and evaluated a lot of technologies from major players.
There's going to be so many ways to game this system when it gains wider adoption, it's going to be insane.
Source: I used to have direct access to such an API
The guidelines are not enforced or audited.
By your webserver analogy, the equivalent would be more akin to google publishing the contact details and search queries of anyone using the service.
"FirstName LastName wants to obtain your location..."
Also betting that you can put 160 characters into those fields, so effectively a blank SMS is received
Betting further still that you can just spoof the SMS reply
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo06...
"To extend that to adults, The Guardian journalist Ben Goldacre showed recently that someone needs possession of another person's mobile phone for only a couple of minutes to appear to give the consent required under mobile phone companies' current procedures. The person he was tracking never got any of the warning messages that were meant to have been sent to her. Even more scarily, a hacker's website has recently published information telling how to spoof consent without even having to have temporary possession of the target's phone; all that is needed is the number. If someone has a person's number, he can track them. It is not a problem. I know where the website is, but I am not going to tell Members. It is possible to track people just through their phone numbers."
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/feb/01/news.g2
A few points to note:
* Obtaining consent is entirely left to the provider to implement. It does not appear to have any auditing. A provider can query any number they like.
* The opt-in process used by many providers is easy to exploit, by spoofing SMS replies or abusing the SMS template so that the surveillance target does not get notified
* The providers have are well aware of the potential to exploit this and have been for some time. It has never been resolved in over 10 years.
This news article was about a year later than the original once, from what I remember. It misses the part that you can replace the name and spoof the SMS though. The SMS quoted in the article does demonstrate the vulnerabilities mentioned though
"Ben Goldacre has requested to add you to their Buddy List! To accept, simply reply to this message with 'LOCATE'"
Interesting to re-discover this now, I had no idea who Ben Goldacre was at the time.
If you find services still vulnerable, let me know. I'm still friends with the journalist who initially spoke to Vodafone before publishing in the first place. I remember them not being too pleased, but as I say, it never got fixed.