jerheinze

What issues exactly? Tor Browser = Firefox ESR + some patches + some other stuff and tweaks. Before the release of the next ESR TB devs rebase and submit these patches to mainline Firefox, that's why you have prefs like privacy.resistFingerprinting and privacy.firstparty.isolate in mainline Firefox, see: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Tor_Uplift

See the full list of bugs of breakage when privacy.firstparty.isolate is enabled: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/FirstPartyIsolation#First_...

So running an exit at home to coverup for posting on a forum that bans all Tor exits, that makes no sense.

They're identical now, I rarely got the awful one that you're talking about when searching on Google.

1. You can hide the fact that you're using Tor by using pluggable transports which are already built-in the Tor Browser (such as meek-azure, obfs4, snowflake, ...).

2. That's the biggest reason as to why one must use Tor as much as possible even if they don't care about privacy. More people using Tor = the less interesting it is to be a Tor user.

Detecting WhatsApp usage is trivial. With Tor you can use pluggable transports to obfuscate your traffic.

I think you're misunderstanding something here, with onion services traffic is e2e encrypted and self-authenticated, as Matt explains:

> When you connect to an onion service, how do you know no one is MitM'ing you? Easy. It's impossible. The bad guy would have to be in your browser (more accurately: between the browser part of Tor Browser and the Tor process it runs in the background) or between the Tor process the onion service operator is running and the webserver it's pointing at. If you assume your Tor Browser hasn't been compromised, and you assume the onion service is being run intelligently, then a MitM attack is impossible. (And if the onion service isn't being run intelligently, can you really trust its operator to do HTTPS intelligently?) > > https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/dont-https-your-o44SnkW2.html

(Also check the new relay guide: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide)

What are your frustrations with the Tor Browser?

That's not the case, even with a SecureDrop setup, a Gov can compromise your SecureDrop machine and listen directly.

Yes, the guy running the exit node can read the bytes that come in and out there. Tor anonymizes the origin of your traffic, and it makes sure to encrypt everything inside the Tor network, but it does not magically encrypt all traffic throughout the Internet.

This is why you should always use end-to-end encryption such as SSL for sensitive Internet connections.

```

Fortunately HTTPS adoption is much better now :)

Completely separate.

Not the case since meek-google was discontinued long ago, meek-amazon and meek-azure don't rely on Google as a front. It does affect however Moat and Snowflake, all of them are still only available in the alpha releases.

The Github page has one: https://github.com/ricochet-im/ricochet/

> As far as I can see currently the only widely used, secure protocols are Matrix and XMPP with OMEMO.

secure != metadata free