> Without HTTPS, you are relying entirely on the transport for assurance of who you are talking to.
That's not the case, even with a SecureDrop setup, a Gov can compromise your SecureDrop machine and listen directly.
That's not the case, even with a SecureDrop setup, a Gov can compromise your SecureDrop machine and listen directly.
I can set up multiple canaries that they will have to pop and the fingerprint of one of those canaries is going to change or drop off the net.
I think you're misunderstanding something here, with onion services traffic is e2e encrypted and self-authenticated, as Matt explains:
> When you connect to an onion service, how do you know no one is MitM'ing you? Easy. It's impossible. The bad guy would have to be in your browser (more accurately: between the browser part of Tor Browser and the Tor process it runs in the background) or between the Tor process the onion service operator is running and the webserver it's pointing at. If you assume your Tor Browser hasn't been compromised, and you assume the onion service is being run intelligently, then a MitM attack is impossible. (And if the onion service isn't being run intelligently, can you really trust its operator to do HTTPS intelligently?) > > https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/dont-https-your-o44SnkW2.html
My point is that is a single point of success. Any other web service I would cut some slack. In the case of Tor, it is marketed as a means by which dissidents may communicate safely. Putting peoples lives on a single point of success is not appropriate, especially when there are technical means to mitigate the risk.