It's not so much about any longstanding personal policy, but if your dog of 10+ years had just died recently, and you sat down to watch a movie to relax, you might not want the movie to feature a prominent animal death, for example.
721 karma · joined December 14, 2017
It's not so much about any longstanding personal policy, but if your dog of 10+ years had just died recently, and you sat down to watch a movie to relax, you might not want the movie to feature a prominent animal death, for example.
It's also great as a nutrition label for media of sorts; "is this movie appropriate for a small get together?" is a question that's often hard to answer without a service like this.
However, the issue this brings up about structs / types not explicitly declaring which interfaces they implement is a real and unaddressed problem, especially in large codebases. The only tool that I'm aware of that finds implementations is GoLand, at steep JetBrains prices.
Figuring out what type an API is asking for should not require reading every line of code in the package, and slows down every developer of large Go projects
"...‘(son’s name) moechtest du mit mir disneys die hexe und der zauberer anschauen auf amazon’ – ‘would you like to watch Disney’s witch and wizard with me on amazon’ on day 461"
If your phone is stolen, you can generate codes manually using a TOTP utility, or by restoring the backup to a new/old phone.
Every time I've messaged support for an account lock, 24 hours later I'm informed it was a false positive and the account is unlocked. Needless to say, this does not inspire confidence that my resources are going to be kept up and running past Kafkaesque fraud monitoring systems
You can only store keys that use the NIST P curves, which are not recommended for SSH, or any serious crypto. There are serious supicions that they were tampered with during design by NSA, and are listed in djb's https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ as unsafe. Using this program would force you to configure your server to accept keys using unsafe curves.
Both the "enemy action" and "operation failure" scenarios are much bigger risks than this article makes out to be. Every non-aligned nation-state offensive cyber team has a knockout of us-east-1 at the top of their desired capabilities. I'm sure efforts range from recruiting Amazon employees to preparing physical sabotage to hoarding 0days in the infrastructure. There's no reason to think one of them wouldnt rock the boat if geopolitics dictated.
Operational failure is probably the most likely. AWS might have a decade of experience building resilience, but some events happen on longer timescales. A bug that silently corrupts data before checksums and duplication and doesn't get noticed until almost every customer is borked, a vendor gives bad ECC ram that fails after 6 months in the field and is already deployed to 10,000 servers, etc. Networking is hard and an extended outage on the order of a week isn't completely impossible. How many customer systems can survive a week of downtime? How many customer businesses can?
For comparison, mullvad accounts have no separate identification and authentication. Each account is a 16 digit number, and knowledge of that number allows you to administer the entire account. Usernames and passwords don't exist
What would be the result of 'curl'ing back a few random hashes as positives from the database? Do I expect to be handcuffed and searched until it's sorted out? What if my app decides to do this to users? A malicious CSRF request even?
This won't let you sign into Google apps anymore, but most major apps work fine after a reboot.
My only complaint is that there is no good alternative to authentication other than using Google for small deployments like this. I don't want to pay an auth provider, and none of them offer a simplified plan for 3-4 users.
A "g-free" phone can get location, but it's purposely hampered.