enord

He mentions that a: autists are dumber (i.e. do not express some or most of the markers for high intelligence) but posess the genetic markers, and b: the expression of intelligence markers of siblings/parents/higher-order relatives of autists (specifically) is understudied and recommends it for further study. [As far as I read it anyway]

I do believe that the "imbalance"-hypothesis he presents is a bit vague and proposes several imbalances according to different (and possibly orthogonal) models for intelligence, making it seem a bit unfalsifiable to me. Who knows. Behavioral neuroscience based on MRI(or similar modalities) is a giant sandcastle anyway, best not stack those results too high.

Do you identify as atheist? Is the distinction important to you? Grouping different religious views together with atheism under the same category is useful when discussing people and their beliefs. Arguing the semantics of wether Atheism is a "belief" or "faith" (or some nicer, more certain-sounding term) is in my experience unfruitful and most often besides the point. /nitpick

Actually, I assume abstraction not emergentism but my assumptions are beside the point. My point is that quantum weirdness is not observed on scales that are not quantum-sized and quantum-whatever is therefore a poor candidate for analogous reasoning. In addition, the gap between the physical components (I do assume physicalism) of the brain and the properties of the mind is so far removed from the quantum-sized(weird) phenomena of quantum physics that some reconciliation(read: major breakthrough) must happen in the field of physics before quantum physics becomes a viable scalpel with which we can try to dissect the mind-brain problem.

I agree that emergence-flavoured theories of consciousness are essentially woo woo, or non-explanations. I am therefore not very exited about massive statistical simulations trying to achieve intelligence, because even if Watson were to become self aware after stuffing it with even more megahertz, we would just have another "brain" on our hands and we will have nothing but the turing test to discern its "brain-ness". That is to say - I am exited, because Watson is really cool and useful, but not exited about what neural nets, genetic algorithms or statistical data analysis will tell us about consciousness.

I'll chime in with this conceptual map of the article (as far as i read it anyway):

Perception->Visual perception->Ontology of visual perception and consciousness->Quantum physics->No.

edit: Actually, when i think about it, there's something analogous to Goodwin's law in papers/articles about the mind and consciousness. Whenever quantum physics becomes a topic the whole article just unravels into nonsense. This is of course obvious to anyone who've studied the physical properties of the mind (We don't even understand how whole braincells work together to form mental phenomena and conscious thought, so anything on a sub-atomic level is just out on a bike-ride (Norwegian idiom, sorry)).

They are arrows. Arrows and objects are the primitives of category theory, just like sets and set membership are the primitives of set theories (well most of them anyway).

A category that captures the notion of sets and maps can be described in terms of arrows, objects and some semantic rules about which arrows (here interpreted as maps) connect which objects (here interpreted as sets).

Wiki on the "Category of sets [and maps]" -> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_of_sets

Other rules about arrows between objects describe categories that capture other mathematical concepts.

This is a top-down approach starting with CT fundamentals and connecting them to CS concepts/patterns after 150 slides.

The air is thinner near the top of the abstraction ladder and more or less unbreathable for people who don't spend considerable time in the Ivory Tower.

Also regarding duality - just because there is a proof of duality between designs it does not follow that they design the same thing at all.

Classic example from CT: In sets (well, the category of sets and maps but still...), the cartesian product is dual to the disjoint union (sum type, variant record etc.) From this, anything proven about cartesian products (which is a lot, as it is fundamental to most of set-theory) proves something about the disjoint union through the duality. What it actually proves about disjouint unions is open to interpretation on a proof by proof basis.

Which is to say: The consequences of duality are rich and powerful, but they are often non-obvious and for systems with many moving parts almost certainly non-trivial.

I get really defensive when my intelligence is on the line. I read this entire article with a combination of pretend aloofness and childlike fear of getting gotten by the gotcha-questions. Apparently, my ego plays into my dysrationalia (for better or worse).

Was going to point this out as well. For a moment I almost resigned myself to be among the 80%, luckily I found a way to smug myself out of self-perceived mediocrity.

This is Very Basic Stuff(tm). I wonder if the same topic would receive similar attention in, say, Java.

Apparently you can record video with your iPhone 6 while on a bike so Apple clearly have different use-cases in mind.

What's with the resentment towards psychology on YC?[Insert Freudian joke here]

Rule (-30): "Good work speaks for itself."

Relax, you're probably a genius.

The article built the point that worshiping individual genius was counterproductive for the majority (non-genius) practitioners of math and science. The last sentence was would not pass as a dictionary entry on "genius" for sure, but that was not the point either. It was a rethorical device. Too bad i chose to start this post with such a piece of pithy nonsense.

You criticize the author for making unfounded assumptions about the nature of cognitive processes and follow up with your own equally unfounded assumption about the nature of cognitive processes. I do agree with you, but it is still bad form.

How is Bayesianism not a form of behaviorism? The essay devotes a paragraph to explain this point allthough Deutsch assumes the reader is familiar with behaviorism and probabilistic methods used i AI.

"If the goal of social development was to enable us to work maximally, we should go crazy.

The goal is to free people to create maximally. Dance, paint, sing. Whatever you want."

-Ernst Wigforss Swedish finance minister 1925-1926, 1936-1949.

There is nothing higher* about the moral ground. It usualy degenerates civil conversation to people taking mountains offense and guilt-by-association attacks.

*'Higher' in this case interpreted as "more positive" or "more virtious".