Are those not based on standard ARM cores or ARM documentation on its cores not deep enough for your purpose?
3,042 karma · joined June 21, 2011
Contact me at bruno@rohee.com
Are those not based on standard ARM cores or ARM documentation on its cores not deep enough for your purpose?
He also has dedicated entries on two very special case, the engine running within pdflatex https://blog.mathieuacher.com/TeXCCChessEngine/ and the one in Brainfuck https://blog.mathieuacher.com/BFChessChessEngineBrainfuck/ which are seemingly the first of their kind.
Maybe it could even be practical to run it on browser in parallel to video streaming on a free video site...
The crimes were relatively benign but Grok going the Silkroad way would be on brand...
Synfuel made just from air and electricity is doable (both water and carbon dioxyde can be extracted from the atmosphere). And with 10% of what's spend on IA we'd be way out of the lab...
Thankfully there are military budgets (synfuel makes sense on a nuclear carrier)
I'm afraid it means clearing all caches at each context switch. The performance penalty is really high.
Your version is likely good enough in practice though.
And then you'd need assurance that the Verilog is faithfully transcribed in the silicon, which is a can of worms in itself.
The one covering side channels is pretty honest:
Information side-channels: this assumption applies to the confidentiality proof only and is not present for functional correctness or integrity. The assumption is that the binary-level model of the hardware captures all relevant information channels. We know this not to be the case. This is not a problem for the validity of the confidentiality proof, but means that its conclusion (that secrets do not leak) holds only for the channels visible in the model. This is a standard situation in information flow proofs: they can never be absolute. As mentioned above, in practice the proof covers all in-kernel storage channels but does not cover timing channels.
So the proof won't be invalidated at it does not cover that particular threat.
Now the question is how useful the is a proof not covering side channels? I'd say pretty useful and it doesn't mean they don't have counter measures for to counter their exploitation, nor that they are not effective, just that a proof of efficiency is out of reach for now.
He took the morphine.
On another note, I had respect for Aeon as a publication, and now I got a lot less.
So much is tied to DNS and particularly email...