455 karma · joined December 12, 2017
A more relevant example is if futures are trading rich relative to bonds - say they are too expensive by 1/32th (about 0.03%). In this case you buy the bonds on repo and sell futures against them, expecting to profit when the price gap closes. Of course, 0.03% is not much profit, so you use 50x leverage (which you can easily do on repo, because it is secured borrowing) turning it into a 1.5% profit.
But even in this case the fund only holds stocks (no bonds or real estate) and only US stocks at that (no international or emerging market exposure).
The bigger problem is that most passive investments are not really passive - for example, choosing to invest in a "passive" S&P 500 ETF over a "passive" Russell 2000 ETF is an "active" investment choice (preferring large cap over small cap) so valuation errors and bubbles could develop in segments of the market, even if constituents with an index are all fairly valued relative to one another. These valuation errors could sustain for a long period of time, because it takes much more money to correct a valuation error in a huge market segment than it takes to correct a valuation error in an individual stock.
1. Baum and Simons started by using a momentum strategy to trade currencies, years before this was commonly done (it had been used to trade commodities for decades, but was only later applied to financial assets)
2. As well as momentum, they used a rudimentary value strategy ("a variety of line trading in which you sell or buy a currency according to whether it is to far above or below its line" and "I try to buy cheap and sell expensive")
3. At least according to this document, they don't seem to have engaged in carry trading (taking advantage of interest differentials in different currencies)
4. They at least considered the impact of macroeconomic variables, albeit in a somewhat ad-hoc and non-systematic way.
Despite starting out with a momentum strategy, Baum didn't seem to subscribe to the most common paraphrase of momentum trading, which is to "cut your losses short and let your winners run on", as evidenced by his statements that "I will hold positions both losing and winning for a very long time" and "I hate to sell in a falling market" and "I am courageous in losing positions holding on and sometimes enlarging them". I would characterize him as more of a value trader than a momentum trader.
It was only realized decades later (in the 1990s and early 2000s) that value and momentum strategies were particularly powerful in combination, and this only became part of the academic record in 2013 or so.
You can argue about the exact selection of people. You can say that Time is 'politicised'. But this is clearly a list of people who are very well known.
It's not embarrassing to admit that you had a blind spot about a particular author, musician or politician. But it is a bit silly to then go on to claim that since you haven't heard about them, they can't be that famous after all.
So it seems fair to say that she is one of the most famous writers in the world. That you haven't heard of her probably says more about you than it does about her.
> One should buy stock when it is undervalued. What I have always wondered about is how much stock one should buy. A few months ago I stumbled upon the answer which is given by the Kelly criterion.
But the rest of the post analyses a mathematical game which has nothing to do with buying stocks, and is in fact only useful in theoretical situations where you know the precise distribution of outcomes.
The paper explicitly addresses the point that large-scale systematic collection of public records may be indicative of the kind of fund that outperforms, rather than an indication that the public records add alpha in and of themselves - it's in the abstract
> The effect is not due to differences in fund type as the results hold within-fund.
I think you need a more convincing argument than just saying "There are a great number of additional factors at play" and "Trying to link public information to an increase in performance is far fetched".
There is a large amount of public information about a company, and the source of edge in quantitative trading is
- Identifying what kind of information is likely to move prices
- Acquiring and processing the information as quickly and efficiently as possible
- Making good forecasts
- Combining the forecasts with a model for risk, financing and trading costs to form a portfolio with a high likelihood of positive returns
These are not trivial tasks. The third and fourth bullets are where traditional quant finance (what you read about in textbooks) has focused, and the difficulty of forecasting and portfolio construction should not be underestimated, but increasingly what differentiates a good from a merely average quant investment process is a relentless focus on uncovering and processing new information.In the past it was enough to use highly structured, numerical data (market prices and volumes, accounting data, analyst forecasts) but the profit available from these sources has been diminishing, and the most important sources of information for forecasting stock prices are unstructured and non-numerical (e.g. text, speech, images).
Renaissance is a leader in its field, and has been for decades. It is perfectly possible for them to have produced the returns that they have, without using insider information.