6 karma · joined February 11, 2017
> That makes mathematics just a subdivision in philosophy, in which statements about statements must be (axiomatically) derived exclusively from a completely explicit starting point.
The main problem with philosophy is exactly the reason which makes above wrong. A global definition of 'contradiction' is not possible, Nor is even something that resembles a consensus to a sufficiently strong degree to make it meaningful.
This is precisely the reason why you can have radically opposing schools of thought that are simultaneously existing. The trivial example being mathematical empiricism or coherentism, both of which directly oppose the axiomatic approach you've provided, from different angles.
A more absurd example is to say it's never the case that all philosophers would agree "P and not P" is not true (including the sentence itself), let alone it being false (i.e. negation as failure), because the value of "P and not P" is dependent upon your theory of truth and no global theory of truth exist without G.E. Moorean appeals to common-sense.
Well, the regular formulation of "Infinitism" is that S is justified to believe P_1 on the basis of P_2 and P_n on the basis of P_n+1. J({regressive, axiomatic}) just defines a limit i.e. S is justified to believe P_1 on the basis of P_2 and P_n on the basis of P_n+1 such that lim_(k->infinity) P_k = P_x where x is not a natural number. You have to say x is not a natural number, because if it were, J's output would have been "foundationalism" and P_x then would be a "self-evident" belief - to use Chisolm's terminology.
P.S. If anyone thinks that this is an abuse of mathematics, I agree. But, its usage is compatible with that of philosophers e.g. Goldman's Causal theory of knowledge literally uses a recursive formulation of belief formation where the base case is "self-evident", I just unwrapped the tail call and wrote it as a loop!
Let the mapping J: powerset(M) -> <schools-of-thought-in-meta-epistemology> to map some subset of M to a theory of justification such that the believers in said theory only find usage of some combination of the said subset to be "acceptable".
Then:
J({}) is in {Skepticism}
J({circular}) is in {Coherentism}
J({axiomatic}) is in {Foundationalism}
J({regressive}) is in {Infinitism}
J({axiomatic, circular}) is in {Foundherentism}
J(M) is in {Quietism}
Is there an x where x is in the powerset of M, such that J(x) is {}? Or literally every possible position can be the foundation of a philosophical paper?