angusmacphail

I think this is a tonic in contrast to the current hype, if a bit over-bitter. The larger problem that blockchain addresses, though, is, as quantdev alludes, is a way for actors outside of a firm to collaborate at scales previously only available to governments and (for some value of large) large firms.

In the parking car example, for instance, it is true that implementing a system to do that requires only RFID and servers. This means that at one time it was only plausible for Interstate System to use them, with the technology cheapening to the point that parking garage operators install them. Blockchain steps this down the next level allowing everyone using the system to also own the system.

| if you'd like to know about the history of the technical ability of spies ...

again, just not the point. This _essay's_ argument would be completely valid in the main, regardless of what technical ability exists _or is falsely claimed to exist_, because the problem is one of power politics, emergent properties of _homo_sapiens_ in 20th century-style bureaucracies, and the cultural history of western intelligence services.

And come on, maybe reconsider the assumption that your interlocutors haven't got the requisite historical background. If we're comparing bibliography size, you may find you come up short, given the number of FOIA-request documents from FBI and CIA I've been through in the past 15 years, not to mention secondary sources on intelligence outfits from around the world.

Here's a fun example of the organizational madness of the US's chief counterterrorism bureaucracy, the FBI. During the late 40's and 50's there was a fear that the Ruskies would target homosexuals in the State Department for blackmail. This lead to all sorts of purges and ugliness, but crucially, the only case of a homosexual's being suborned in this manner was one in which the FBI itself blackmailed a State Department employee to prove that it was a threat.

And doesn't it fit neatly that we're force-fed the narrative of Islamic extremism as public enemy number one... Poor religious radicals are the only foe our intelligence services are likely to outwit

The salient point in the Adam Curtis piece is that regardless of their _technical_ capabilities, the organizations are themselves incapable of making use of what signals they may capture. A similar case can easily be made about the US intelligence establishment, for what it's worth.

I've turned down so many, and quit the only job in the space I ever had after 3 months. Bad products and bad people.

take a look at http://www.comparably.com -- early days but they do anonymous candidate/company job matching

Thanks! I must have missed that one last year, but I've thought a project like this should exist for years. I'd be willing to contribute to an indiegogo campaign to support this.