731 karma · joined June 6, 2020
EDIT: source: https://saaramar.github.io/IOMobileFrameBuffer_LPE_POC/
You're entitled to your opinion and so do they. I don't really see how there's basis for bad faith accusations. Their stance and actions seems reasonable and consistent, even if other people would have acted differently.
I get the activism aspect and I agree that copyright laws are outdated, but how entitled do you need to be to expect preferential treatment because of your political beliefs? If you're in a foreign country and hasn't settled yet, just create a fake persona and disassociate from controversial activities.
World problems are here to stay, they'll still be around for you to solve once you get a citizenship.
Btw, what is organisation meant to do in this situation? Sue the person they believe is infringing on their rights without regard to humanity? Ignore the issue altogether?
Some had certain variables hardcoded, e.g. Administrator user's name and their exploits worked with higher success rate in anglosphere, but failed in localized environments. Others had more advanced exploits which queried parameters instead of assuming them - those where more successful around the globe.
Another nuance missing from popular press is that most groups in China (and Russia) are operating independently, but share tradecraft among them and occasionally engage with politicized missions (either working on explicit orders from government handlers or simply defending their beliefs hacktivist-style). This is what FireEye means by "affiliation with Chinese government", NOT "operates strictly on government orders".
It should be great for debugging random server problems while on vacation though.
I'm not advocating for installing a fresh OS on an exploited hardware and calling it a day, no matter how hard you try to present my words this way.
The point is to keep any single environment around only for a short period of time so that adversaries don't have enough time for replicating your systems and crafting a targeted exploit chain.
It is not meant to be the only line of defense. You would still harden every system you own, putting particular focus on tamper & intrusion detection (including retrospective analysis).
Couple that with strong compartmentalization (e.g. using different hardware for different purposes, Qubes OS style virtualization approaches) and defense in depth (exploit mitigations, traffic anonymization).
Here, I have spelled it out for you. Feel free to outline how you would approach attacking such individual adversary, even with NSA level team at your disposal. Silent assumptions being that 1) if person's physical location is known, CIA is a cheaper option than NSA and 2) failed offensive operation leaving attributable evidence is considered by NSA worse than missed opportunity.
Please, stop low effort ad hominem attacks.
The threat modeling that you see in this thread is laughable. Nobody has infinite resources, not even NSA. They can't throw all their capability at you alone. In fact they are not even interested in any one individual. They might be interested in some groups of people like "terrorist leadership" but even in that case they don't have the need to hack all people matching that group. So at every step of the decision making process there is a cost benefit analysis. And in the end NSA will only hack some terrorist leaders, the ones deemed sufficiently significant but not any more risky then is necessary.
The amount of meetings and paperwork required for carrying out offensive action is significant and everyone involved is very risk averse. Getting superiors to sign up for an operation against an individual capable of detecting attack and thus risking attribution would only be possible if the proposed techniques can be shown to be extraordinarily stealthy. That requires replicating the system in the lab and rigorously testing methodology beforehand.
Yeah, it is hard to protect organizations from nation states. Because all sufficiently complex systems have bugs and given long enough time persistent attackers will find & exploit these bugs. But that's because organizations have other real-world priorities besides fighting NSA. These organizations can't change protocols overnight and replace core systems just for fun of it.
Individuals actually have an advantage here because they can rotate systems at will and have much higher control over their personal lives than any CEO/CTO/CISO has over their organization. As a result, yes you can raise the cost of an attack against you high enough that NSA won't bother hacking you - either because there are other people who are less protected but hacking them would fulfill the same objective or because your ass gets handed to another agency which is able to present more cost-effective solution.
Your link demonstrates this dichotomy between options that NSA has available for hacking organizations vs individuals. Individuals rarely have well documented procurement processes available for third party auditing you know.
This principle isn't scalable to every computer system out there and will definitely go against other requirements in most organizations, but if you are an individual, it's not hard to pull it off.