154 karma · joined June 20, 2012
IOTA has an absolutely unprofessional development team, doing things like saying critical security vulnerabilities are there on purpose so they can point it out when someone forks or saying that the network being unusable due to a DOS attack is fine because they can use it for testing. Don't forget the time they turned off the network for 2 days without any prior notice (yes, they can do that). I'm all for new technology, but Bitcoin is 9 year old proven technology at this point, while IOTA and RaiBlocks are both new and unproven. Let them mature a bit before suggesting people rely on them. Would be quite bad if someone turned off IOTA when you need your money, wouldn't it?
I have kind of mixed feelings about removing ASIC boost. I do feel it is everyones right to innovate and get an advantage, then patent that advantage. It takes money to do that R&D, so it should be protected. Others can do so as well, or operate from countries where these patents are not respected. On the other hand, others have so far been unable to get their own advantages, so maybe it is time to hardfork (yes, hardfork, SegWit does not fix it, not until > 90% of transactions are using SegWit) to prevent getting this advantage.
As for developers removing the malleability fix (SegWit) to break the LN, that is just a plain lie. First, SegWit was removed because it is just an hack that can be achieved in much better ways. SegWit is such technical debt because it did in a soft fork what should have been done in a hard fork. Second, you can see on the development mailing list that fixing it has been discussed well, and a fix for third party malleability is actually already active. You can also see that nobody is against 2nd layer systems like Lightning Network, and it will be supported if and when it is actually useful.
The EDA that was in place in the first 3 months was indeed a big mistake and has since been replaced with a well performing fast acting DAA, but it is not the reason people push for 0-conf. 0-conf was a pretty well used and working feature of BTC before the blocks first became full. It is only logical to use it again on a chain that does not intend to let its blocks become full.
Back then I needed a key for Warcraft III, which just came out, so I tried some keygen I found on the net, without any antivirus. When the keygen did not work I knew something was wrong, so I checked for suspicious network traffic and saw some IRC connection, quickly found the process responsible for causing the traffic and fired up a disassembler. After UPX unpacking I had the assembler code to the program and was able to determine the IRC server, the bot password (they didn't use password hashes or hostmasks back then) and I got a command reference for the specific bot (SDBOT). I joined the channel disguised as one of the bots, logged in and sent the remove command. This kills the botnet. The bot herder was pissed, but I started talking to him and I got interested in malware to get CD keys, which I couldn't afford at the time.
I started modifying SDBOT for my usage, writing scanners and fixing bugs in the IRC connection code. After I while I felt limited by the codebase and started my own called Agobot. Agobot quickly grew into one of the most capable trojans at the time, with thousands of variants. I also quickly got a team of at peak ~15 people together who helped with testing and coding. Coding was mostly done by me and at most 3 other coders. We were having really cool stuff, like wormride which was a tool to make other malware/worms spread Agobot instead of itself. It also contained an exploit that I wrote for the LSASS hole that Sasser used only a few days after the advisory. My LSASS exploit did not crash the target, which let it spread a few days without being noticed. ISC noticed it after a while and raised the threat level to orange.
There was also a variant of the bot that used the waste network to communicate and the gnutella network to find themselves. It made the DHS shit their pants and release an advisory :)
First I hosted the bots on public IRC, but after being detected very quickly I got to talk with some IRC opers that offered me a private server to run the botnet in exchange for usage rights. These were powerful servers, holding around 50k bots at peak. Basically this all got busted by the FBI, which caused the Foonet/CIT shutdown. For more infos, check these URLs:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/08/27/ddos_mafia_busted/
http://regmedia.co.uk/2008/10/03/03116720232.pdf
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9411
http://www.techimo.com/forum/imo-community/100728-your-isp-n...
Anyway, they caught me because I accidentally let a bot start a short scan from the linux host where we hosted the SVN repository and IRC. The company running the datacenter detected the scan and decided to investigate the server (illegaly) and found all the stuff (I didn't even think about encrypting all that). I got 2 years probation for this as well as hacking Valve Software.
Hers some more info:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agobot
http://www.honeynet.org/node/55
http://www.infectionvectors.com/vectors/kitchensink.htm
http://web.archive.org/web/20070423182932/http://www.lurhq.c...