The blog-post argues against Wall Street analysts' behavior, but misapplies "Friedman Doctrine" as a label for it. Friedman didn't specify a time-frame because it's
the life-time of the corporation. He mentions "long run interest" and alludes to future shareholders:
> And, whether he wants to or not, can he get away with spending his stockholders, customers’ or employes’ money? Will not the stockholders fire him? (Either the present ones or those who take over when his actions in the name of social responsibility have reduced the corporation's profits and the price of its stock.)
FWIW, I think the actual essay could appeal to folks who are skeptical of big-company CEOs because it (a) suggests that governments should stop incentivizing them to influence society and (b) implies that governments should tax directly to fund these social aims rather than asking CEOs to spend company money on them.