> Because voting softwares don't solve any real problem while creating a horde of its own
It solves some problems that have been introduced over time in most election systems. Primarily, time to count/verify, ease of access and verifiability. To say that paper doesn't have these problems shows a lack of understanding or a willful intent to mislead. The boxes of uncounted votes from the Bush/Gore election (https://www.theacru.org/horace_cooper_bush_v_gore_redux/) were a watershed moment that could have affected change beyond the locality.
> Paper ballot is a perfect technology once you introduce optical readers, and when in doubt, you can always re-count everything again.
There are weaknesses with transport or tampering the same as any mechanical recording or electronic recording.
It's important to narrow the intent of a typical modern voting system, with "should haves" rather than hand waving away useful tools.
* Votes should have only been counted from voting membership (registered voters, for example).
* The intent (choices)/member information should have confidence that this data is opaque to inspection without a private/public key respectively. Yes, voters would have to generate their own, as that's an attack vector.
* A voting member should have the ability to track that the vote was counted at all in a given race via a reversible process, which would necessarily include the public and private key.
> You can't get that kind of transparency with voting software.
You can, but the US wont. It's an important distinction that is patently obvious.
Today, most vote tracking systems are electronic, although the ballot was paper. What's the point of half the process being paper? The US government is too inefficient, demotivated, and lacking the impetus to retrain the populace to make any system that is reliable.