LogonType10

Please don't be snarky and assume the weakest possible interpretation of what someone says (I already talked about faraday bags near residences and workplaces). Repeatedly calling another's argument delusional without substantive discussion isn't helpful and it's not what people use HN for.

https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

>You don’t think they can match location data with metadata and figure it out?

Automatically, with dragnet surveillance? Not a chance, the search space is too huge. But if you think it's so easy, feel free to try building this and selling it, you would become the next billionaire.

I'm not sure what point you're trying to make. Was this supposed to be a funny joke?

What did they do after the patriot act that they weren't doing before it?

Do you think US intelligence agencies were hindered whatsoever by their bad reputation?

>Your disconnects will flag it in the metadata.

This would make too many false positives, for which you'd have to do in person surveillance to verify.

>You don’t think they can identify phones in bulk collection? What evidence is there of that?

It doesn't matter if a cell tower can read your IMEI. It matters if that IMEI can be associated with your real name. Have you seen anyone's location data successfully correlated with a real identity when that location data doesn't include travel to residence or place of work? If you can solve this problem, you can sell it for more money than you could fathom.

My phone is in a faraday bag when it gets anywhere close to my home or place of work. Even if you were bulk collecting cell tower data and location data you couldn't identify my phone, it's lost in the noise.

America prosecutes American hackers who hack foreign nationals. This already gives them the moral high ground over their peers. See: Russian ransomware gangs that are de facto state sponsored. Cyberspace is a new frontier that wasn't built to conform to your sense of right and wrong.

>questionable but certainly to their advantage when the rest of the world didn't do

They would if they could.

GrapheneOS runs all open source software (no closed source Google code), doesn't phone home to Google, doesn't allow for targeted updates based on IMEI, has strong app memory isolation, and isn't vulnerable to run of the mill NSO zero days. Buy a Mint Mobile SIM card with cash and boom, anonymous phone not tied to your name.

What don't you like about it? I'd like to experience the drawbacks firsthand, but I don't have the hardware yet and Qubes can't be demoed in a VM.

I'm also planning to make the switch. Do you know anyone who's tried Qubes? The finicky hardware requirements are intimidating.

That's kind of the point, no? Limit your ability to buy only stablecoins with factual claims of backing.

I might be wrong about this but it seems like foreign cars are an exception to this trend, specifically Japanese cars sold in the United States. Do you know what factors might be at play here?

In essence, it's not theft because they can get away with it.

Sounds like you footgunned yourself. When starting Signal for the first time it gives the option to register OR migrate old account. There's no UI in the world that can totally protect users from themselves.

>jailed for not complying with the illegal requests of the surveillance state

From the wiki page:

>On March 15, 2005, Nacchio and six other former Qwest executives were sued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. They were accused of a $3 billion financial fraud between 1999 and 2002 and of benefiting from an inflated stock price.

Thanks for the IRC bot!

It seems like you think that red teaming and blue teaming works much like an RPG game where you can spend skill points on perks, but blue team perks (like tier 1 endpoint defense) cost more skill points than red team perks. I don't think this is an accurate mental model, and I'd rather frame it like this: exploits are secrets, and when you learn the secret, you can share it with others as well as develop the countermeasure to the exploit. If you spend a lot of money discovering a useful exploit it is by definition something nontrivial that is unlikely to be discovered by regular hackers unless it is leaked or discovered after careless usage. If you discover an exploit that an enemy will soon discover, it is to your advantage to publish the countermeasures to the exploit before your opponent discovers and weaponizes it.