1,650 karma · joined August 8, 2020
I can speak up about it. Others can too. We don’t have to live under these conditions.
If it’s a matter of the domain being “warmed up” then I basically have no chance. This is unfair.
If you value the privacy / integrity of other data then that also is more protected.
What happened here isn’t necessarily poor management of finances, instead they failed to grow the business and thus couldn’t attract more investors for a second round.
Can you be more specific? Is this something that could be done with non-root privileges and without explicit coordination? Like normal TCP sockets?
Can you cite where in the article it addresses the fact that the assembly snippet is not an apples to apples comparison with the C code?
> If you have a specific criticism to make
Pointing out that the assembly is not an apples to apples comparison with the C code is a specific criticism.
The C code contains no optimization annotations either, the compiler could be inlining the indirect benchmark and/or devirtualizing the indirect call itself.
In general you have a point but it’s a judgement call like many things in engineering. Even in the absence of specialized TLS hardware, TLS operations are so common, there is a strong case for pushing it in the kernel if that improves efficiency by a double digit percentage.
SSL_sendfile in particular is an efficiency boon for large static site hosts, it could result in significantly less hardware waste and/or reduced power consumption.
Even if long term he can bootstrap a proper userspace ecosystem of using /dev/*random, will the unification ever be possible if we have to support these old systems?
I am generally in favor of maintaining 100% userspace backward compatibility but in this case I would support changing the behavior since the old shell scripts were exploiting behavior that wasn’t documented and was always incorrect.
I don’t have to do this with a normal data link layer, that’s the entirety of the complaint.